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Overview and Executive Summary
The State Government initiated the review of the west coast rock lobster management
system in March 2002. The purpose of this review paper is to present the options for
managing the fishery and to compare the current fishing effort control system to a
more flexible one and to two types of individually transferable quota (ITQ)
management systems, one with the current effort controls and the other without or
with reduced1 effort controls.
The State Government does not have a preconceived idea as to what is the best
management system, rather it has an expectation that the review process will identify
the best long-term and strategic approach for managing the fishery to produce the best
socio-economic outcomes for the State, within an ecologically sustainable
development framework.
This report also includes an overview of the major findings of three specialist reports
prepared for the review that should be read in conjunction with it. The specialist
reports provide important detailed information on different aspects of the management
review:
•

•

•

Bio-Economic Modelling – Compares the economic benefits that can be
realised under different fishing effort and quota management systems. The
paper is titled A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the
West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, by Economic Research Associates, 2005.
Social Research – Presents the initial findings of research on the possible
social impacts of fishing effort and quota management systems, particularly on
small coastal communities. The paper is titled A Social Assessment of Coastal
Communities Hosting the Western Rock Lobster Fishing Fleet, by the Institute
for Regional Development, University of Western Australia, 2005.2
Quota Experience in Other Rock Lobster Fisheries – Describes the rock
lobster quota management experience in South Australia, Tasmania and New
Zealand. The paper is titled How do Quota Management Systems Work in
Rock Lobster Fisheries? The Experience in New Zealand, Tasmania and
South Australia, by Tim Bray, Steven Gill and Ron Edwards, Department of
Fisheries, 2005.

[This paper and the three associated reports listed above are available on the
Department of Fisheries’ web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au or the Western Rock
Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobsterwa.com and hard copies are available
by contacting the Department on (08) 9482 7267.]
Because of the very large amount of information that has been provided as
background for the management review, this overview has been included to help

1

The ITQ system without effort controls that was modelled for this review does not have uncontrolled
effort. It has been limited to a 20 per cent increase in the number of pots fishers can use because
experience in other ITQ lobster fisheries has shown that fishers do not use excessive numbers of pots,
when controls on pot numbers are removed.
2
This is a three-year project funded by the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation.
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focus readers’ attention on some of the most important issues that are discussed in
more detail in this report and the three accompanying specialist reports.
The rock lobster fishery has had a long history of fishing effort controls dating back to
1963 when the fishery became limited entry. Many regulations were introduced in the
20 years after 1963 to try to control and slow the continual growth in fishing effort
that scientists feared would eventually lead to overfishing and a collapse of the lobster
breeding stock. As the fishing effort controls became more numerous and complex,
they began to impinge on the flexibility of fishing operations and significant
economic inefficiencies began to emerge. The industry pushed hard for management
reforms to alleviate these problems and over the next 20 years some of the very tight
effort control rules, particularly the strict boat replacement policy, were relaxed (see
section headed History of Regulation of the Western Rock Lobster Fishery for further
details).
Unfortunately, while relaxing some of the effort control rules has given fishers greater
flexibility, it has also allowed effective fishing effort to increase at a faster rate than it
would have otherwise, and pot reduction programs have had to be implemented to
counteract it, i.e. 10 per cent in 1986, 18 per cent in 1993 and 10 per cent for part of
the season in Zone A and B in 2005.
The Western Rock Lobster Fishery is currently ecologically sustainable and
profitable, however, it is facing unprecedented economic challenges both in the shortand long-term due to rising costs (e.g. fuel, bait, labour) and reduced prices for the
catch (a decline of about 20 per cent in real terms over the last 10 years). The current
economic conditions and the recent management process to decide on the fishing
effort reduction package for 2005-06 has raised considerable interest among fishers
with regard to how the current effort control management system would compare to
other management systems, particularly individual transferable quotas (ITQs).
Some people believe the rock lobster industry is at a “management crossroads” –
should it stay with the current effort control system, or move to an ITQ system?
These people are of the view that despite some uncertainty and issues surrounding
ITQs, they have the potential to deliver significantly different economic and social
benefits compared to the current management system. Others would argue that the
current system has served the fishery well for more than 40 years and “if it ain’t
broke, don’t fix it”.
Detailed economic modelling and social and fisheries management research has
identified a number of major issues that readers need to be aware of while reading the
detail of this review.

Key Issues
Rules to protect the breeding stock
No matter what management system is used, the breeding stock must be maintained at
levels above those of the late 1970s to ensure the sustainability of the fishery. It will
be necessary to retain the current breeding stock decision rules framework, with its
trigger points for management action.
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Accuracy of the bio-economic model
Economic Research Associates (ERA), the consultants who have undertaken the
economic modelling of the Western Rock Lobster Fishery have obtained their
information from a survey of fishers (postal questionnaire – 21 fishers responded),
detailed discussions with focus groups of fishers, processors, research scientists and
managers, scientific publications, Department of Fisheries’ databases, and the
Australian Bureau of Statistics. The information has been collected in order to
develop the assumptions that underpin the model. ERA have tested the model outputs
against the historical fishery information (e.g. catch and fishing effort, catch rate
(kg/pot lift), distribution of catch by month, boat and pot numbers, and beach prices)
and the fits are good. Therefore, ERA believe the model is behaving in a realistic and
reliable way and that the model outputs provide robust estimates of what would
happen to the fishery under the different management options, based on the
assumptions used.
It is impossible to model the behaviour of each individual boat/business in the fishery.
Therefore, by necessity, the model used what is called an “average” or
“representative” boat/business for Zones A, B and C. The behaviour of the
representative boat/business is modelled under the different assumptions (e.g. price
and efficiency increases) for each management option and the results are then applied
to the entire fleet in each zone. In reality, individual businesses will have different
capital and cost structures. However, the model provides a good indication of what
would happen on a total fleet basis.
For example, under the ITQ system without controls on pot numbers,3 the model
predicts that fishers (the representative boat/business) would make changes to their
normal fishing patterns to maximise their profits. For instance, such a change might
involve catching some of their quota in July-August when the price is higher and the
increase in pot efficiency could allow them to work two- and three-day pulls very
economically. The model shows that the normal catch peaks in the whites and the
reds are still present but are reduced a little, which allows more rock lobsters to be
available at traditionally low catch rate periods and during the extended season, when
prices are higher. The model appears to be realistic in that it does not allow fishers
(the representative boat/business) to concentrate their entire quota in periods of high
price, because catchability in those periods is low and only a modest portion of the
quota could be taken at that time.
To give an indication of how “realistic” the model outputs are, the average number of
pot lifts and the average catch (kg) per month for Zone C are shown below as
examples of what the model estimates for some of the different management options.
Note that graphs 3c and 3d and 4c and 4d overlay each other, so it is difficult to
distinguish between them.

3

Under this option pot usage was allowed to increase by 20 per cent, the fishing season was extended
to 31 August, there was an increase in the beach price in certain months of the season (particularly
July-August) and the catching efficiency of the pots was increased.
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current effort (pot number) controls and price increases of $2.00/kg and $1.00/kg respectively;
Scenario 4c and 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are
increased by 20 per cent, and price increases of $2.50/kg and $1.25/kg respectively. Graphs 3c and 3d
and 4c and 4d overlay each other, so it is difficult to distinguish between them.]

One factor that has not been modelled, which would be likely to have a significant
impact on fishers’ behaviour and the potential $ benefits that could be gained by
moving to an ITQ system, is the start time for the quota season. For instance, if the
quota season started in February or May, fishers would use different fishing strategies
to what they would use for a traditional November start.
Modelling fleet efficiency/economic gains
An important aspect of the bio-economic modelling was to determine if any of the
management options offered additional gains in fleet efficiency, that is, greater annual
net economic benefits ($ profits) compared to the current system. In the model, the
fleet efficiency gains were calculated using the assumptions around the increases in
pot efficiency (obtained by changes in pot design) and the optimisation of fleet size,
while taking into account the costs of fishing. These gains were expressed as
reductions in boat numbers. That is, economic theory implies (and the model
assumes) that fewer boats in the fleet means more catch per boat = lower costs/kg of
lobsters caught. This, in turn, means a more efficient fleet overall and greater net
profits.
However, increasing fleet efficiency and net profits does not necessarily just involve
boats leaving the fishery. Fleet efficiency and net profits can also be increased,
particularly under an ITQ system, if fishers reduce their individual operating costs,
e.g. use smaller, less costly and more economic boats and implement strategies to
save on fuel, bait, labour costs and so on. Therefore, the significant economic gains
($), due to fleet efficiency increases (the significant reduction in boat numbers), that
the model has predicted for the ITQ system without effort controls are, in practice,
more than likely to be made up of a combination of reduced operating costs and fewer
boats, rather than just fewer boats in the fleet.4
It is possible that the bio-economic model overestimates boat reductions for ITQs
without effort (pot number) controls (Option 4).
Pot reductions and economic efficiency gains
Bio-economic modelling shows that under the current effort control management
system, a pot reduction (e.g. 20 per cent, at two per cent per year over 10 years) would
drive fleet rationalisation (i.e. reduce the number of boats) faster than the current
system with no pot reduction, but not to the same extent as an ITQ without controls on
effort (pots numbers). A 20 per cent pot reduction would also result in slightly greater
fleet efficiency/economic ($) benefits than the current system, but it would not yield
the same $ benefits as ITQs. This is due to the competitive nature of fishing under the
current system and with a 20 per cent pot reduction, which provides less opportunity
for fishers to reduce operating costs. Therefore, the efficiency gains estimated by the
4

The current bio-economic model cannot provide separate estimates of the economic gains that can be
attributed to reductions in boat numbers compared to reductions in individual boat operating costs.
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model for the current system and the 20% pot reduction option are significantly lower
than for ITQs, and the majority of the gains would come through a reduction in the
number of boats, i.e. the fleet could comprise fewer boats with larger numbers of pots.
Uncertainty around the economic benefits of ITQs
The potential benefits of ITQs predicted from the bio-economic modelling are derived
from hypothetical price increases and efficiency gains that industry representatives
considered reasonable. There are risks that these gains may not be fully realised,
however, the model has to make assumptions on how the fleet could behave under
different conditions associated with the various management options.
Hypothetical price increase of up to $5.50/kg for the whole season
The price increases are based on the best judgements of processors and marketers
against the background of the uncertainties of international market conditions. The
price increases apply to the total catch over a year and are composed of:
•
•
•

$2/kg due to the longer season of supply – November to August (this applies
to the more flexible effort control and the ITQ options that were modelled);
$1.50 to $3.00/kg if quotas result in a more stable supply of product from
season to season; and
$0.50/kg if quotas result in a more stable supply of product within a season,
i.e. catch is spread a little more evenly throughout the season (lower catch
peaks in the whites and reds).

If these hypothetical price increases did not materialise as an additional benefit on top
of the normal price fluctuations caused by changes in exchange rate or economic
conditions, then the potential economic benefits of an ITQ system with or without
effort controls would be reduced. This would considerably reduce the economic
incentive to change the current management system. To allow for this uncertainty, the
model used a conservative $1.00/kg increase in price for one of the ITQ options. The
sensitivity of the model’s estimates of average annual $ benefits to increases in price
is discussed under Sensitivity of $ benefits to increases in price/kg in the section titled
Comparisons Between Effort And Quota Management Systems – Results Of Bioeconomic Modelling.
Hypothetical efficiency gains from changes in pot design
It is estimated that changes in pot design (e.g. larger pots with side entrances, parlour
pots that stop escapement, etc) could yield catching efficiency increases of between
15 per cent and 40 per cent. This would mean that a fisher could use more efficient
pots to reduce overall operating costs by reducing the number of pots used. This
could result in the purchase of a smaller, more economic boat and lower fuel, bait,
labour costs and so on. The model shows that there are significant economic benefits
to be gained by increasing the catching efficiency of pots.
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Modelled efficiency gains from boat reductions
The modelling results for ITQs showed the potential for significant increases in fleet
efficiency (hence annual $ benefits) that could flow from a large reduction in the
number of boats in the fishery. This was particularly so for the ITQ system without
(reduced) fishing effort controls (i.e. fishers could use up to 20 per cent more pots
than they currently use and the pots could be up to 40 per cent more efficient at
catching), where the number of boats declined from 549 to 256. In practice, the $
gains from increases in fleet efficiency may not be as great as predicted by the model
because:
o the reduction in boat numbers could be less than predicted;
o efficiency gains assumed for a significantly smaller fleet size may not be as
large as anticipated; and
o the decline in boat numbers may occur over a long period of time.
If the efficiency gains were not as great as predicted and/or were slow to materialise,
the benefits of ITQ systems (particularly with reduced effort controls) could be lower
than the model estimates.
Processing and Marketing
At present, it appears that the processing sector is competitive and most of the value
of the catch flows to fishers. Fishers do little or no product promotion themselves and
the current small margins on processing mean that in general processors have limited
funds to invest in marketing, for example doing large promotions or advertising,
developing and promoting specific brands, developing a larger product range, etc.
This could change if there was a shift to ITQs and processors could gain extra benefits
in the market place. Under ITQs processors would be able to signal to fishers the best
time to take their quota to maximise the $ return in the market place. Some of the
additional $ benefits obtained could be used to do more market promotion to try and
develop a premium price for western rock lobster, compared to other lobsters. In
addition, processors could also secure control over quantities of quota, which could
provide them with greater $ returns, some of which could be directed back into market
promotion.
Values of unit (pot) entitlements and ITQs
In this review no attempt was made to model (predict) the possible changes in the
value of unit (pot) entitlements or ITQs that may occur under the different
management options. This is because it is difficult to fully understand the factors that
drive prices; they appear to be a mixture of economic forces and fisher and investor
sentiments5.
In addition, fishers and investors have alternative investment
opportunities that they take into consideration and the market for entitlements is
small, which means scarcity can also affect prices. The prime focus of the review is

5

For example after the 18 per cent pot reduction in 1993 some fishers wanted to buy pots to get back to
their original number for economic reasons, while others just wanted to have the same number of pots
they had previously.
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on the net economic benefits that can be derived from the different management
options.
Time required to realise the benefits of ITQs
If the fishery moved to ITQs, it may take as long as one generation of fishers to
realise the full potential economic benefits. The time would depend largely on two
factors:
•

•

how quickly the management system could be deregulated under ITQs to
allow fishers to design more efficient pots and to use more pots (e.g. up to 20
per cent more) to catch their quota. Deregulation could only proceed if it did
not impact adversely on the sustainability of the stock and the integrity of the
management and enforcement system (particularly the control of the black
market for illegal catch); and
how rapidly the industry (fishers, processors and marketers) would adjust to
the new ITQ system and deliver the price increases (processors would need to
play a lead role) and efficiency gains (fishers would have to reduce their
operating costs and boats would have to retire from the fishery).

Risks associated with constant (fixed), variable and competitive quotas
If it was decided to move an ITQ system there are two ways of setting the quota:
•
•

a constant quota which does not vary from year to year (i.e. it could be set for
5, 10 or more years at a time), or
a variable quota based on catch predictions, which could vary each year.

Modelling has shown that the annual $ benefits of a constant quota are greater than for
a variable quota system. However, there is a far greater risk of depleting the breeding
stock under a constant quota (particularly during poor recruitment years), unless it is
set at a very conservative level6, which then significantly reduces the $ benefits.
Therefore from a sustainability and economic perspective the use of a constant quota
from year to year would be difficult to justify. So while a constant quota has been
modelled and reported on as part of this review it is not considered very highly as a
viable or practicable management option. Therefore, variable quotas would be the
basis of any ITQ system for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery.
The use of a competitive Total Allowable Commercial Catch quota (TACC), i.e.
where a total quota is set for the fishery and fishers compete for their share of the
catch (with either limited or unlimited pots), was not considered a viable alternative
management option. Experience around the world has shown that competitive quotas
combine the worst aspects of both quota and effort control systems and they are the
most unpredictable regarding their impact on long-term sustainability (breeding stock
levels). Therefore, this review has focused on ITQs.

6

Possibly 9,000 to 9,500 tonnes/year
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Initial quota allocation
If it were decided to move to an ITQ system, there would be significant changes in
some fisher’s catches because quota allocation would be based on the number of units
(pots) a person owned and not on their catch history. Fishers who would normally
catch below the average would be raised up to the average, and fishers who caught
above the average would be reduced down to the average. To increase catch, a fisher
would have to buy (or lease) additional quota. See the example of how quota would
be allocated in the Introduction under the heading Quota Allocation.
Zone quotas
Separate quotas would be set for each Zone (A, B and C). A and B fishers would
have one quota for the period 15 November to 14 March and another for the
remainder of the season (i.e. separate coastal and Abrolhos quotas). Consideration
may also need to be given to quotas on the peaks of the whites and the reds if fishers
concentrated too much on these high catch rate periods and exacerbated the current
peak supply issues.
Quota legislation
New legislation would be required to implement the initial quota allocation procedure
and the annual quota setting process. To ensure complete transparency of determining
and recommending quota levels to the Minister for Fisheries, a quota setting advisory
committee with a clear set of business rules, would have to be established. The
committee would be composed of all relevant stakeholders and it would need a
scientific advisory group to help it determine sustainable annual quota levels.
Quota enforcement - risks and costs
ITQ enforcement risks and costs around a black market for illegal lobsters would be
major considerations in moving to an ITQ system and any increase in the uncertainty
around the level of economic benefit that may be realised from ITQs would further
raise the importance of these issues. The enforcement system would need to keep the
illegal lobster catch at very low levels, because even a five per cent leakage (about
500 tonnes) to the black market would cost the industry in the vicinity of $12 million
annually. That is, every fisher’s quota would have to be reduced by about 900 kg
($22,000 per year at current market value) to take account of it. It would be difficult
to justify a move to ITQs if there was significant potential for a 10 per cent illegal
catch/blackmarket ($24 million annually) to develop. The consequences of large
scale quota avoidance by the industry has not been included in the modelling results.
The risks around quota enforcement need to be judged against the current background
of unlicensed lobster sales (currently believed to be in the order of 200 tonnes), which
will remain problematic under any system of management.
Who will own the quota and will wealth distribution change?
The marketplace may view ITQs as a more secure and reliable share of the catch than
pots. Therefore, if the fishery were to move to an ITQ system investors and
14

processors may show more interest in owning or leasing quota than they currently do
in owning or leasing pots. However, for investors in particular, there is still a similar
level of security around “quota rights” in the same way as there is around unit (pot)
and boat licences, in that the Minister for Fisheries will have the authority to vary,
suspend and cancel quota in a similar way as currently applies to unit (pot) and boat
licences. Investors and processors would make their investment decisions based on
the $ return they could receive on their ITQ compared to other investment
opportunities (e.g. real estate, shares, etc). Processors may also want to hold quota to
ensure a continuity of supply at particular times of the year.
In other fisheries around the world, there have been mixed experiences with changes
in quota ownership. Some ITQ fisheries, particularly those with large volumes and
high processing/catching infrastructure costs, appear more prone to purchase by
processors/corporations than other low volume high value fisheries, which appear
more likely to stay in the hands of family fishing businesses.
A trend towards a change in the composition of ownership of rock lobster entitlements
is already apparent under the current system (investors buy unit (pot) entitlements and
lease them out) and it is likely to continue. This trend may accelerate under an ITQ
system for the reasons discussed.
The experience in some ITQ fisheries where there has been a significant shift in the
ownership of quota entitlements to investors/processors and hence in the wealth
distribution, is that it has resulted in a reduced sense of stewardship towards the
resource, i.e. industry takes less ownership and responsibility for sustainability of the
resource.
Lifestyle, social and retirement issues
As with the population in general, there is a large group of rock lobster fishers who
are at the age where they are considering retirement and another significant group
aged in their 40s to early 50s who have spent 20 years or so in the fishery. Rock
lobster fishing is physically and mentally demanding and can be anti family-social
from a working hours and/or fishing location point of view.
Some of these fishers want to stay in the industry, which has rewarded them well for
working hard and offers a unique lifestyle. However, they do not want to be under
what they consider to be the excessive pressure of competition for catch that is part
and parcel of the current effort control management system. These fishers believe
that ITQs could provide much greater freedom to choose when, how and where they
fished and enable them to concentrate on reducing fishing costs, without being under
the relentless pressure of competing for catch. They maintain that this freedom offers
the potential for a far better working environment and lifestyle generally, and for
these reasons alone, ITQs should be considered even if they do not result in increased
economic benefits through reduced fishing costs or increases in product price.
Other fishers would like to retire from active fishing but still maintain a
presence/interest in and generate an income from the fishery by leasing their pots.
Some of these fishers argue that ITQs offer a more financially secure and simpler
leasing/trading unit than pots because:
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o the current unit (pot) trading system is a cumbersome and indirect way of
“allocating” catch;
o the catch from pots under the current system is “unpredictable”, in that it can
vary significantly depending on many factors, including a fisher’s ability,
competition from other fishers in his fishing location, fluctuations in
recruitment, etc;
o because of the uncertainty in what a fisher’s annual catch might be (which is
further exacerbated by any fluctuations in price), it is far more difficult for
potential pot leasers or purchasers to undertake sound financial planning to
reduce the possibility that they will overcommit themselves.
Another group of fishers has a counter view in that they believe that an important part
of rock lobster fishing is the competition to be a good catcher. They also argue that
competition for catch encourages and rewards young fishers/new entrants for working
hard and smart to catch well, which helps them to pay off their investment loans.
Social ramifications of quotas and reductions in fishing effort
The bio-economic model results and social research predicts that the implementation
of ITQ systems or reductions in fishing effort (particularly by reducing pots) would
cause boat numbers to decline even faster than they currently are. This could impact
on:
o employment within the industry, e.g. fewer skippers and deckhands and to a
lesser extent in support industries (e.g. boat building); and
o coastal communities – it is predicted that only a few of the smaller, more rock
lobster dependent coastal communities would be impacted by a reduction in
the size of the fleet from the current 495 (as at December 2005) to 250 – 450
as predicted for under some of the management options, particularly ITQs.
Summary of bio-economic model results - annual $ benefits
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The figure above shows the bio-economic modelling results for the average annual
benefits in $ millions, for the management options that were modelled for the Western
Rock Lobster Fishery. The management options, some of the main model
assumptions that underpin them and their $ benefits are summarised below. This
report, particularly the section Comparison Between Effort and Quota Management
Systems – Results of Bio-Economic Modelling should be read so that the assumptions
and limitations of the model are clearly understood.
•

Input (effort) controls. The three fishing effort (pot number) control
management options (Scenarios) produced the lowest benefits of the options
that were modelled:
o 1 – the current system gave an estimated annual net benefit of $15.4
million
o 1c – the current system with a 20 per cent pot reduction gave an
estimated annual net benefit of $16.9 million; and
o 2 – a flexible effort control system where pots and fishing days could
be adjusted, the season extended to 31 August and a $2/kg increase on
the average beach price gave an estimated annual net benefit of $28
million.

•

Quotas with input controls. The four ITQ system options (Scenarios) with
the current effort (pot number) controls produced $ benefits that were
significantly greater than the effort control options but significantly lower than
the comparable “Pure” ITQ options with reduced effort (pot) controls.
o 3a – constant (fixed) ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach
price increase of $5/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $61.2
million. However, there are significant sustainability risks with fixed
quotas (quotas that do not vary from year to year) as described above
under the section Risks associated with constant (fixed) and variable
quotas, that make fixed quotas a less attractive management option.
o 3b – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price
increase of $3.50/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $51.6
million.
o 3c – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price
increase of $2.00/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $43.0 million
o 3d – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price
increase of $1.00/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $35.8
million.

•

Pure ITQ. The four ITQ system options (Scenarios) without the current
effort (pot number) controls produced $ benefits that were significantly greater
than any of the other management options. Under these options effort
controls, that is controls on pot numbers, were relaxed and the number of pots
was allowed to increase by 20 per cent.
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o 4a – constant (fixed) ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a
beach price increase of $5.50/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the
catching efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of
$87.6 million. However, there are significant sustainability risks with
fixed quotas (quotas that do not vary from year to year) as described
above under the section Risks associated with constant (fixed) and
variable quotas, that make fixed quotas a less attractive management
option.
o 4b – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price
increase of $4.00/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $96.6
million.
o 4c – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price
increase of $2.50/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $91.4
million.
o 4d – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price
increase of $1.25/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $82.7
million.
The bio-economic modelling results indicate that overall the ITQ management
systems offer greater scope for fishers to be more efficient (i.e. to reduce their costs)
and for processors to maximise the value of the catch (and hence the beach price paid
to fishers). However, as explained in the report the significant $ benefits that the
model estimates for the ITQ options are dependent on fishers maximising the
potentially large efficiency gains and processors maximising the potential market
opportunities that ITQs may offer.
Planned timetable of review and decision making process
A four phase consultation and decision making process will be used to decide which
management system is best for the long-term management of the rock lobster
industry.
Phase 1 (Jan 04 to Dec 05)
Phase 2 (Jan 06 to Sept 06)

Phase 3 (Oct 06 to Feb 07)

Phase 4 (March 07 to
September 08)

Assess and compare a number of fishing effort and
quota management systems.
Stakeholder discussion on the advantages and
disadvantages of fishing effort and quota
management systems.
Stakeholder’s views considered and advice prepared
for Government. Industry will be polled for their
views. It is hoped that fishers will arrive at an
industry consensus on which management option
they prefer.
Government makes its decision on which
management system to use and implementation
commences with the view to having it in place by
2008/09.
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Definitions Of Terms And Abbreviations
See Attachment 1 for Definitions of Terms and Abbreviations.

Introduction
State Government’s Rock Lobster Management Review
Initiative
In March 2002, the then Minister for Fisheries Hon. Kim Chance MLC announced, on
behalf of the State Government, the response to the review of fisheries legislation in
Western Australia as required by the Commonwealth Government’s National
Competition Policy.
This review of fisheries legislation began late in 1998. From the outset, it was clear
that the National Competition Council, the body that administers competition policy
at a Commonwealth level, was interested in the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery and
why the fishery was managed under an input system (effort controls), as opposed to
an output system (catch controls – quotas) as is the case for other Australian lobster
fisheries. Indeed, it is fair to say that the National Competition Council had an
expectation that the State Government would announce a timetable under which the
fishery would be moved from an input to an output (quota) management system.
This was not the State Government’s position. It does not have a preconceived idea
as to what is the best management system, rather it stated on the record that:
“The current input based management regime for the Western Rock
Lobster Fishery will remain in place until at least December 2006 with
the Department of Fisheries and the Rock Lobster Industry Advisory
Committee to review and quantify any further efficiency gains from
additional changes to the current regulatory regime, including the
costs and risks of management failure, over the next 2-3 years”.
The process to decide on the future management system for the rock lobster fishery
will not be rushed and is designed to be inclusive, open and transparent. The State
Government is investing in a three-year consultation process so that at the end of it
stakeholders will have been provided with all the information they need to make up
their minds as to what is the best management system for the fishery.
It needs to be re-emphasised that the State Government does not share the National
Competition Council’s expectation that the rock lobster fishery will move to a quota
management system. Rather, the Government has an expectation that the review
process will identify the best long-term and strategic approach for managing the
fishery within an ecologically sustainable development framework. A case for
changing the management system would need to produce convincing arguments that
there is a significant quantum of additional benefits7 to be realised, in an ecologically
sustainable development context, under a new system of management. It may well be
7

See the Conclusions section for further discussion on this issue.
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that the review will demonstrate that the current system is the best way to manage the
fishery.
The National Competition Policy provided the initial need for this review8, and its test
of legislation is founded on economic principles alone. However, the pursuit of
economic ideals in isolation of ecological and social values and objectives is not an
appropriate basis for managing a fishery.
If the review of the management system is going to produce results that are truly in
the better interests of the Western Australian community, it has to have objectives that
are consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development, which are
entrenched in fisheries resource management policy in Australia.
In Australia, ecologically sustainable development is widely recognised as a natural
resource management philosophy that seeks to provide balance to the competing
ecological, social and economic objectives associated with the utilisation of renewable
natural resources such as fish stocks.
In meeting the ecological management requirements set by the Commonwealth
Government’s Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 and
the Marine Stewardship Council, it is reasonable to state that the “ecological leg” of
ecologically sustainable development is being satisfied and will continue to be
satisfied regardless of the management system employed.
This being the case, the review of the management system that is currently underway
is treating the need for good ecological management practices (e.g. a safe/sustainable
level of breeding stock) as an essential requirement for any management system under
consideration. With appropriate wording in the objective, this assumption allows the
focus of the assessment to be on the economic and social components of ecologically
sustainable development, which is potentially where the greatest room for
improvement exists.
The two management systems that will be reviewed and compared are effort control
management systems, such as the current rock lobster management system and catch
quota (ITQ) management systems.

Quota Allocation
If the issue of quota allocation were to be left unresolved until after or late in the
management review process, there would be a significant risk that the review would
be sidetracked by argument and uncertainty regarding the allocation process.
Therefore, to help focus the discussions on which management system offers the rock
lobster industry and the Western Australian community the best long-term ecological,
social and economic outcomes, the State Government has decided how individual

8

It also makes good business sense to review the current management system so that inefficiencies can
be highlighted and to determine if other systems (e.g. ITQs) offer substantial additional economic
benefits. The cost-price squeeze that the industry has been experiencing over recent years has brought
the need for a review into sharper focus.
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transferable quotas (ITQs) will be allocated if the rock lobster fishery were to move to
a quota management system.
Based on practical considerations and legal rulings that have been handed down in
Australia in recent years regarding quota allocation9, the State Government has
decided that:
•
•
•

a quota will be set for each zone, i.e. Zones A, B and C;
each fisher will be allocated an individual share (catch quota) of their zone’s
quota, based on the number of units (pots) held on a licence; and
a fisher’s catch history will not be taken into account in the quota allocation
process.

Catch history would not be used in an ITQ allocation process because it would distort
the value of authorisations (entitlements) for the following reasons:
•

•

•

It is possible in this fishery to link catch at a given time to a managed fishery
licence (MFL). But the MFL is not the ‘currency’ of the fishery – the gear
unit (pot) is the currency of the fishery. The extent of trading in units (buying,
selling and leasing) that has occurred over the years means that it is simply not
possible to track with administrative efficiency or accuracy, the ownership or
fishing history of each unit in the fishery.
The market for rock lobster units of entitlement factors in the expected
earnings into the value of the units, and this therefore represents the truest
judgement of their worth. The market does not differentiate between low and
high catches of lobster when valuing units for sale. All units have equal value
in the market.
The strength of the lease market for rock lobster units of entitlement means
that “owners” are not limited to fishing in order to use their entitlement to
develop an income stream.

A theoretical example of a quota allocation: If the quota for Zone X was set at
4,550,00 kg for the season and there were 34,579 units (pots) in the zone, then each
unit would be allocated a quota of 131.6 kg of lobsters for the season (4,550,000 kg ÷
34,579 pots). Therefore, a person who owned 100 units/pots would be allocated a
total of 13,160 kg of lobsters for the season.
A practical unit (entitlement) size would need to be developed to assist quota trading,
i.e. to allow small kg amounts to be traded.

The Management Review Process
Objectives
In the context of ecologically sustainable development, the objectives for the review
of the rock lobster management system are to:
• assess and compare alternative management systems using the current
management system of fishing effort (input) controls as the benchmark; and
9

See Independent Allocation Review Panel for the Southern Shark Fishery. Final Report. October
2003. Report to the Australian Fisheries Management Authority.
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•

make a decision as to which management system offers the best long-term
socio-economic return to the State of Western Australia based on:
o providing the greatest incentives and opportunity for growth in
economic terms; and
o encouraging the maintenance and development of regional
communities.
See Attachment 2 for further details.

It is important to reiterate that the current effort control management system has
served the fishery well over the years and will continue to do so in future provided
managers and industry reduce fishing effort if overexploitation threatens the breeding
stock. However, there is a need to assess if additional benefits (ecological, economic,
social and management) can be obtained by moving to an alternative management
system, while still ensuring long-term sustainability.
Proposed review timetable and consultative process
See Attachment 2 for a summary table and details of the timetable and consultative
process of the management review.
Phase 1 – Objective analysis of management options
October 2003 to December 2005, a joint departmental and industry Steering
Committee has overseen the development of four papers that assessed the relative
advantages and disadvantages of the effort control and quota management systems
outlined above. The papers produced were:
•

•

•

•

Bio-Economic Modelling – Compares the economic benefits that can be
realised under different fishing effort and quota management systems. The
paper is titled A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the
West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery by Economic Research Associates, 2005.
Social Research – Presents the initial findings of research on the possible
social impacts of fishing effort and quota management systems, particularly on
small coastal communities. The paper is titled A Social Assessment of Coastal
Communities Hosting the Western Rock Lobster Fishing Fleet by the Institute
for Regional Development, University of Western Australia, 2005.10
Quota Experience in Other Fisheries – Describes the rock lobster quota
management experience in South Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand. The
paper is titled How do Quota Management Systems Work in Rock Lobster
Fisheries? The Experience in New Zealand, Tasmania and South Australia,
by Tim Bray, Steven Gill and Ron Edwards, Department of Fisheries, 2005.
This paper – provides an overview of the management review process and
findings.

Phase 2 – Communicate analysis of management scenarios with
stakeholders
The purpose of Phase 2 (November 2005 – September 2006) is to communicate to all
stakeholders (commercial and recreational fishers, processors, conservation sector,
10

This is a three-year project funded by the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation.
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local communities and government, etc) the results of the assessment and comparison
of the different management options to empower stakeholders to arrive at their own
conclusions as to which management system is best.
Commencing in early February 2006, an independent facilitator will conduct a series
of workshops with professional fishermen’s associations and other interested parties.
Phase 3 – RLIAC prepares advice for government
In this phase (October 2006 - February 2007), RLIAC will receive submissions from
stakeholders and engage with them to clarify their positions.
The Western Rock Lobster Council will conduct a poll of the rock lobster fishing
sector to ascertain which management system it prefers. The results will not
necessarily determine RLIAC’s advice or the Government’s final position, but will
make it clear to Government which management system the majority of fishers
support.
During RLIAC’s October 2006 coastal tour, the committee’s proposed advice to
Government will be communicated to all stakeholders before it is formally presented
to the Minister for Fisheries in early 2007.
Phase 4 – Government’s decision and implementation
Once the Minister for Fisheries has received RLIAC’s advice he will take his position
to Cabinet and a decision on the long-term management of the rock lobster fishery is
likely to be made in 2007. If there is a decision to move to a new management
system, it is anticipated that it would be implemented for the 2008/09 season.

Western Rock Lobster Fishery – Background
This section provides a summary of the history of the regulation of the West Coast
Rock Lobster Fishery and its catch and fishing effort, as background information to
help readers understand how the fishery has evolved and what its current status is.
The catch predictions for the next three seasons (2005/06 to 2007/08) and the main
factors responsible for the current “cost-price squeeze” are also provided to give an
indication of future trends.

History Of Regulation Of The Western Rock Lobster Fishery
The main aims of the regulations that have been introduced in to the Western Rock
Lobster Fishery have been two-fold. First and most importantly, they have been used
to conserve the rock lobster stocks (particularly the breeding stock) and secondly, the
limited entry rules introduced in 1963 also protected fisher’s livelihoods by restricting
the number of boats (fishers) that could operate in the fishery.11

11

The fishery’s management arrangements serve a twofold purpose, in that biological and fishing effort
constraints ensure sustainability of the stock (now enshrined in the Decision Rules Framework) and
limited entry protects fishers’ economic interests.
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Some of the major regulations and reductions in fishing effort/exploitation were:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•

1887 – Minimum size, initially a weight and then a carapace length.
1899 – Protection of spawners (egg carrying females).
1962 – Closed seasons.
1963 – March 1963, limits on entry, boats and number of pots involving:
o the number of boats (fishers) was restricted to 836, including 45
freezer boats that were licensed to process at sea; and
o the number of pots was restricted to three per foot (0.33 meter) length
of boat, with about 76,000 being in the fishery. However, a fisher
could still increase his number of pots by building/purchasing a larger
boat.
1965 – Pot numbers and boat replacement. Pot numbers were set at 76,623
and boat replacements had to match exactly the number of pots held on the
licence.
1966 – Escape gaps introduced, one x 51 x 304 mm, increased to one x 54 x
304 mm in 1971 and processing factories required a licence.
1973 – Multiple necks and parlour pots banned.
1978 – Season shorten by six weeks to 30 June.
1979 – Boat replacement policy relaxed to give fishermen greater flexibility
when replacing their boats. It allowed between seven and 10 pots per meter of
boat length.
1984 – Pot dimensions restricted:
o maximum pot volume of 0.257 cubic meters; and
o large wire traps and large batten and beehive pots restricted;
1986
o 5 per cent pot reduction if a boat were less than six years old when
replaced (rule not revoked until 1995).
o Escape gaps increased from one to three/four x 54x304mm.
o Temporary 10 per cent pot reduction for one season, from 76,623 to
68,961.
1987-91 – Permanent 10 per cent pot reduction at two per cent per year over
five years.
1992 (one year only)
o Summer closure (10 Jan to 9 Feb) in Zone B.
o Maximum female size 115 mm.
o Setose and tarspot females to be returned to the water between 15
November and 28 February.
o 10 per cent pot reduction in Zone B (15 Nov-10 Jan).
o Up until April 1993, boats had to nominate landing zones in Zone C.
1993 – Sustainability management package to address breeding stock decline.
o 18 per cent pot reduction (i.e. pot usage reduced from 68,961 to
56,548).
o Maximum sizes for females (105mm northern sector. and 115mm
southern sector).
o An increase in the minimum size from 76 to 77mm from 15 November
to 31 January.
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•
•
•

o Protection of all setose and tar spot females continued.12
1997 – Boat replacement rule abolished, i.e. pot numbers no longer linked to
boat length. Maximum pots per boat 150 and minimum 63.
2003 – Abolition of the 150-pot rule, i.e. the rule that set the maximum
number of pots a boat could use.
2005 – Sustainability management package to address breeding stock decline
(particularly in Zone B).
o Zones A and B – A 26-day summer closure from 15 January to 9
February, and Sunday closures from 15 March to 30 June in Zone B,
plus 10 per cent pot reductions in Zone B from 15 November to 10
February and in Zone A from 15 March to 15 April.
o Zone C – A closure from 15 to 24 November and a 3-day moon
closure from 1 February to 30 June.

Catch, Effort and Boat History
Catch in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery increased steadily until the late 1970s
when it appeared that they had reached a maximum sustainable level (Figure 1).
Fluctuations in catch over the subsequent period reflect the level of puerulus (young
rock lobster) settlement, which determines the catch three to four years later. It is
changing environmental conditions, particularly the strength of the Leeuwin Current
that controls the level of puerulus settlement and hence catches.13
Fishing effort (the number of pot lifts) increased rapidly during the period up to 1963
as men, vessels and traps entered the open access rock lobster fishery (Figure 1).
Effort declined for a few years after 1963 when the fishery became limited entry and a
cap was placed on the number of boats and traps. However, it began to increase
again, but not as rapidly, up until 1993, when a major sustainability management
package (approximately 23 per cent effort reduction, including a 18 per cent pot
reduction) was introduced to protect and rebuild the breeding stock, since then the
number of pot lifts has stabilised. It must be noted, however, that the measure of
fishing effort, the pot lift, does not take into account any increases in fishing
efficiency (better boats and pot setting, advances in technology, etc) that have
occurred since 1944-45. If increases in fishing efficiency were taken into account, the
measure of effective effort would be greater.
Catch rate or catch per unit of fishing effort (average weight of rock lobsters caught
per pot lift) has decreased steadily from 1944-45 and in the past decade has been
reasonably steady at an average of about one kilo per pot lift.14

12

For further details see Fisheries Management Paper No.55 Rock Lobster Industry Advisory
Committee, Chairman's report to the Minister for Fisheries on management proposals for 1993-94 and
1994-95 western rock lobster seasons (September 1993). Department of Fisheries publication.
13
It was only in the late 1980s to early 1990s at the Abrolhos Is., that there was evidence that the
breeding stock had fallen to a level that had affected the level of puerulus settlement.
14
If increases in fishing efficiency were taking into account in the catch rate calculation, it would that it
has continued to decline in real terms.
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Annual rock lobster catch and nominal fishing effort
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Figure 1: Western rock lobster catch in millions of kg and nominal fishing effort
in millions of pot lifts (unadjusted for increases in efficiency/technology).

Catch Predictions
Table 1 below shows the rock lobster catches that are predicted for Zones A, B and C
for the next three seasons, based on the levels of puerulus settlement that occurred
three and four year previously and the expected level of fishing effort.
Table 1. Catch predictions for Zones A, B and C for the three seasons 2005/06 to
2007/08 and the 10-year average catch 1995-96 to 2004-05 (the predictions do not
take into account the 2005-06 management changes).

15
16

Catch predictions (tonnes)
Season
2006-07
2007-08

Zone

2005-06

A
B15
C16
Total Catch
A+B+C

1,750
3500
5200

1,800
3,600
4,400

1,800
3,600
4,750

10 yr av. 1995-96 to
2004-05
1,823
3,571
6,091

10450

9,800

10,150

11,488

Includes Big Bank (approx 100 tonnes)
Predictions using all puerulus collector sites in Zone C.
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Number Of Boats In The Fishery
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Figure 2: Shows the decline in the number of boats taken place in the fishery
since 1988.
Boat numbers have declined from 836 in 1963, when limited entry was introduced, to
495 in December 2005. The decline accelerated after the freeing up of the boat
replacement rules (1979), pot reductions (1986 and 1993) and for economic reasons
(particularly in 2002 and 2005). The removal in 1997 of the rule that limited the
number of pots a boat could use (know as the ‘seven and 10 rule’17) and in 2003 of the
maximum 150 pot/boat rule, have also played a part in the reduction in boat numbers.

Economic Issues Affecting Fishers – Cost-price Squeeze
The profitability of rock lobster fishing is affected by a few key factors and the degree
to which these affect profitability is influenced by environmental factors and
management constraints. They are:

17

1

The prices received for rock lobsters
• Up to $10/kg variation in price has occurred from one season to the next in
the past decade; and
• Up to $15/kg variation within a season (normally $2-$5/kg).

2

Catches
The quantity of rock lobsters caught can vary significantly from season to
season, e.g. by up to 4,000 tonnes from one season to the next and by almost
100 per cent over a few seasons in Zone C. Catch predictions (Table 1)

Boats were allowed between seven and 10 pots per metre of length.
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indicate that there will be a significant reduction in catch over the next two
seasons in Zone C, while Zone A and B are predicted to remain relatively
stable.
3

Fishing cost including
• increases in fuel costs, which have risen significantly over the past five
years and in particular from January to September 2005,
• increases in bait costs,
• labour costs have been increasing steadily over the past five years and are
set to increase more rapidly in future due to the boom in Western
Australia’s resource sector. Fishers are finding it difficult to attract and
keep crew, particularly in the Mid-West region where there is increasing
competition for labour from the mining sector.

See Attachment 3 for a more detailed discussion of the economic factors affecting the
rock lobster industry’s profitability.

Accompanying Reports and Previous Reviews and Studies
Three other reports have been prepared as part of this management review and it is
important that they are read in conjunction with this paper.
•

•

•

Bio-economic modelling A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options
for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery – compares the economic benefits
that can be realised under different fishing effort and quota management
systems.
Social impact study A Social Assessment of Coastal Communities Hosting the
Western Rock Lobster Fishing Fleet – presents results of research on the
possible social impacts of fishing effort and quota management systems,
particularly on small coastal communities.
Quota experience in other rock lobster fisheries How do Quota
Management Systems Work in Rock Lobster Fisheries? The Experience in
New Zealand, Tasmania and South Australia – describes the rock lobster
quota management experience in South Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand.

Previous rock lobster management reviews and associated studies that are
recommended reading are listed in Attachment 4. Of particular interest are the four
volumes produced in 1994 that compared fishing effort and quota management
systems in relation to the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery and the Food and
Agricultural Organisation’s (FAO) review papers on fishing effort and quota
management.
•
•

Bowen, B. 1994, ‘Long-term Management Strategies for the Western Rock
Lobster Fishery’, in Volume 1, Fisheries Management Paper No. 67, Fisheries
Department of WA.
Lindner, B. 1994, ‘Economic efficiency of alternative input and output based
management systems in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery’, in Volume 2,
Fisheries Management Paper No. 68, Dept of Fisheries of WA.
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•
•
•
•

Marec Pty, 1994, ‘Long-term Management Strategies for the Western Rock
Lobster Fishery. A Market-based Economic Assessment for the Western Rock
Lobster Industry’, in Volume 3, Fisheries Management Paper No.69.
McLaughlan, N. 1994, ‘Long-term Management Strategies for the Western
Rock Lobster Fishery. Law Enforcement Considerations.’ in Volume 4,
Fisheries Management Paper No. 70.
Shotton, R. 2001, Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota
Rights in Fisheries, Food and Agricultural Organisation, Fisheries Technical
Report No. 411, p373.
Shotton, R. 2001, Case Studies on the Effect of Transferable Fishing Fights
on Fleet Capacity and Concentration of Quota Ownership, Food and
Agricultural Organisation, Fisheries Technical Report No. 412, p246.

NOTE: To aid the current discussion on management options, the documents listed
above plus this paper, have been made available on the Department of Fisheries’ web
site at www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site at
www.rocklobsterwa.com and are available in hard copy by phoning the Department of
Fisheries on 9482 7267.

Objective of Fishing Effort and Quota
Management
Catch quota (output control) management systems can appear to be radically different
compared to fishing effort (input control) systems, like the rock lobster management
system. However, from a stock sustainability point of view they are used to achieve
exactly the same result. The objective of both quota and effort management systems
is to ensure the long-term sustainability of the rock lobster stock and fishery by taking
into account:
• biological (e.g. protecting the breeding stock)18;
• economic; and
• social factors.
Fishing effort and quota management systems achieve their objective by controlling
the level of exploitation19, that is, they limit the catch of rock lobsters that can be
taken each season. Moving from fishing effort to quota management does not change
the fact that the primary aim of any fishery management system will be to keep the
rock lobster stock at a sustainable level by limiting the catch that fishers can take.

18

And also maintaining the ecological stability of the marine environment in which rock lobsters live,
in particular by ensuring an appropriate abundance (density) of legal size lobster are present on the
fishing grounds (particularly in deeper water).
19
Exploitation, often referred to as exploitation rate, refers to the number or weight (kg) of fish, in this
case rock lobsters that are caught each season from what is available on the fishing grounds.
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Comparing Effort and Quota Management
Options – Key Issues and Benefits
This section summarises and compares some of the key issues, benefits and costs of
the fishing effort and quota management systems that have been assessed in the
review of the Western Rock Lobster Fishery. It also includes a discussion on how the
different options would be implemented and what type of legislation, enforcement and
research would be required to ensure they were managed successfully and sustainably.
No matter what management system is used for the rock lobster fishery, it will be
necessary to retain the current breeding stock decision rules framework (a working
document) that clearly sets out the trigger points for taking management action to
ensure a safe level of breeding stock.
Attachment 5 provides a summary of the management arrangements and assumptions,
such as price premiums and increases in pot efficiency that have been used in the bioeconomic modelling and social research that has been undertaken for this review.

Management Systems Assessed
Below are the management systems that have been modelled, assessed and compared.
1. Current fishing effort control system – individual transferable effort
(ITE)
The system we have today is individual transferable effort (ITE). To ascertain
if the current system could produce benefits similar to the modified more
flexible effort control and quota management systems, a hypothetical effort
(pot) reduction scenario of 20 per cent phased in at 2 per cent per year over 10
years was also examined.
2. Modified more flexible individual transferable effort (ITE) system
Total fishing time and effort would be set for each zone at the start of the
season. Each fisher would be allocated a share or “quota” of the total fishing
time and fishing effort for his zone and would have the flexibility to use it
when he wanted during the season. A longer season to 31 August would
apply.
3. Individual transferable quota (ITQ) system with effort controls
A system whereby a catch quota would be set for each zone and each unit
(pot) would be allocated a share of the zone quota. Fishing effort (pot
numbers) controls would remain and a longer season to 31 August would
apply. If it were decided to move to an ITQ system, it would initially retain all
the current effort controls, which could gradually be relaxed over time to
produce greater benefits as the new system stabilised. Pot catching efficiency
was increased by 15 per cent through changes in pot design.
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4. Individual transferable quota (ITQ) system without effort controls20
A system whereby a catch quota would be set for each zone and each unit
(pot) would be allocated a share of the zone quota. There would be no
controls on effort (pot numbers). However, from experience in other ITQ
fisheries doing away with controls on pot numbers does not lead to fishers
putting hundreds of additional pots in the water, as it is not a cost effective
way to take the quota. Pot numbers are largely limited by the carrying
capacity of the vessel and how many can be efficiently operated each day.
Therefore in the bio-economic model, pot numbers were allowed to increase
by 20 per cent and pot catching efficiency was increased by 40 per cent
through changes in pot design. This system has the potential to provide the
greatest freedom to fishers in terms of harvesting their quota. A longer season
to 31 August would apply.

The Current Rock Lobster Effort Management
System (ITE)
This section discusses the key issues and benefits of the current rock lobster
management system. Attachment 5 provides a summary of the current management
rules/arrangements that were used as the base case to assess its performance against
the other management options.

Key Issues
The current fishing effort control system for the rock lobster fishery is known as an
individual transferable effort management system, or ITE system (see Attachment 1
for a definition). This management system has served the fishery well for more than
40 years. As long as timely management decisions are made to control and reduce
fishing effort to ensure the breeding stock levels are maintained, this system should
continue to ensure the long-term sustainability of the rock lobster stocks. However,
industry needs to be aware that the continued increase in fishing effort and
exploitation under the current effort management system can lead to serious
disagreements within the industry over what management action should be taken to
reduce it (e.g. time off as opposed to pot reductions) and encourages economic
inefficiencies, particularly overcapitalisation and higher fishing costs.
Reaching consensus regarding management action
The current system offers so many different options for reducing the catch (via effort
reductions21) that it is very difficult for industry to come up with one option that
satisfies everyone.

20

The ITQ system without effort controls that was modelled for this review does not have uncontrolled
effort. It has been limited to a 20 per cent increase in the number of pots fishers can use because
experience in other ITQ lobster fisheries has shown that fishers do not use excessive numbers of pots,
when controls on pot numbers are removed.
21
Changes to minimum and maximum sizes and protection of particular classes of lobsters (e.g.
spawners and tar spots) can also be used to maintain the breeding stock.
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There is divergence of opinion within industry because different effort reduction
options – for example, time period closures and pot reductions – can potentially have
very different impacts on a fisher’s catch. These differences split the industry and
make it very difficult for it to present the unified front that is necessary for it to be
able to work in a corporate partnership manner with the Government and other
stakeholders to resolve sustainability issues.
Under a quota management system, this is less of a problem, as the only option that
can be used to protect the stock is to reduce the catch, i.e. reduce each fishers’ ITQ. It
could be argued that a reduction in individual quotas is more equitable than an effort
reduction (for instance, reducing pots or closing a particular time of the season), as
each fisher bears the burden of the reduction in direct proportion to the size of the
quota. This could avoid the equity arguments that arise with effort reductions, e.g.
that they affect small boat/unit holders more than large holders, or shallow water
fishers more than deepwater fishers, or Abrolhos boats more than coastal boats.
Under ITQs, the debate focuses on the pivotal issue: “How many kilos does the quota
need be reduced by to protect the breeding stock?”.
Risk to the breeding stock and ecology
Breeding stock
Under the current management system, which has a decision rules framework to deal
with the issue of breeding stock levels, there is little risk of overfishing the breeding
stock to the point where it would affect subsequent puerulus settlement, provided
timely fishing effort reduction initiatives were implemented if levels began to decline.
Ecology
Some fisheries scientists are concerned that the current level of exploitation may have
reduced the number or density of legal size lobsters to such low levels that it may
begin to have an impact on the general ecology in which the rock lobster lives (i.e. the
interactions rock lobsters have with other organisms). This is particularly true for
populations of large lobsters in deeper water. It is difficult to evaluate if ITQs would
offer a better system to deal with ecological issues than the current system. The most
important factor regardless of whether it is an effort or quota management system is
the commitment of industry, managers and the State Government to resolve
ecological issues if and when they arise.
Competition between fishers – fishing “harder” and “smarter”
Under an effort control management system, the exploitation of the stock – the
number of lobsters caught each season from what is available on the fishing grounds –
gradually increases due to intense competition between fishers (pots) to maximise
their share of the catch. High levels of competition are always generated in effort
control fisheries and it is referred to as the “rush to fish”. Competition encourages
fishers to fish “harder” (e.g. by fishing more days, taking more time or risks to set
pots, travelling longer distances to fish the higher catch rate hot spots and “big runs”,
using more bait, etc) and “smarter” (e.g. by using technological advances such as
larger and faster boats, GPS, colour sounders, computers, etc) and hence the

32

exploitation increases. This gradual increase in fishing efficiency is sometimes
referred to as “effort creep”.
Competition encourages innovation and hard work and in itself is not a bad thing.
However, the more rock lobsters a fisher catches, the more he is exploiting the stock
and the more pressure he puts on it. This inevitably leads to fewer rock lobsters being
left on the fishing grounds at the end of each season, and hence fewer breeding
lobsters.
Because of the high exploitation, the abundance (number, density) of legal size
lobsters on the fishing ground is usually very low at the end of each season and hence
the catch from the fishery becomes very dependent on the new young lobster that
recruit (grow) into the fishery each year. High exploitation leads to fewer and fewer
resident residual lobsters surviving from year to year to act as a “buffer” if
recruitment into the fishery declines. The catch from a recruitment dependent fishery
can go sharply up and down as it follows the level of new recruits coming in each
season, as seen in the rock lobster fishery.
The competitive nature of the current fishery and the need to pay off loans or meet
leasing obligations can lead to fishers taking risks with safety (e.g. going out in bad
weather, fishing too close to reefs or in dangerous swell conditions, etc). The
competitive pressure can also make fishers work long hours each day with few breaks
during the season, which can have social (family/relationship) and safety (tiredness)
implications.
The need to reduce fishing effort
The second issue is a consequence of the intense competition between fishers and the
very high exploitation this generates. As a consequence, the breeding stock begins to
decline towards the point where it could affect the future levels of puerulus (young
lobsters) settling, which would result in lower catches three to four years later. If this
occurred, tough conservation strategies to reduce fishing effort would have to be
implemented.
Under effort control management systems, it is always necessary to periodically
reduce fishing effort (exploitation) to ensure the breeding stock is maintained at a safe
and sustainable level so that it does not affect recruitment. Reductions in fishing
effort create debate and concern within the rock lobster industry and people have
different opinions on how it should be done (e.g. time closures verses pot reductions),
based on their particular type of fishing operation and personal circumstances. In
particular, pot reductions are often seen as reductions in a fisher’s capital asset,
whereas in fact a fisher’s percentage share of the units (pots) – and hence potential
catch – in the fishery is not altered.
Reductions in fishing effort and exploitation are commonly achieved by:
• closing the fishery for periods of time, for example:
o moon closures;
o start and end of season closures;
o closures over low catch rate periods;
o regular weekly, monthly, etc closures;

33

•
•
•
•

o closing areas of the fishery for specific times (e.g. the Abrolhos Is.);
reducing pot numbers (i.e. over the whole season or during particular periods,
or for example, the whites or reds);
restrictions on pot designs to make them less efficient (e.g. size and shape of
pots, one neck, etc);
increasing the minimum legal size; and
decreasing the maximum female legal size (there could also be one for males).

Fishing effort in the rock lobster fishery would have to be significantly reduced to
reach the point where competition between fishers (pots) was reduced to the same
extent as could potentially occur under ITQs. However, even at this much lower level
of effort, fishing efficiency under the current management system would increase
through advances in technology and increases in an individual fisher’s experience and
expertise (i.e. fishers would still fish “smarter”).
Competition leads to over capitalisation and increased fishing costs
Competition between fishers for a share of the catch results in individual fisher’s (and
hence the fleet) overcapitalising their fishing operations. In the fully exploited
Western Rock Lobster Fishery, the only way a fisher can consistently catch more than
those fishing around him, is to fish “harder” and “smarter” than they do. Therefore,
fishers invest a lot of money in heavier baiting, larger and faster boats (which cost
more to purchase and operate) and the latest technology to try and maintain or
increase their share of the catch.
For example, if one fisher purchases a new technology or is baiting more heavily and
he catches more than those fishing around him, then to maintain their share of the
catch, the other fishers have to buy the same or equivalent technology or use more
bait, or both. If they don’t, they will lose some of their potential catch to the more
competitive fisher. Extra expenditure required to maintain catch forces the overall
cost of fishing to increase and net profits from the catch to decline.
Due to the competitive nature of the rock lobster fishery under the current effort
control management system, it is not easy for fishers to reduce their fishing costs and
still maximise their share of the catch. For example, if a fisher decided to trade in his
large vessel for a smaller more economic vessel, but he could not carry all his pots in
one load, he would not be able to respond as quickly as other fishers to changes in
catch rates in other areas of the fishery. That is, the fisher’s ability to keep up with
and compete with the mobile fleet would be reduced and his share of the catch would
decline. Another example would be if a fisher decided to reduce costs by using less
bait than those fishing nearby. His pots would be out-competed and his share of the
catch would also decline. In both of these examples, the reduction in catch would be
offset to some degree by a reduction in fishing costs.
If under the current management system, fishing effort could be reduced to the point
where there was little competition between fishers (pots) for the available catch, it
would encourage fishers to reduce their fishing costs – for example, by using less bait
and fuel (less travel), and replacing large boats with smaller more economic ones. A
large reduction in fishing effort would be likely to accelerate the rate of decline in the
number of boats in the fishery, unless a counter measure (incentive) was introduced.
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It is important to note that time closures (e.g. shortened seasons, moon closures and
days off) can reduce fishing costs and help protect the breeding stock, but they do not
reduce competition between fishers. In fact, they can increase competition, as there is
an even shorter period of time for each fisher to take a share of the catch.

Benefits of the Current Management System
It’s a familiar management system
One of the major benefits of the current effort management system, which should not
be underestimated, is that it is familiar to all fishers. They have grown up with it over
the years and seen it evolve from a simple set of rules to the much more complex set
of management arrangements it is today. Generally, fishers know how changes in the
current system will affect them and there is a substantial body of experience and
knowledge amongst fishers themselves, processors, marketers, accountants, boat and
pot brokers, banks, insurance companies and other institutions to help them adapt
their businesses to any management changes that occur under this system.
Effort control is also the management system that fisheries manager, researchers,
enforcement and legal officers and governments have dealt with over the past 40
years. They feel reasonably certain of being able to predict the results of any
management changes that are made to the fishery and how they might impact on rock
lobster stocks and the fishery generally.
Research
There is a wealth of research data and information that has been painstakingly built up
over the last 60 years, which makes the rock lobster itself and the fishery one of the
most studied and best understood in the world. A significant aspect of this
understanding is how the catch rate (catch per pot lift) of lobsters relates to their
abundance on the fishing grounds. The catch rate to abundance relationship is based
on understanding the catching efficiency or fishing power of the “standard” pot types
(batten and beehive). If the management system is changed, for example to an ITQ
system and pot numbers and design are to allowed vary, it would require additional
fishery independent monitoring and modelling to ensure estimates of abundance
(especially of the breeding stock) remained accurate. The cost of the additional
research for ITQs is estimated to be approximately $1.1 million per year on top of the
current research budget, which would have to be met through cost recovery. The
additional costs have been included in the bio-economic modelling.
Enforcement
The current fishing effort enforcement system has been developed over a long period
of time and it monitors the main areas of illegal activities such as over-potting,
consigning undersize and prohibited females, and boundary violations. The
Department’s compliance program delivers very cost effective enforcement outcomes
and the great majority of industry has confidence in the system. Enforcement under
the current system depends on reasonably straightforward observations of illegal
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activities, such as pot counts and inspecting and measuring lobsters at processing
factories.
If a decision were made to move to a quota management system, the enforcement
emphasis would have to shift significantly to reflect the fact that the most important
aspect from a sustainability and fisher equity perspective would be to ensure that
individual quotas were not exceeded. A slippage of just 1 per cent to the black market
would cost the industry about $2.5 million annually and a 5 per cent slippage would
cost more than $12 million. Additional enforcement expertise would be required to
monitor the quota electronic/paper trail and investigate fraud, especially collusion
between fishers and processors. Also, investigation procedures would be far more
intrusive in relation to fishers and processors financial affairs than they currently are.
It is estimated that there would be a one-off enforcement/management cost of about
$1 million to set up an ITQ system and an additional ongoing
enforcement/management cost of about $2.5 million annually22, which would be cost
recovered.23 The additional costs have been included in the bio-economic modelling.
Effort control systems “reward” more competitive fishers
Under the effort control management system used in the rock lobster fishery, half the
fishers catch more on average (sometimes a lot more) than the other half, despite the
fact that they may fish the same general area and have very similar fishing operations
(boat type, number of pots, bait, GPS, sounders, etc). Effort control systems
“reward”, with additional catch, fishers who fish “harder” and “smarter”.
This can be seen as an advantage of an effort control system in that it rewards hard
work, skill, knowledge and innovation. However, it is also its Achilles heel, because
at the same time it encourages increases in fishing effort and hence exploitation,
which can lead to the need to implement conservation (effort reduction) measures.
2003-04
Zone A
Zone B
Zone C

Annual catch (kg) per pot per year
Minimum24
Average
Maximum
less than 100
210
350+
about 100
175
350+
less than 150
277
420+

The above table provides an indication of the large variation in annual catch (kg) per
pot per year for the three zones of the fishery for the 2003-04 season. Some fishers
catch more than twice the annual catch (kg) per pot per year of other fishers.

22

This could vary depending on the type of ITQ system that was finally adopted.
See report ‘How do Quota Management Systems work in Rock Lobster Fisheries?’ for further
discussion on enforcement implications and cost under quota systems at www.fish.wa.gov.au or
www.rocklobsterwa.com
24
Note the low minimum values are significantly affected by the low number of days fished recorded
by some fishers.
23

36

Implementation and Costs
For the purposes of the review and the bio-economic modelling, the current
management system has remained unchanged to what it was in 2004-05, so that it
could be compared against the other management options. However, it was decided
prior to the review that a unit register would be developed to aid in the identification
of unit holders and unit transfers. In addition, since the review commenced, industry
and management have been discussing the possibility of installing Vessel Monitoring
Systems (VMS) on all boats in the fleet. These are additional costs, which will be
covered by cost recovery or individual boat owners. These cost would be the same
for all the management options reviewed.

Modelling the Current Effort Control System
It is recommended that the full economic modelling report A Bio-Economic
Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, by
consultants Economic Research Associates be read in conjunction with this summary.
It is available at www.fish.wa.gov.au or www.rocklobsterwa.com
The main assumptions and management arrangements used to model the current
management system were:
•
•
•
•
•
•

there is a strong “rush to fish”, i.e. to catch as much as possible;
no increase in pot efficiency;
effort creep/increases in fishing efficiency is 1 per cent per year;25
boat numbers decline at 1 per cent per year;
no increase in season (15 Nov to 30 June); and
no price increases.

See Attachment 5 (Tables A and B) for further details of management rules and model
assumptions for each management option reviewed.
The following is a brief summary of the results of modelling the current management
system over a 10-year period.
•

•
•

The average increase in net benefit to the fishery under the current
management arrangements was estimated to be $15.4 million. This is the
“base” value against which the other management options are compared. It is
significantly less than the net benefits estimated for the ITQ systems.
Boat numbers were reduced from 549 to 505 (total 44), i.e. it is about the
historic rate of boat decline.
Catch was slightly higher and nominal fishing effort was at least 19 per cent
higher compared to the other management options.

25

Efficiency gains due to “effort creep” come about through technology and other changes that
improve fishing (catching) efficiency.
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Could the Current Effort Control System Deliver Similar
Benefits Compared to ITQs?
There are a number of ways the current management system could deliver some of the
benefits that economic modelling has predicted for ITQ systems that would help ease
the “cost-price squeeze” being experienced by industry today. In general, however,
the benefits from effort reductions (closures and/or pot reductions) and increases in
pot catching efficiency under the current management system would not be expected
to be as large as those predicted for the ITQ systems. This is because effort control
systems (like the current system) encourage catch competition between fishers, which
would not allow the maximum potential benefits of increasing efficiency (reducing
fishing costs) to be fully realised. Having said this, there would still be merit in
exploring the potential benefits that may be obtained by making the current system
more efficient.
Increasing the catching efficiency of pots
With a little more flexibility in the current system, fishers could be allowed to develop
more efficient pots. For example, they could be larger, have multiple necks, side
entrances, and parlours to stop escapement. In particular, more efficient pots could be
used effectively over two- and three-day pulls and so on during high catch rate
periods (e.g. the whites). This might however, further exacerbate the current catch
peaks. Fewer, but more efficient, pots could result in greater net profits for a fisher
due to:
•
•

savings on pot costs, bait and fuel; and
allowing the use of smaller, more economic boats.

Extending the fishing season
If processors and the marketers could demonstrate that there were substantial
economic benefits to be gained by extending the current season into the winter and
spring months (July to October), it could be accommodated under the current
management system. However, a reduction in fishing effort (for example, the number
of pots used or closures) would be necessary during other times of the season (e.g. the
whites when catch volumes are very high and $ returns/kg to fishers can be at their
lowest) to compensate for the extra effort during the extended season.26
Closures during low catch periods
Closures during low catch periods at the beginning and end of the season, between the
whites and reds and over the full moon, would enhance the rock lobster fleet’s overall
economic performance. However, within season closures of any significant length of
time could impact on some markets.

26

It was not possible to estimate with complete accuracy factors influencing prices, noting that most of
the price variation is driven by exchange rates, supply from other sources, cold storage holdings
throughout the world, etc and it is difficult to separate them from other market influences.
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Pot reductions
Pot reductions can produce economic efficiencies by reducing the amount of fishing
gear that needs to be operated. Fewer pots can mean:
•
•
•

less bait used;
less fuel used to set and retrieve pots; and
potentially smaller, more economic boats could be used.

Based on pervious experience, a reduction in pots would also increase demand for and
the value of units (pot) entitlements and could to some degree accelerate the rate at
which boats redistributed (sold) their units (pots) and left the fishery. For example a
significant pot reduction in the order of 20 per cent over 10 years could help drive
further fleet rationalisation and result in a fleet of around 400 to 450 boats. However
as seen in Figure 2 boats are already leaving the industry at a fairly rapid rate.27 It is
argued on purely economic grounds that a smaller fleet would be more efficient and
thereby produce considerable economic benefits for the industry as a whole.
Possible consequences of staying with the current management system
If fishing efficiency continues to increase under the current system, further effort
reductions will be needed to protect the breeding stock. Effort reductions could be in
the form of fewer fishing days (e.g. moon closures) or pot reductions or both. It is
likely that in all cases effort reductions would lead to further reductions in the number
of vessels and a larger number of pots per boat (and possibly larger boats). In the bioeconomic model, the reduction in boats for the current system is factored in at 1 per
cent per year. In reality, this could be significantly higher (e.g. due to the “cost-price
squeeze”) and therefore the model could be underestimating the reduction in boat
numbers that may occur.

Modelling a 20 per cent Pot Reduction
It is recommended that the full economic modelling report A Bio-Economic
Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, by
consultants Economic Research Associates be read in conjunction with this summary.
It is available at www.fish.wa.gov.au or www.rocklobsterwa.com
The main assumptions and management arrangements used to model the 20 per cent
pot reduction were:
•
•
•
•
•

there is a “rush to fish”;
extra cost (above normal costs) of fishing for the season $5,000;28
efficiency of pots increased by 10 per cent.
effort creep/increases in fishing efficiency is two per cent per year;
boat numbers decline at 1.5 per cent per year;

27

Boat numbers have declined from 549 to 495 (down 54) from December 2004 to December 2005.
The extra costs are due to fishers working their remaining gear harder, e.g. taking more time/care to
set pots, using more bait, etc).

28
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•
•

no increase in season (15 Nov to 30 June); and
no price increases.

See Attachment 5 for further details of management rules and model assumptions for
each management option reviewed.
The following is a brief summary of the results of modelling a 20 per cent pot
reduction at two per cent per year over 10 years.
•

•

The average net benefit to the fishery was estimated to be $16.9 million, only
$1.5 million above the net benefit produced by the current management
system with no pot reduction. It is also significantly less than the net benefits
estimated for the ITQ systems.
Boat numbers were reduced from 549 to 480 (total 69), which is 25 more than
the model estimated would leave the fishery under the current management
system with no pot reduction.

A Modified, More Flexible Effort Control
System
This section discusses the key issues and potential benefits of moving to a modified,
more flexible individual transferable effort (ITE) control management system and it
briefly compares the economic modelling results of this system with the other
management options that were modelled for this review.
The current system could be modified to allow fishers greater operating flexibility,
while at the same time meeting the ecologically sustainable development
requirements for the stock. However, to gain the potential economic benefits this ITE
system could offer, would require fishers to accept that fishing effort (i.e. the number
of pots they could fish and the number of days they could go fishing) may be varied
up or down each (or every second or third) season according to:
•
•
•
•
•

the catch predictions;
fishery sustainability issues, such as breeding stock levels;
ecological issues, e.g. legal size abundance levels;
economic factors, such as levels of supply, market demand and prices; and
social considerations.

This system would retain the current competitive nature of the fishery (the “rush to
fish”) and it would be a more complex system to administer and manage than the
current system.

How a Flexible ITE System Would Work
A flexible ITE system would work in a similar way to ITQs, except it would be the
level of fishing effort (pot numbers and fishing days) that would be varied rather than
the level of catch. Fishers would have a fixed number of days they could fish over an
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extended season (e.g. November to August) and it would be up to each individual to
decide how to use his fishing days.
An ITE Committee would need to be established and it would recommend to the
Minister for Fisheries the appropriate level of fishing effort each season (or for a
number of seasons). Effort levels could be set up to three seasons in advance based
on catch predictions, and the other considerations listed above. The ITE Committee
would review the available information each year and set the appropriate level of
effort to take the available sustainable catch. The simplest and most direct way to set
fishing effort levels would be to vary the number of pots and days that could be fished
each season. The ITE Committee could also recommend closing the fishery during
low catch periods (e.g. for five days over the full moon) or to reduce fishing effort
during the peaks of the whites and reds to help smooth the flow of product and
increase the value of the catch and hence the beach price paid to fishers.
A hypothetical example of a flexible ITE system
Zone X has 30,000 unit (pot) entitlements and a season that runs from 15 November
to 31 August (289 days). If the catch predicted for Zone X was 4.5 million kg and the
ITE Committee could, after taking breeding stock levels and other ecological and
economic factors into consideration, set the level of fishing effort for the season at
4,100,000 pot lifts over 185 days29. Therefore, the combination of 30,000 unit
entitlements and 185 fishing days would have to equal 4,100,000 pot lifts and the
equation to calculate the value of each unit of entitlement would be:
4,100,000 (pot lifts) ÷ [185 (days) x 30,000 (units)] = 0.72
To calculate the number of pots a fisher could use, the fisher would multiply the
number of units owned by 0.72. For example, a fisher with 110 units would be able to
use 79 pots (110 x 0.72 = 79).
Note: A number of different combinations of pots used and days fished would have
given the same level of fishing effort, i.e. total number of pot lifts for the season
(4,100,000).

Key Issues
Most of the key issues and benefits of a more flexible ITE system are the same as
those discussed above under the section Current Rock Lobster Effort Management
System (ITE), therefore they will not be repeated here. However, the additional
complexity of this system compared to the current system needs to be acknowledged
and fishers would have to accept that their fishing effort would be varied each season
(or possibly every second or third season), i.e. number of pots to used and number of
days fishing.

Benefits
An additional benefit of this system compared to the current system, is that it enables
fishing effort to be controlled through a flexible system of limits on pot usage and
29

The average number of days currently fished per season.
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days fished, which are fully transferable between seasons. And, once the system
“matured”, could be transferable within season. This would allow fishers to trade in
ITEs to increase or decrease their potential catch and to take their catch at the most
profitable time (i.e. depending on rock lobster catchability, abundance and price/kg).
It would also encourage fishers to use more multiple day pulls, particularly during the
lower catch rate periods of the season.

Implementation and Costs
A modified, more flexible ITE system could be implemented through the current
management licensing systems with some additional modifications and costs. A unit
(pot) register would be necessary to keep track of unit trading and management and
enforcement software and hardware would need to be modified and updated to enable
it to interface with the new system in “real time”. In addition, all vessels would have
to be fitted with Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS).
These management
requirements and additional costs would be the same for all the management options
reviewed.
Assumptions and limitations of the modelling
It needs to be emphasised that due to the complexity of this management option, the
bio-economic model used a much simpler version of the system than described in the
section How A Flexible ITE System Would Work above. In the simplified model
version, effort levels were not set based on the catch predictions or breeding stock
levels. Instead, the number of fishing days for each year was held constant at 185,
and there was no variation in the number of pots that could be used. This means there
is significantly less flexibility in the modelled system than there would be in practice
and hence the opportunity for the industry to increase efficiencies (e.g. reduce capital
and operating costs) could be significantly underestimated in the model outputs.
Therefore, the average annual net benefits could also be significantly greater for this
option than the model estimates.

A CATCH QUOTA SYSTEM (ITQs)
This section discusses the key issues and potential benefits of moving to an individual
transferable quota (ITQ) management system. Two ITQ systems – one with the
current effort (pot number) controls and one without30 (significantly fewer) fishing
effort controls – are assessed, and the bio-economic modelling results from both
systems are compared with the other management options that were modelled for this
review. Also discussed are the use of constant, variable and competitive quotas and
quotas for the whites and reds periods of the rock lobster fishery.

30

The ITQ system without effort controls that was modelled for this review does not have uncontrolled
effort. It has been limited to a 20 per cent increase in the number of pots fishers can use because
experience in other ITQ lobster fisheries has shown that fishers do not use excessive numbers of pots,
when controls on pot numbers are removed.
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Key Issues
Risks associated with constant (fixed), variable and competitive quotas
If it was decided to move to an ITQ system, there are two ways of setting the quota:
•
•

a constant quota which does not vary from year to year (i.e. it could be set for
five, 10, or more years at a time), or
a variable quota based on catch predictions, which would vary each year.

Modelling has shown that the annual $ benefits of a constant quota are greater than for
a variable quota system. However, there is a far greater risk of depleting the breeding
stock under a constant quota (particularly during low recruitment years), unless it is
set at a very conservative level,31 which significantly reduces the $ benefits.
Therefore, from a sustainability and economic perspective, the use of a constant quota
from year to year would be difficult to justify. So while a constant quota has been
modelled and reported on as part of this review, it is not considered a viable or
practicable management option. Therefore, variable quotas would be the basis of any
ITQ system for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery.
Variable quotas would be set annually based on the catch predictions for the season
(using puerulus settlement) and would take into account the level of breeding stock,
ecological factors, quota cheating, etc. Variable quotas would go up and down
annually in response to the predicted level of catch.
The use of a competitive Total Allowable Commercial Catch quota (TACC), i.e.
where a total quota is set for the commercial fishery and fishers compete for their
share of the catch (with either limited or unlimited pots), was not considered a viable
alternative management option. Experience around the world has shown that
competitive quotas combine the worst aspects of both quota and effort control systems
and they are the most unpredictable regarding their impact on long-term sustainability
(e.g. breeding stock levels). Therefore, this review has focused on ITQs.
Quota allocation
The State Government has stated that if it were decided that the rock lobster fishery
should move to an ITQ management system:
•
•
•
•

the catch would be allocated on the basis of the number of units (pots) a
person owned;
a fisher’s catch history would not be taken into account;
a quota would be set for each zone of the fishery (A, B and C); and
each fisher’s share of the zone quota would be calculated on the number of
units (pots) he owned.

Catch history would not be used in an ITQ allocation process because it would distort
the value of authorisations (entitlements) for the following reasons:
31

possibly as low as 9 to 9,500 tonnes/year
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•

•

•

It is possible in this fishery to link catch at a given time to a managed fishery
licence (MFL). But the MFL is not the ‘currency’ of the fishery – the gear
unit (pot) is the currency of the fishery. The extent of trading in units (buying,
selling and leasing) that has occurred within the market over the years means
that it is simply not possible to track with administrative efficiency or
accuracy, the ownership or fishing history of each unit in the fishery.
The market for rock lobster units of entitlement factors in the expected
earnings into the value of the units, and this therefore represents the truest
judgement of their worth. The market does not differentiate between low and
high catches of lobster when valuing units for sale. All units have equal value
in the market.
The strength of the lease market for rock lobster units of entitlement means
that “owners” are not limited to fishing in order to use their entitlement to
develop an income stream.

Allocation issues are often the stumbling block for the introduction of an ITQ system
in a fishery that is already well established. This is because when it is done on the
basis of units owned, it significantly changes many fishers’ share of the catch.
Often fisheries that make the transition to quota management do so from a
management system where there has not been sufficient controls on fishing effort. In
these cases, they have failed to protect the breeding stock and ecology generally and
cannot ensure the long-term sustainability of the fish stocks being exploited. The
review of the current rock lobster effort control system has not been initiated because
the current system has not ensured the sustainability of the rock lobster stocks.
Rather, the review was undertaken to see if a different management system could
offer any additional benefits (ecological, social, economic) that would warrant a
change.
Maintaining biological controls to ensure sustainability
Under a quota system, the biological controls such as minimum size, protection of
berried, tar spot, setose and maximum size females, would be maintained in one form
or another as part of the long-term sustainability settings.
Maintaining effort (pot number) controls
If it were decided to move to an ITQ system, there are two main ways it could be
introduced – with effort controls or without them. Initially, an ITQ system would
have to be introduced with the current effort controls in place to enable everyone
(fishers, processors, government, fisheries managers, researchers and other
stakeholders) to become accustomed to the new arrangements and to monitor its effect
on the fishery. This is known as the transition period, during which the system can
stabilise and all the teething problems can be sorted out. Once the ITQ system has
stabilised, consideration could be given to relaxing fishing effort (pot number)
controls. An ITQ without any fishing effort controls (e.g. controls on pot numbers,
pot design, season, etc) would theoretically provide the maximum economic benefits
an ITQ system could deliver.
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This review does assess an ITQ system without effort (pot) controls. However, in the
model the increase in pot numbers under this system has been limited to 20 per cent,
as experience in other fisheries has shown that when fishers are allowed to use as
many pots as they like to take their quota, they do not use excessive numbers. In New
Zealand for instance, fishers use about 20 per cent more pots.32 Pot usage is
controlled largely by the vessel’s carrying capacity and how many pots can be worked
effectively each day. It is not cost effective for a fisher to buy and use more pots than
is necessary to take his quota in the most cost effective way.
Exploitation
Under a catch quota system, fishers don’t have to be concerned about increases in
fishing effort leading to increases in exploitation and hence the need to reduce fishing
effort. This is because the exploitation of the stock is controlled by setting tight limits
on the amount that can be caught rather than on fishing effort. If breeding stocks
levels declined, quotas would need to be reduced.
Catch quotas are usually set at a level a little below what could be obtained under an
effort control system because of the uncertainties inherent in quota setting. This can
allow more lobsters to survive each season and hence the overall abundance of
lobsters to increase, which provides a ‘buffer’ against:
•
•
•

uncertainties in the catch predictions that are used as the basis of quota setting;
illegal catches going to the black market (i.e. quota cheating); and
unanticipated responses of the fishing fleet and the rock lobster stocks to
exploitation and environmental factors.

Conservative quota setting also ensures that fishers can catch their quota each season
without risking the sustainability of the stock.
If fishery independent monitoring shows that the abundance of rock lobsters has
increased and is consistently above the level required for ecological sustainability,
then the quota could be set higher to harvest some of them.
Competition Between Fishers
Under an ITQ management system, the emphasis shifts from competition between
fishers to maximise the amount of catch they take to maximising the $ value of their
quota (i.e. catching the highest value lobsters) and minimising their fishing costs.
There is no “reward” or incentive for fishers to fish harder to try and maximise their
catch because their quota limits it. The only way to increase catch is to buy or lease
more quota.
When a fisher knows prior to the commencement of the season what his catch quota is
and is confident he will catch it, competition between fishers is significantly reduced
and the emphasis shifts to fishing “smarter” to reduce the costs of the fishing
32

Information provided by Economic Research Associates. It has also been note in New Zealand that
fishers will use extra pots to secure and retain ground rather than to increase their effort, which could
generate significant ecological and resource sharing issues.
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operation to maximise net profit. This is the fundamental and important difference
between effort and quota management systems.
Although a quota system may produce on average a little less catch than an effort
control system, it could provide greater stability in economic, social and ecological
terms. This could translate into higher net profits for fishers and greater benefits to
the community and marine environment generally.
Impact of ITQ allocation on a fisher’s catch and behaviour
The ITQ allocation could encourage fleet restructuring to occur at an accelerated rate,
particularly within the first few years, as those who remain in the fishery seek to
adjust their quota holdings to the level of catch they had prior to ITQ allocation.
People who own multiple boats and ITQs could be inclined to aggregate their ITQs
onto fewer boats. The more proficient fishers are more likely to drive this adjustment.
When fishers and other people who own pots weigh up the advantages and
disadvantages of effort controls versus quota control systems, they usually do so from
the perspective of whether the catch they would be allocated under a quota system
would be more or less than the catch they would expect to take under the existing
effort control system. ITQ systems, where initial allocation is based on the number of
units (pots) owned, make all fishers average catchers. Whereas effort control systems
encourage fishers to maximise their catches by being highly competitive. ITQs allow
fishers to concentrate their efforts on reducing their fishing costs without the fear of
being out-competed by other fishers.
Competition between fishers may continue to some extent under ITQs (e.g. it could
still concentrate in the highest catch periods – whites and reds) until fishers adjust to
the new system and the market may take some time to provide the appropriate
feedback on when to fish. Therefore, the increase in profits due to greater
efficiencies, reduced costs and increased prices could take some time to be fully
realised.
The advantages and disadvantages of effort and quota systems are much more
complex than just who would catch the most under the different management systems.
The amount of rock lobsters a fisher catches is only one part of the equation that
generates the net profit of the business. The other very important parts of the profit
equation are:
•
•

how much it costs to catch each kg of rock lobsters; and
the opportunities the different management systems offer to maximise the
price received for the catch.

It may appear at first glance that an above average fisher would be worse off under
quota, because his share of the catch would be less than what he would get under a
competitive effort control system. However, the potential to reduce fishing costs and
maximise the price received for his catch could significantly offset or out-weigh the
reduction in catch. Below-average fishers could be seen as the big winners in moving
to a quota system, as their share of the catch would increase and they may also be able
to reduce their fishing costs and maximise the price they received for their catch.
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However, some below-average catchers may have to fish more days and/or use more
pots to achieve their quota or they may choose to sell or lease some of it.
It also needs to be noted that fishers who catch above-average under the current
management system do not always make the most profit per kg of lobsters caught.
Indeed as the cost of fishing increases – as is occurring now with increases in prices
such as diesel, bait, labour, maintenance, and insurance – fishing “harder” for a few
extra kilos is sometimes not cost effective, i.e. the cost of fishing can exceed the profit
from the catch.
Impact of ITQs on the peak catching periods
ITQs could encourage fishers to concentrate on the most productive periods of the
season (whites – December/January, and reds – March/April). This would be more
likely to occur if there were no controls on pot numbers or if there weren’t a price
differential throughout the season (e.g. higher prices paid at the end of the season).
As already stated, ITQs would initially be implemented using the same controls on
pots (numbers and design) as apply under the current system.
The annual starting date of the ITQ season could be critical in determining fishing
patterns. If the season started in November, fishers may be reluctant to forgo any
fishing during the ‘high catch rate’ whites period, because of concerns about their
ability to achieve their full quota during the ‘low catch rate’ periods later in the year,
particularly May-August. This could even exacerbate the catches in the peak periods.
However, if the season started in February/March, fishers could maximise their effort
through to the end of August and if they had achieved a significant proportion of their
quota, they may reduce their effort in the following whites period.
Effects on new entrants and potential new business approaches
It has been suggested that, compared to the current system, ITQs could limit the scope
for new entrants to the fishery to fish hard and maximise their catch to help them to
pay off their loans. Under an ITQ system, fishers maximise their profit by focusing
on reducing the cost of fishing, rather than increasing catch. Under an effort control
system, new entrants have the opportunity to work harder to increase their catch and
hence their profits, which could give them greater capacity to meet their loan
repayments.
ITQs could see significant new innovations around fishing operations such as:
•
•
•
•

pots with multiple necks;
bait savers;
more fuel efficient engines;
fishing closer to port to reduce costs, etc.

Under quotas, there is likely to be much greater heterogeneity of the fleet (i.e. a
greater variety of boats and gear). These could include new vessel designs to optimise
the quota arrangements for a particular vessel (e.g. a vessel that specialises in fishing
distant grounds such as Big Bank).
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Experience in other fisheries has also shown that some fishers (particularly if
financially pressed) would reduce their maintenance costs on boats and gear, which
could affect vessel safety.
Cheating on quota
Unfortunately, no matter what management system is used, there will always be a
small number of fishers and processors/buyers that break the rules. The amount of
quota cheating that takes place would have to be quantified and taken off the
commercial quota that was set to ensure that the total catch (legal + illegal catch) was
sustainable.
For example, if it were estimated that the commercial quota for a zone should be
4,000,000 kg, but it was estimated that there was a 5 per cent illegal commercial take,
then the commercial quota that would be allocated would be 4,000,000 kg minus 5 per
cent, that is, 3,800,000 kg. That is, each fisher’s ITQ would be reduced by 5 per cent
from what it would have been if there were no illegal catch.
In some quota fisheries in Australia and New Zealand (e.g. abalone and lobster),
illegal quota is a serious management problem that the industry has to pay for by
reducing ITQs and increasing enforcement costs. If a fisher is under financial
pressure, there is considerable incentive to cheat on quota. And if there is collusion
between a fisher and a buyer/processor, it likely that it would be more difficult to
detect him taking 10 per cent more illegal quota than it would if he were working 10
per cent more pots illegally under the current management system.
Compliance
Quotas require a very high degree of enforcement, significantly more than the current
management system. There would need to be very tight security around and
surveillance/inspection of weigh-in stations (which may need to be restricted in
number and require special supervision) and consignment dockets (the electronic and
paper audit trail) to enable a fisher’s catch to be followed from his fishing boat to the
“dinner plate” (end user), on a daily basis, i.e. in real time. There would be a
requirement for fishers to keep accurate documentation for every kilo of lobster that
they sold and they may also have to count all lobsters they consign, as they do in
South Australia.
Enforcement would become much more intrusive, black and white, and knifed-edged
under a quota system33. There would also need to be severe penalties for quota
cheating to keep the black market from undermining the ITQ system.
It is estimated that there would be a one-off enforcement/management cost of about
$1 million to set up an ITQ system and an additional ongoing
enforcement/management cost of about $3 million annually. The additional costs
have been included in the bio-economic modelling.

33

For further discussion see report ‘How do Quota Management Systems work in Rock Lobster
Fisheries?’ at www.fish.wa.gov.au or www.lobsterwa.com
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Research
Historic catch and effort information would not be comparable to that under ITQs
because of changes in fishing behaviour, pot catching efficiency, etc. Fishery data
collected from commercial research logbooks and statutory monthly returns under an
ITQ system would not be as useful for stock assessment purposes. Therefore,
additional research would have to be undertaken particularly the collection of fishery
independent (not obtained from the commercial fishery) stock data. For example, this
data could include length frequencies, breeding stock abundance, stock densities, etc,
to ensure that accurate stock assessments were produced and that quotas were being
set at sustainable levels.
In addition, any changes to pot design to increase catching efficiency would have to
be calibrated against a ‘standard’ pot to allow comparisons of catch rates and hence
abundance estimates, if commercial fishing data were to be at all useful for stock
assessment purposes.
It is estimated that the additional ongoing research cost would be about $1.1 million
annually. The additional costs have been included in the bio-economic modelling.

Legal Framework and Procedures Required for ITQs
If it were decided that the fishery was to move to an ITQ system, the details of the
framework and process would be developed in conjunction with all relevant
stakeholders at the time. Below is an example of what such a legal framework and
process might look like.
Legal framework
A legal framework would need to be established to allocate quota in the first instance
and to set quota on an ongoing basis. The main aspects could include:
•
•

•

•

a specific Act of Parliament to enshrine the initial quota allocation and perhaps
the annual quota setting procedure;
a Quota Setting Committee established under the current Fish Resources
Management Act (FRMA) 1994, which would recommend quota levels to the
State Government. The committee could comprise relevant members of
government, commercial and recreational fishers, processors, the conservation
sector, and community stakeholder groups. The composition of the committee
would depend on whether a Total Allowable Catch (TAC – for all sectors, e.g.
customary, commercial and recreational) was being set for the fishery as a
whole, as distinct from a quota for the commercial fishery;
a Technical Advisory Committee for quota allocation, which would calculate
quota levels based on a clear set of sustainability principles. This committee
would be comprised of scientific experts and fisheries managers and they
would advise and make recommendations to the Quota Setting Committee;
a new management plan under the FRMA to clearly set out the rules of the
quota management system, including transfers of quota (buying, selling and
leasing);
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•
•

new regulations and penalties for quota enforcement; and
development of new systems or modification of the current legal, licensing,
quota registrations and enforcement systems (e.g. paper trail audits of fishers
and processors).

Quota setting procedure
A possible quota setting process for the commercial fishery is briefly described below.
Quotas would always be set at ecologically sustainable levels.
•

•

•

•

For each zone (A, B and C) the biological information on puerulus settlement,
catch predictions, rock lobster stock status (size and sex frequencies,
abundances, etc), breeding stock levels and ecological issues would be
compiled, modelled, analysed and documented by research scientists.
The Technical Advisory Committee (comprising scientific experts) would use
a set of clear business rules to review and assess the biological information
and calculate the level of quota that it believed should be set for each zone (A,
B and C). The Technical Advisory Committee would then make a
recommendation to the Quota Setting Committee.
The Quota Setting Committee would assess the Technical Advisory
Committee’s recommendation and supporting documentation. It would also
take into account any other ecological, economic, social or management issues
it considered relevant before it made its recommendation on quota levels to the
Minister for Fisheries.
The Quota Setting Committee would meet at least annually, with a view of
setting quota three years in advance.

The Basis of Quota Setting
Conservative quota setting
To account for uncertainty around catch predictions and unforeseen environmental
influences, catch quotas are traditionally set below the catch that could potentially be
realised in an effort controlled fishery. In the short term (e.g. five years) this could
produce slightly lower catches (though not necessarily lower $ returns). However,
conservative quota setting can lead to an increase in abundance of the overall lobster
population, which could result in:
•
•
•

greater catching efficiency, i.e. because of the generally higher abundance of
lobsters, they are easier and quicker to catch and hence there can be significant
savings on operating costs (e.g. pot numbers, bait, travelling time, etc);
higher catches at times of the season when catches are normally low; and
greater ecological stability due to a higher density of all sizes of lobsters on
the fishing grounds, which would result in less impact overall on the
general/rock lobster ecology.34

34

It could be argued that it would also be possible to gain these benefits under an effort control system
if the level of fishing effort was set conservatively enough. In addition, industry could argue for higher
quotas if the lobster abundance went above that required for ecological sustainability.
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Quota management issues
Commercial35 catch quota setting for each zone would be done taking into account the
following:
•

•

•
•
•

•

Catch predictions: The catch predictions, which are predictions of
recruitment levels to the fishery based on the levels of puerulus settlement that
occurred in the previous three to four years, would be used to set the quota for
each zone. For example, if the catch prediction for a zone was between 4.5
and 5.0 million kg, then the quota could be set at 4.5 million kg. The lower
end of the catch prediction would initially be used to minimise the risk of
impacting on the ecological sustainability of the stock, due to the uncertainties
inherent in predicting catch, unforseen changes in fishing fleet responses and
lobster behaviour due to changing patterns of exploitation and the natural
variations that occur in environmental factors.
Breeding stock: The level of breeding stock in each zone would be
maintained above the level it was in the late 1970s-early 1980s (the current
trigger points for management action). Quotas would be adjusted to ensure the
breeding stock was maintained above this level.
Ecological sustainability: The broad requirements of ecologically sustainable
development would also be taken into account in quota setting.
Illegal catch: A reduction in commercial quota allocation would be required
to offset any illegal (unreported) catch, due to some fishers cheating on their
quota. See the section Cheating on quota below for further discussion.
Increases in lobster abundance: If over a number of years, fishery
independent research monitoring showed that rock lobster abundances on the
fishing grounds had increased and were consistently well above the level
required for both sustainability and ecological purposes, then the quota could
be increased for a number of seasons to harvest the surplus.
The timing of the start of the season: There could be a big impact on fishers’
behaviour depending on which month the quota season started. For instance,
if the season started in February after the whites or in May after the reds,
fishers may adopt different fishing strategies to those they currently use. This
would be further compounded if there were also significant difference in
price/kg for different periods of the season (e.g. lower prices in the whites).

Zone Quotas
If the rock lobster fishery moved to an ITQ system, a quota would be set for each
zone – A, B and C. Quotas could be set in the following way:
•

‘A’ fishers would have a quota in Zone B that they could catch up until the 14
March. ‘A’ fishers would then move to Zone A where they would have a
quota from 15 March to the end of the season, allocated on the basis of how
many units (pots) were held on a licence.

35

There would be a separate quota set for recreational fishers, based on the percentage share of the total
catch negotiated through the Integrated Fisheries Management process, which is currently underway.
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•

•

•

‘B’ fishers would have one quota in Zone B up until 14 March and another
quota in Zone B from 15 March to the end of the season, allocated on the basis
of how many units (pots) were held on a licence. ‘B’ fishers could also be
allowed to shift whites quota into the reds fishery, but not vice versa.
‘A’ and ‘B’ fishers could have their quotas for the period 15 November to 14
March calculated as a proportion of total catch taken in Zone B in the
following way:
o Catch for the period 15 November to 14 March could be averaged over
a 10-year period as a percentage of total catch in Zone B (15
November to end 30 June) and this percentage could then be used to
split future quotas between these two periods of the season.
o The quota calculated for the period 15 November to 14 March would
be allocated to ‘A’ and ‘B’ fishers on the basis of the number of units
held on a licence.
Zone C fishers could have one quota for the whole season allocated on the
basis of how many units (pots) were held on a licence.

Whites and Reds Quotas
Industry may decide that within an ITQ system there are significant processing,
marketing – and hence beach price benefits – in having quotas on the whites (e.g.
December-January) and reds (March-April) catch periods. Whites and reds quotas
could be used to reduce some of the peak catches and make more lobsters available in
traditionally lower catch periods (e.g. February and May-August). A quota for the
whites could also be used to ensure sufficient migrating lobsters escaped the fishery to
replenish the breeding stock on the offshore deeper water reefs and at the southern
and northern ends of the fishery.
If there were significant economic advantages to be obtained, a catch quota could also
be considered for the first two to four weeks of the Abrolhos Islands season to help
reduce the very high catch peak and spread product over a longer period. As
previously mentioned, the way fishers would distribute their quota between the whites
and reds peaks would depend to a large extent on the start time to the quota season.

Potential Benefits of ITQs
The main potential benefits that ITQ systems could offer are described below:
•
•
•

substantial potential economic benefits;
competition between fishers for catch would be significantly reduced over
time,36 provided the quota was set at a level where it could always be taken;
fishers are able to use innovation and technology to reduce fishing costs
without the fear of loosing catch to more competitive fishers. For example:
o more efficient pot designs (pots that catch more and retain lobsters
better),
o more economic boats and baiting strategies,

36

Some local competition may occur as local rock lobster abundances are fished down, i.e. to fill their
quota fishers may have to travel further than they would prefer.
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•

•

o greater use of two- or more day pulls using more effective pots (i.e.
pots that keep catching over a longer period of time and don’t allow
lobsters to escape), etc;
if quotas help to flatten out the catch peaks (whites, reds and Abrolhos) and
processors/marketers can realise price premiums through more stable and
extended supply (fewer peaks and longer season), then quotas have the
potential to generate higher returns from the catch;
fishers can choose when they fish to maximise their profits and to suit their
lifestyle.

ITQs with Effort Controls
This section describes how a variable ITQ system with the current fishing effort (pot
numbers) controls would work in practice.
Variable ITQs would be used for the reasons discussed above. Zone quotas would be
set annually based on catch predictions and the status of the breeding stock.
Note: As stated above, if it were decided to move to a quota system, then ITQs with
fishing effort controls would be the system that would initially be introduced. If
additional economic benefits could be gained, then effort controls could be relaxed
over time as the new system stabilised and evolved.

How an Effort Controlled ITQ System Would Work
Under an ITQ system which is effort controlled, a fisher would be allocated a quota
based on the number of units held on his licence and he would only be able to use the
number of pots he can use under the current system. However, the pots could be 15
per cent more efficient due to changes in pot design. Below is a description of one
way such a system could work.
Quota allocation
• Initial and all subsequent quota allocations would be based on the number of
units held on a licence and the units would relate directly to the number of pots
that could be used, as is the case under the current system.
• Prior to the commencement of each season, unit holders would be told what
their quota was for the season based on the zone quota and the number of units
they held.
• For example, if the zone quota were 3,500,000 kg and the number of units in
the zone were 27,000, then each unit would be allocated 129.6 kg. A person
with 110 units would have a total ITQ of 14,256 kg at the start of the season.
If, as is currently the case, a fisher could use only 0.82 of his units, he would
be able to fish his quota with 90 pots (i.e. 110 units x 0.82 = 90 pots in the
water).
Quota/pot transfers and pot usage
A clear set of business rules for quota/pot transfers would need to be developed with
stakeholders. Transfers of quota and pots (buying, selling, leasing) would initially
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only be allowed prior to the season, but as the system evolved over time, transfers
during the season could be considered. The more flexible the transfer system was
required to be, the more complex it would be, particularly if there was a strict link
between quota and pot usage. For examples of how within season transfers could
work see Attachment 6.

ITQs Without Effort Controls
Note: As stated above, if it were decided to move to a quota system, then ITQs with
fishing effort controls would be the system that would initially be introduced. If
additional economic benefits could be gained, then effort controls could be relaxed
over time as the new system stabilised and evolved.
An ITQ system without effort controls is theoretically the management system that
offers the greatest potential economic benefits for the rock lobster industry. However,
these potential benefits have to be weighed up against the risks, as described under the
Key Issues section above.
This section describes how a variable ITQ system without effort controls would work
in practice. Variable ITQs would be used for the reasons discussed above and zone
quotas would be set annually based on catch predictions and the status of the breeding
stock.
From experience in other fisheries, ITQs without effort controls (no controls on pot
numbers) do not lead to excessive increases in pots in the water. Pot numbers are
largely limited by the carrying capacity of the boats and the number that can be
effectively worked each day. Once fishers become used to an ITQ system, they
appear to use the most cost-effective number of pots to take their quota.
For this review and the bio-economic modelling exercise, it has been assumed (from
experience in other fisheries) that in practice fishers would not increase their fishing
effort excessively under this system (as discussed under Maintaining effort (pot
number) controls), even though no pot limits would apply. Therefore, an increase in
pot numbers of 20 per cent and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of a
pot (through changes in pot design) has been used in the model. This equates to an
increase in catching efficiency of the “standard” boat of about 68 per cent. Under the
model’s assumptions, the ability to significantly increase the catching efficiency of
the boats would encourage a significant number of them to sell their quota and leave
the fishery.

How an ITQ System Without Effort Controls Could Work
A variable ITQ system without effort controls would work in almost the same way as
described for a variable ITQ system with effort controls. A fisher would be allocated
a quota based on the number of units held on the licence and he would only be able to
use 20 per cent more pots (as modelled) than he could use under the current system.
Below is a description of one way such a system could work.
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Quota allocation
• Initial and all subsequent quota allocations would be based on the number of
units held and 20 per cent more pots than the current number could be used to
take the quota.
• Prior to the commencement of each season, unit holders would be told what
their quota was for the season based on the zone quota and number of units
held.
• For example, if the zone quota were 3,500,000 kg and the number of units in
the zone were 27,000, then each unit would be allocated 129.6 kg. A person
with 110 units would have a total ITQ of 14,256 kg at the start of the season.
• A fisher could use 20 per cent more pots than his current units to fish his
quota, i.e. 110 units x 120 per cent (or 1.20) = 132 pots in the water).
Quota transfers and pot usage
A clear set of business rules for quota/pot transfers would need to be developed with
stakeholders. Transfers of quota (buying, selling, leasing) would initially only be
allowed prior to the season, but as the system evolved over time, transfers during the
season could be considered. For an example of how within season transfers could
work, see Attachment 6.

Comparisons Between Effort and Quota
Management Systems – Results of Bio-economic
Modelling
This section describes and discusses the main assumptions and management rules that
have been used in the bio-economic model37, some of the model’s limitations, and the
care that needs to be taken in interpreting the model’s results. A summary and
general comparison is made of the model estimates of average annual $ benefits for
the 11 management option variations that were assessed. A more detailed description
and discussion of the model outputs for breeding stock levels, annual catch and
fishing effort, boat numbers and economic benefits is also provided for four of the
management options, which had the most conservative assumptions (e.g. lowest price
increases).
A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock
Lobster Fishery, produced by Economic Research Associates (ERA) and referred to
as the ERA report, should be read in conjunction with this section.38

37

More details of the management arrangements and model assumptions for each of the management
options are provided in Attachment 5 (Tables A and B).
38
See A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster
Fishery, produced by Economic Research Associates on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at
www.fish.wa.gov.au or the Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site www.rocklobsterwa.com or
phone the Department of Fisheries on 9482 7267 for a hard copy.
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Key Issues and Assumptions Of The Bio-Economic Model
Accuracy of the model
ERA, the consultants who have undertaken the bio-economic modelling of the
Western Rock Lobster Fishery have obtained the information on the assumptions that
underpin the model from:
•
•
•
•
•

a survey of commercial fishers (postal questionnaire – 21 respondents);
detailed discussions with focus groups of fishers, processors, research
scientists and managers;
scientific publications;
Department of Fisheries’ databases; and
Australian Bureau of Statistics.

ERA have tested the model outputs against the historical fishery information (e.g.
catch and fishing effort, catch rate (kg/pot lift), distribution of catch by month, boat
and pot numbers, beach prices, etc) and the fits are good, therefore they believe the
model is behaving in a realistic and reliable way. ERA believe that based on the
assumptions used, the model outputs provide robust estimates of what could happen to
the fishery under the different management options.
For example, under the ITQ system with reduced effort (pot number) controls – i.e.
options 4a to 4d where pot usage has been allowed to increase by 20 per cent) the
fishing season was lengthened to 31 August, the average beach price was increased by
between $1.25/kg and $5.50/kg, and the catching efficiency of the pots was increased
by 40 per cent through changes in pot design – the model predicts the fishery would
gain a significant annual benefit in excess of $80 million. The model estimates these
large benefits because it assumes that fishers would make changes to their normal
fishing behaviour to maximise their profits by, for instance, catching some of their
quota in July-August when the price is higher and the increase in pot efficiency could
allow them to work two- and three-day pulls very economically.
The model shows that the major catch peaks in the whites and the reds are still
dominant under ITQs but are reduced a little, which allows more rock lobsters to be
available in traditionally low catch rate periods and during the extended season, when
prices are higher. The model appears to be realistic in that it does not allow fishers to
concentrate their entire quota in periods of high price, because the
catchability/availability of lobsters in those periods is relatively low, so only a modest
portion of the quota could be taken at that time.
If the price increases and efficiency gains used in the model are lower than expected,
the $ benefits that would flow from the management options based on these
assumptions would be significantly reduced.
To give an indication of how “realistic” the model outputs are, the average number of
pot lifts and the average catch (kg) per month for Zone C are shown below as
examples of what the model estimates for some of the different management options.
Note that 3c and 3d and 4c and 4d overlay each other, so it is difficult to distinguish
between them.
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[Note: Sc = Scenario; Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current
management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3c and 3d = variable ITQ with the
current effort (pot number) controls and price increases of $2.00/kg and $1.00/kg respectively;
Scenario 4c and 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are
increased by 20 per cent, and price increases of $2.50/kg and $1.25/kg respectively. Graphs 3c and 3d
and 4c and 4d overlay each other, so it is difficult to distinguish between them.]
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[Note: Sc = Scenario; Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current
management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3c and 3d = variable ITQ with the
current effort (pot number) controls and price increases of $2.00/kg and $1.00/kg respectively;
Scenario 4c and 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are
increased by 20 per cent, and price increases of $2.50/kg and $1.25/kg respectively. Graphs 3c and 3d
and 4c and 4d overlay each other, so it is difficult to distinguish between them.]

One factor that has not been modelled, which would be likely to have a significant
impact on fisher behaviour and the potential $ benefits that could be gained by
moving to an ITQ system, is the start time for the quota season. For instance, if the
quota season started in February or May, fishers would use different fishing strategies
to what they would use for a traditional November start.
Modelling fleet efficiency/economic gains
An important aspect of ERA’s bio-economic modelling was to determine if any of the
management options offered additional gains in fleet efficiency, that is, greater annual
net economic benefits ($ profits) compared to the current system. In the model, the
fleet efficiency gains were calculated and expressed as reductions in boat numbers.
That is, economic theory implies (and the model assumes) that fewer boats in the fleet
mean more catch per boat = lower costs/kg of lobsters caught. This, in turn, means a
more efficient fleet overall and greater net profits/benefits.
However, increasing fleet efficiency and net profits do not necessarily just involve
boats leaving the fishery. Fleet efficiency can also be increased, particularly under an
ITQ system, if fishers reduce their individual operating costs, e.g. use smaller, less
costly and more economic boats and implement strategies to save on fuel, bait, labour
and costs. Therefore, the significant economic gains ($), due to fleet efficiency
increases (the significant reduction in boat numbers), that the model has predicted for
the ITQ system with reduced effort (pot number) controls (i.e. it allows a 20 per cent
increase in pot numbers) are, in practice, more than likely to be made up of a
combination of reduced operating costs and fewer boats, rather than just fewer boats
in the fleet. The current model cannot provide separate estimates of reductions in
individual boat operating costs compared to the economic gains that can be attributed
to reductions in boat numbers. However, it is reasonable to assume that the economic
efficiency gains from fleet reduction can be used as a proxy for the efficiency gains.
ITEs and pot reductions
Bio-economic modelling shows that under the current ITE (effort control)
management system, a pot reduction (e.g. 20 per cent at two per cent per year over 10
years) would reduce the number of boats faster than the current system with no pot
reduction, but not to the same extent as the ITQ system with reduced controls on pots
numbers. A 20 per cent pot reduction under the current system would, according to
the model, also result in slightly greater fleet economic ($) benefits than the current
system without a pot reduction. But it would not yield nearly the same $ benefits as
ITQs. The majority of the gains under the ITE systems (including the 20 per cent pot
reduction) would come through a reduction in the number of boats (i.e. the fleet
would comprise fewer boats with larger numbers of pots) rather than a reduction in
individual fisher’s operating costs. This is because under the current ITE system
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(with or without a 20 per cent pot reduction), the competitive nature of fishing is
encouraged and therefore there is less scope for fishers to reduce their operating costs.
Uncertainty around the economic benefits of ITQs
The potential benefits of ITQs that are predicted from the bio-economic modelling are
derived from hypothetical price increases and efficiency gains that industry
representatives considered were reasonable. However, there are risks that these gains
may not be fully realised.
Hypothetical price increase of up to $5.50/kg for the total catch
The price increases used in the model apply to the total annual catch and are
composed of:
•
•
•

$2/kg due to the longer season of supply November to August (this also
applies to the more flexible effort control option that was modelled);
$1.50 to $3.00/kg if ITQs result in less variation in the catch from season to
season; and
$0.50/kg if ITQs result in a more stable supply of product within a season, i.e.
catch is spread a little more evenly throughout the season (e.g. lower catch
peaks in the whites and reds).

If these hypothetical price increases were less than estimated, or did not materialise as
an additional benefit to the normal price changes due to changes in exchange rates or
economic conditions, then the potential economic benefits of an ITQ system with or
without effort controls would be significantly reduced. This would considerably
reduce the economic incentive to change the current management system. To allow
for this uncertainty, the model used what was considered to be a conservative
$1.00/kg and $1.25/kg increase in price for two of the ITQ options (options 3d and
4d).
See the section below on Sensitivity of $ benefits to increases in price/kg for
discussion on how increases in beach prices influence model outputs, i.e. the
proportion of the estimated $ benefits due to price increases compared to efficiency
gains.
Hypothetical efficiency gains from changes in pot design
It is estimated that changes in pot design (e.g. larger pots with side entrances, parlour
pots that stop escapement, etc) could yield efficiency increases of between 15 per cent
and 40 per cent. This would mean that a fisher could use fewer but more efficient
pots, to reduce his overall operating costs, which could result in the purchase of a
smaller, more economic boat with lower fuel, bait, and labour costs. The model
shows that there are significant economic benefits to be gained by increasing the
catching efficiency of pots.
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Modelled efficiency gains from boat reductions
The modelling results for ITQs showed the potential for significant increases in fleet
efficiency (hence annual $ benefits) that could flow from a large reduction in the
number of boats in the fishery. This was particularly so for the ITQ system with
reduced fishing effort controls (i.e. fishers could use up to 20 per cent more pots than
they currently use and the pots could be up to 40 per cent more efficient at catching).
Under this ITQ option, the number of boats declined from 549 to 256 (i.e. 293 boats
left the fleet). In practice, the $ gains from increases in fleet efficiency may not be as
great as predicted by the model because:
o a significant portion of the efficiency gains may come through individual
fishers reducing their costs, rather than boats leaving the industry;
o the reduction in boat numbers could be less than estimated;
o efficiency gains assumed for a significantly smaller fleet size may not be as
large as anticipated; and
o the decline in boat numbers may occur over a very long period of time.
If the efficiency gains obtained by significantly reducing the size of the fleet were not
as great as predicted and/or were slow to materialise, the significant benefits of ITQ
systems, particularly with reduced controls on pot numbers and increased pot catching
efficiency, could be significantly lower than the model estimates.
Time required to realise the benefits of ITQs
If the fishery moved to ITQs, it may take as long as one generation of fishers to
realise the full potential economic benefits. The time would depend largely on two
factors:
•

•

how quickly the management system could be deregulated under ITQs to
allow fishers to design more efficient pots and to use more pots (e.g. 20 per
cent more) to catch their quota. Deregulation could only proceed if it did not
impact adversely on the sustainability of the stock and the integrity of the
management and enforcement system (particularly the control of the black
market for illegal catch); and
how rapidly the industry (fishers, processors and marketers) would adjust to
the new ITQ system and deliver the price increases (processors would need to
play a lead role) and efficiency gains (fishers would have to reduce their
operating costs and boats would have to retire from the fishery).

Modelling Results – the Different Management Options
Profit Optimising Behaviour
The bio-economic model assumed that the operators of its average representative boat
in each fishing zone would engage in profit optimising behaviour. This means, for
instance, the operator would not go fishing on days when it was not profitable even
when an entitlement (fishing days or quota) may not be fully utilised. In reality,
individual fishers may not always behave in this way because of non-economic

60

factors that may influence their decisions about when and where to fish that may not
be economically optimal.
Processing and marketing
Generally, when processors and marketers assess effort and quota systems, they do so
from the point of view of how they might be able to maximise the value of the catch
they process. Generally, processors agree that the following factors could help to
increase the value of the total catch:
•

•
•

having the catch come in more constantly during the season and from one
season to the next, without big peaks and troughs, so a mix of products could
be produced that would maximise the overall value (e.g. lives compared to
frozen tails, etc);
catching less of the low-value lobster and more of the high-value ones (e.g.
reds compared to whites); and
having a longer catching and marketing season.

The bio-economic model results indicate that ITQ systems generally offer greater
scope to optimise these factors.
Summary of the bio-economic model results of the annual $ benefits for
the Western Rock Lobster Fishery

Input controlled Quotas with Inputs
Controlled

Scenario
4a
Scenario
4b
Scenario
4c
Scenario
4d

3d

Zone C
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Figure 3. The bio-economic modelling results for average annual benefits in $
millions, for the 11 management option variations that were modelled for the Western
Rock Lobster Fishery.
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Average Annual Benefits ($million)

Scenario
4d

Scenario
4c

Scenarion4
b

Pure ITQ
Scenario
4a

Scenario 3d

Scenario 3c

Scenario 3b

Quotas with Inputs
Controlled
Scenario
3a

Scenario 2

Scenario
1c

Scenario 1

Input Controlled

Zone
A/B

3.31

27.11 21.40

16.52 13.20 35.88 45.06 40.66 36.81

Zone C

12.10 12.86 18.81 34.13 30.21

26.51 22.64 51.73 51.52 50.69 45.87

TOTAL 15.41 16.92 28.03 61.24 51.61

43.03 35.84 87.61 96.58 91.35 82.68

4.06

9.22

Table 2 above shows the bio-economic modelling results for average annual benefits
in $ millions, for the 11 management options modelled for the Western Rock Lobster
Fishery.
Management options modelled
Input (effort) controls (ITEs). The three fishing effort (pot number) control
management options (Scenarios) produced the lowest benefits of all the options that
were modelled:
•
•
•

1 – the current system gave an estimated annual net benefit of $15.4 million
1c – the current system with a 20 per cent pot reduction gave an estimated
annual net benefit of $16.9 million; and
2 – a flexible effort control system39 where pots and fishing days could be
adjusted annually, the season extended to 31 August, and there was a $2/kg

39

The main assumptions and management arrangements used to model the flexible ITE system were
an extension of the season to the 31 August; 1 per cent per annum productivity gain through effort
creep; minimum unit entitlement of 43 to operate in the fishery; price increase of $2.00/kg due to the
extended season; $7,200 in extra costs (i.e. above normal operating costs) for fishing during the
extended season; limit of 185 fishing days allowed per season, with no flexibility to change it from
season to season or for different parts of the season; and limits on the number of pots used in each
zone, with no flexibility to vary them from season to season or for different parts of the season. See
Attachment 5 for further details of management rules and model assumptions for each management
option reviewed.
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increase in the average beach price, gave an estimated annual net benefit of
$28 million.
Quotas (ITQs) with input controls. The four ITQ system options (Scenarios 3a to
d) with the current effort (pot number) controls produced $ benefits that were
significantly greater than the effort control options (1, 1c and 2) but significantly
lower than the comparable “pure” ITQ options (4a to d) with reduced effort (pot
number) controls.
•

•
•
•

3a – constant (fixed) ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price
increase of $5/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of pots
gave an estimated annual net benefit of $61.2 million. However, there are
significant sustainability risks with fixed quotas (quotas that do not vary from
year to year) as described under the section Risks associated with constant
(fixed) and variable quotas, that make fixed quotas a less attractive
management option.
3b – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price increase of
$3.50/kg, and a 15 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of pots gave an
estimated annual net benefit of $51.6 million.
3c – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price increase of
$2.00/kg, and a 15 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of pots gave an
estimated annual net benefit of $43.0 million
3d – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price increase of
$1.00/kg, and a 15 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of pots gave an
estimated annual net benefit of $38.8 million.

Pure ITQ – ITQs with reduced effort controls. The four ITQ system options
(Scenarios 4a to d) without the current effort (pot number) controls40 produced $
benefits that were significantly greater than any of the other management options.
Under these ITQ options, controls on pot numbers were relaxed and the number of
pots was allowed to increase by 20 per cent.
•

•
•
•

40

4a – constant (fixed) ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price
increase of $5.50/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of
pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $87.6 million. However, there are
significant sustainability risks with fixed quotas (quotas that do not vary from
year to year) as described above under the section Risks associated with
constant (fixed) and variable quotas, that make fixed quotas a less attractive
management option.
4b – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price
increase of $4.00/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of
pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $96.6 million.
4c – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price
increase of $2.50/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of
pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $91.4 million.
4d – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price
increase of $1.25/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of
pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $82.7 million.

Pot numbers were allowed to increase by 20 per cent.
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A Detailed Examination of Four Management Options
The section below is based on Chapter 6 of A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the
Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, produced by
Economic Research Associates and should be read in conjunction with this section.41
This section describes and compares in more detail the model outputs of one example
of each of the main management options that have been summarise above. They are
the options that have the most conservative model assumptions (e.g. lowest price
increases) and appear to provide the most robust results. Attachment 5 (Tables A and
B) provides the details of the management arrangements and the assumptions used in
the bio-economic modelling for all the management options assessed in this review.
The current management system (Scenario 1)
The main management arrangements and assumptions used for modelling the current
ITE management system compared to the other management options were:
•
•
•
•
•

“rush to fish” (fishers compete for catch);
no extension of the season (other management options have the season
extended to 31 August);
1 per cent per year productivity gain through effort creep (not relevant to
ITQs);
no price increase (other management options had a price increase of $1 to
$5.50/kg); and
no increase in the catching efficiency of pots due to changes in pot design (the
ITQs had efficiency gains from changes in pot design of between 15 per cent
and 40 per cent);

The current management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction
(Scenario 1c)
The main management arrangements and assumptions used for modelling the current
ITE management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction compared to the other
management options were:
•
•
•
•
•

“rush to fish” (fishers compete for catch);
20 per cent pot reduction;
no extension of the season (other management options have the season
extended to the 31 August);
2 per cent per year productivity gain through effort creep (not relevant to
ITQs);
no price increase (other management options had a price increase of $1 to
$5.50/kg);

41

See ERA’s full report on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au or the
Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobserwa.com or phone the Department of
Fisheries on 9482 7267 for a hard copy.

64

•
•

a 10 per cent catch efficiency gain through an increase in catchability (the
ITQs had efficiency gains from changes in pot design of between 15 per cent
and 40 per cent); and
a $5,000 increase in costs per average boat due to fishers fishing their
remaining pots harder and expending on technology to make them more
competitive.

A variable ITQ system with the current effort (pot numbers) controls
(Scenario 3d)
The main management arrangements and assumptions used for modelling the variable
ITQ system with the current effort (pot number) controls were:
•
•
•
•
•
•

pot numbers the same as under the current system;
an extension of the season to the 31 August;
$7,200 worth of additional operating costs for the extended season (i.e. an
extra $120 per day on top of normal operating costs per average vessel);
a 15 per cent catch efficiency gain through changes in pot design;
no “rush to fish” (significantly reduced competition between fishers); and
a price increase of $1.00/kg due to greater stability in the catch.

A variable ITQ system with reduced effort (pot number) controls
(Scenario 4d)
The main management arrangements and assumptions used for modelling the variable
ITQ system with reduced effort (pot number) controls were:
•
•
•
•
•
•

pot numbers were allowed to increase by 20 per cent compared to the current
system;
an extension of the season to the 31 August;
$7,200 worth of additional operating costs for the extended season (i.e. an
extra $120 per day on top of normal operating costs per average vessel);
a 40 per cent catch efficiency gain through changes in pot design;
no “rush to fish” (significantly reduced competition between fishers); and
a price increase of $1.25/kg due to greater stability in the catch.

Presentation of the Modelling Results
Key comparative results by fishing zone for each of the four options (outlined above)
over a 10-year modelling period are presented in relation to:
•

breeding stock levels;

•

annual catch;

•

annual number of boats;

•

annual number of pot lifts;

•

average annual net economic benefits; and
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•

sensitivity of annual net $ benefits to increases in price/kg average, i.e. the
level of annual net benefits that result from various increases in beach price.

Breeding stock levels
The breeding stock (biomass) index for Zone C is described below as an example of
the model’s breeding stock estimates for the different management options. A more
detailed discussion on the model’s breeding stock level estimates and the results for
Zones A and B can be found in Chapter 6 of A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the
Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, produced by
Economic Research Associates42.
The model was required to adhere to a sustainability rule, for example in the case of
Zone C, the breeding stock had to stay above an index of 800,000.
Figure 4 shows the levels of the breeding stock in Zone C under each of the four
alternative management options. The variables that explain the differences between
the level of breeding stock are how and when the catch was taken, and the overall
stock abundance under each management option.
As Figure 4 shows, none of the options reduced the breeding stock below the 800,000
“trigger point” (the level of the late 1970s). However, for those management options
where the breeding stock level fell below the opening level at the end of the ten year
period (the X-marked horizontal line – Op Stock = opening stock – represents the
opening breeding stock level), some adjustment to future fishing effort or quota levels
may have been required to ensure that the decline did not continue. The 20 per cent
pot reduction option (Sc 1c = Scenario 1c) was the most conservative, in that it
produced breeding stock levels over the 10 years that were always above its opening
level.

42

See ERA’s full report on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au, the Western
Rock Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobsterwa.com or phone the Department of Fisheries on
9482 7267 for a hard copy.
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Figure 4: Zone C breeding stocks levels over the 10-year modelling
period
[Note: Sc = Scenario; Op Stock = opening stock; Sc 1 = the current management
system; Sc 1c = the current management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Sc
3d = variable ITQ with the current effort (pot number) controls; Sc 4d = variable ITQ
without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are increased by 20
per cent.]
Annual Average Catch
Figure 5 below shows average annual catch over the 10-year modelling period by
zone for the four alternative management options (Scenarios 1, 1c, 3d and 4d). They
are similar for each of the zones and in total. This indicates that the model is
behaving in a realistic way, in that the catches under each of these management
options do not differ very much from those predicted under the current management
system and they are maintained at levels that are necessary to ensure the long-term
sustainability of the stock.
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Zone A

Zone B

Zone C

Average Annual Catch (kg)

12,000,000
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
0

Scenario 1

Scenario
1c

Scenario
3d

Scenario
4d

Zone C 5,826,471

5,616,955

5,826,471

5,826,471

Zone B 3,999,879

3,232,342

3,360,244

3,310,251

Zone A 1,704,251

1,669,983

1,704,251

1,700,734

11,530,601

10,5192,80

10,890,966

10,837,456

Total

Figure 5: Annual catch by zone
[Note: Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current management system
with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3d = variable ITQ with the current effort (pot number)
controls; Scenario 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers
are increased by 20 per cent.]

If there were a management mechanism in place that allowed the build-up in lobster
abundance under options 1c and the ITQ systems (3d and 4d) to be harvested by
adjustments to effort or quotas, then the benefits estimated by the model for these
options would be under-estimates.
Boats
Table 3 below shows what happens to boat numbers under each of the four
management options. The boat numbers are after the implementation phase (which
could be one or two years, or five or 10 years) and are dependent on the number of
fishing days, pot efficiency and pot lifts. The boat numbers described in Table 3 as
current are as at December 2004. The number of boats as at December 2005 was
495.43
As can be seen, the model estimates that under the variable ITQ system with a 20 per
cent increase in the number of pots, boat numbers are reduced by 293, i.e. over half
the fleet retires under this option. It should be noted, however, that the model
43

Number of boats is defined as the number of Managed Fishery Licences with the minimum number
of units (pots) required to operate in the fishery.
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expresses efficiency gains by reducing the number of boats. Whereas in reality, it is
likely that there will be a combination of efficiency gains through reduced boat
numbers and individual fishers making significant reductions in the costs of fishing.
Therefore, the large reduction in boat numbers under option 4d may well be
overestimated.
Reference Points

Boat Numbers

10 Years Ago

639

Current at December 2004¹

549

- 90

505

- 44 ²

Scenario 1c – 20 per cent pot
reduction

480

-69 ²

Scenario 3d – ITQ with
current pot controls

505

-44 ²

Scenario 4d - ITQ with a 20
per cent increase in pots

256

-293 ²

Closing Fleet at the End of
the 10-year period:

Reduction in Boat Numbers

Scenario 1 – current
management system

Notes:
¹ The current boat numbers (December 2004) makes no allowance for the impact of removal of the
150-pot rule where adjustments to this rule change are still taking place within the industry. The
number of boats as of December 2005 was 495.
² Compared to the current (December 2004) boat numbers. The number of boats as of December 2005
was 495.

Table 3: The decline in rock lobster boat numbers
Annual Pot Lifts
Figure 6 below shows the annual number of pot lifts by zone for the four alternative
management options.
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Zone A

Zone B

Zone C

Average Annual Pot Lifts

10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
0
Scenario 1

Scenario 1c

Scenario 3d Scenario 4d

Zone C

5,190,121

4,250,429

4,071,189

3,629,544

Zone B

3,418,159

2,838,471

2,439,501

2,277,907

Zone A

1,203,233

1,005,272

858,933

961,556

Total

9,811,513

8,094,172

7,369,623

6,869,007

Figure 6: Annual pot lifts by zone
[Note: Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current management system
with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3d = variable ITQ with the current effort (pot number)
controls; Scenario 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers
are increased by 20 per cent.]

The lower number pot lifts under Scenarios 1c, 3d and 4d achieve broadly similar
average annual catches compared to the current system (Scenario 1), as shown in
Figure 5 above. This means that the catch per pot lift and per boat for these scenarios
has increased compared to the current management system (Scenario 1), resulting in
greater productivity gains, which are reflected in greater $ benefits as shown in Figure
7 below. In the case of Scenarios 3d and 4d, a significant factor in the reduction in
pot lifts is the use of improved pot designs that increases pot catching efficiency by 15
per cent in 3d and 40 per cent in 4d.
Average Annual Net Benefits
Figure 7 shows the average annual net $ benefits over the 10-year period of the model
run for each of the four alternative management options by fishing zone and by the
fishery overall.

70

Zone A/B

Zone C

90,000,000
80,000,000
Average Annual Net Benefit
($)

s
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60,000,000
50,000,000
40,000,000
30,000,000
20,000,000
10,000,000
0
Zone C
Zone A/B

Total

Scenario 1

Scenario 1c

Scenario 3d

Scenario 4d

12,101,428

12,864,621

22,640,503

45,867,652

3,309,887

4,058,537

13,199,199

36,805,714

15,411,315

16,923,158

35,839,702

82,673,366

Figure 7: Average annual net benefits over the 10-year period ($million)
[Note: Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current management system
with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3d = variable ITQ with the current effort (pot number)
controls; Scenario 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers
are increased by 20 per cent.]

The average annual $ benefits shown above are the same as those shown in Figure 3
above. The large increases in net benefits of the ITQ options (3d and 4d), compared
to the current system (1) and a 20 per cent pot reduction (1c), are due to price
increases and more particularly increases in fleet efficiency.
•

•

Price increases –Increase in the beach price of $1.00 for 3d and $1.25/kg for
4d would increase profits by about $10 and $12 million for 3d and 4d
respectively, based on an average 10 million kg catch. There are various
views within the industry as to whether these beach price increases are
realistic. Based on discussions with the processing sector, ERA believe the
price increases are achievable under ITQs due to the longer season of supply
(season runs to 31 August) and greater stability in the catch between and
within seasons, which help processors maximise the value of the catch.
Fleet efficiency gains – Significant increases in efficiency due to changes in
pot design that increase catching efficiency. Scenario 1c has a 10 per cent, 3d
has a 15 per cent, and 4d a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of
pots. Pots with greater catching efficiency allow fishers to reduce costs and
hence increase profits. There are a variety of views within industry regarding
how much more efficient pot designed could be. In the past, fishers have
shown great ingenuity and innovative when it comes to designing pots which
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catch much better under a variety of conditions than the standard pots. For
instance, very large circular wire traps with side entrances, for the whites and
parlour type traps, which prevent lobsters form escaping over two- to five-day
pulls.
Under the various management options (particularly ITQs), fishers will have
incentives to seek out ways to make their fishing business more efficient. They will
respond to management rule and other changes in their fishing/business environment
by assessing and reassessing the best way to fish. For example, fishers’ adjustments
to the 18 per cent pot reduction in 1993-94 and the more recent removal of the ‘150
pot rule’, and the effort rule changes for the 2005-06 season, which are yet to fully
play out in the industry.
Changes in fishing behaviour/patterns do not usually occur in a single season but
rather it is several seasons before the impacts of any management changes have fully
played out in the industry. Management changes (e.g. pot reductions, moon closures,
changing management to ITQs, etc) can generate efficiency gains in ways that cannot
easily be foreseen and incorporated into modelling. These gains are what economists
refer to as dynamic efficiency gains. For example, at the moment, there is
undoubtedly “capital stuffing”44 under Scenarios 1 and 1c, as some capital
expenditure (on boats, equipment and technology) is about catching lobster ahead of
anyone else, as opposed to catching lobster more cost effectively. Under the ITQ
management options, the incentive is for fishers to develop fishing strategies and to
invest in boats, pots, and other gear that will enable them to catch their quota in the
most cost effective way possible45. This is a dynamic adjustment that cannot be
modelled at this stage.
Sensitivity of $ benefits to increases in price/kg
Price increases were built into the some of the management options to reflect the
enhanced marketing opportunities associated with an extended season and within and
between years catch stability. The price levels and price increases used in the
modelling exercise were derived from a variety of sources, including processors. The
price data and rationale for the price increases used in the model are discussed in
detail in Chapter 5 of ERA’s report.
The price increases used change the absolute price levels between the various
management options, but the pattern of prices within the season is the same for all
management options (generally, there is a price increase from the beginning to the end
of the season). The assumed price increases for having an extended season and
having greater within and between years catch stability, are based on information
from the processing sector. They reflect the current state of knowledge about the
world lobster markets and the product prices achievable under different seasonal
supply patterns.
44

Capital stuffing in the sense used here means that fishers spend a lot of money on items (boats,
technology, etc) to catch the maximum number of lobsters they can, even though some of the
expenditure may not be very cost effective.
45
It has been noticed in some ITQ fisheries (e.g. New Zealand) that fishers (particularly those leasing
quota who are on slim profit margins) neglect or put off boat and other gear maintenance to reduce
their costs, which can lead to reduced safety for the skipper and crew.
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In order to show the contribution of different price increases on the average annual $
benefit outputs estimated by the model for the alternative management options, ERA
have compared two sets of ITQ options where the only feature to change between
them was the price increases. The options compared were ITQs with the current
controls on pot numbers (3c and 3d) and ITQs with reduced effort controls that
allowed pot numbers to increase by 20 per cent (4c and 4d). The price increase in 3d
and 4d ($1.00 and $1.25/kg respectively) were only half of those used in 3c and 4c
($2.00 and 2.50/kg respectively). The comparative results are shown for the total
fishery in Figure 8.
These results show that, while the annual $ benefit outputs of the model do change
due to the different price increases used, they do not change markedly. The level of
recruitment to the fishery (and hence catch) and efficiency gains are of much greater
significance in explaining the level of annual $ benefits the model estimates for the
different management options. In short, the price increases assumed in the model are
not the key drivers of the estimated profits the fishery makes under the different
management options, the size of the annual catch and the efficiency gains are more
important.
For example, halving the price increases used in the model, as shown for the ITQ
options 3c ($2.00/kg) compared to 3d ($1.00/kg), changes the net benefits obtained by
less than 14 per cent on average over the 10 years of the model run.
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Figure 8: Total industry net benefit sensitivity to price increases
[Note: Scenario 3c and 3d are variable ITQs with the current effort (pot number) controls and price
increase of $2 and $1/kg respectively; Scenario 3c and 3d are variable ITQs without the current effort
(pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are increased by 20 per cent and price increases of $2.50 and
$1.25/kg respectively.]
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It should be noted that if there was a different pattern of within season price increases
than the model assumes, it will almost certainly induce fishermen to change their
fishing behaviour, which could affect both the gains from the assumed price increases
and the efficiency gains. Hence, the model results using different price increases
should be seen as indicative only.
There is an important conclusion to be drawn from these results. Across all the
management options, the efficiency gains (i.e. the reductions in fishing costs) that are
achieved are generated from within the industry itself. Competitive pressure will
ensure that these gains are achieved over time and in this sense the efficiency gains
are relatively more certain of being achieved (i.e. they are more “bankable”), than the
$ benefits estimated from the price increase components of the model. The gains
from the price increases are dependent on many factors associated with world
markets, which are outside the direct control of the industry. Gains achieved due to
prices increases just enhance the more significant efficiency gains associated with
each management option.
Rock lobster is increasingly being seen as a commodity in the market place.
Commoditisation means that producers face internationally determined world prices
and must be cost competitive at those prices to ensure long-run viability. With prices
set in world markets, the key is to be able to reduce fishing costs to levels consistent
with those prices.
The relative ranking of the different management options is not affected by the price
increases. Changes in the price increases only change the absolute magnitude of the
annual $ benefits, but leave ITQ option 4 (a to b) the highest ranked.
The model results show that ITQ option 4 (a to b) offers the greatest scope for
efficiency gains because it allows the greatest flexibility to adjust capital inputs (pots
and vessels) to optimise effort to best match the ITQs. The other management options
(1, 1c, 2 and 3 (a to b)) do not allow the maximum efficiency gains to be realised.

Compliance – Illegal Fishing and Selling of Lobsters
Effort control system
Under an effort control system, the main areas of compliance concern are over
potting, selling (consigning) undersize and protected females (over the legal size,
setose and tarspots) and unlicensed or recreational fishers selling lobsters.
Enforcement resources are focused on these areas and under the current system there
appears to be sufficient levels of inspection, along with severe penalties, to keep these
illegal activities under control.
There are no checks on the amount of legal size lobsters a fisher can catch or sell
under the current system which, compared to an ITQ system, makes enforcement
relatively simple and cost effective, as each fishers’ daily catch does not have to be
recorded and assessed to ensure he is within his quota.
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Quota system
Under a quota system, the biological controls (minimum size, protection of berried,
tar spot, setose and maximum size females) would be maintained, whereas controls on
pot numbers, closed seasons and pot design could be relaxed, either on
implementation of an ITQ system or after a transition period when the new system
had stabilised.46
Under ITQ systems, it is generally considered that there is a significant risk of a black
market developing for illegal catch. This is because lobsters (like abalone) are highvalue, low-volume species, which means significant $ amounts can be easily transport
in the boot of a car or hidden among other cargo on trucks (as has occurred in the past
with undersize lobsters). By comparison, it would be very difficult to see a black
market developing for low-value, high-volume fish, such as mullet, if they were
managed under an ITQ system. The black market risk is increased considerably with
western rock lobsters because there is a very long and, in places, isolated coastline
along which illegal lobsters could easily be landed with little possibility of detection.
There would need to be very tight security and inspection of boat movements, weighin stations and consignment dockets and severe penalties to keep quota cheating from
undermining the ITQ system.
Under ITQs, enforcement would be likely to become much more intrusive (e.g. to
check the quota paper trail), black and white, and knifed edged (i.e. there would be no
warnings given for cheating on quota) and the penalties would have to be severe.
See the Compliance section under A Catch Quota System (ITQ), above, and
Mclaughlan, M. 1994, ‘Long-term Management Strategies for the Western Rock
Lobster Fishery. Law Enforcement Considerations’, in Volume 4, Fisheries
Management Paper No. 7047, for more discussion of compliance/enforcement issues
relating to quotas.

Modelling Different Variations of Effort and Quota Systems
There are different ways to manage fishing effort and quota systems and many
different assumptions that can be put into the bio-economic model that will give
different results to those presented above. Because space is limited, and the desire not
to get bogged down in the complexity of testing too many possibilities, four major
options with variations have been tested (options 1, 2, 3 and 4). These provide a large
spectrum of possible outcomes, which should indicate the upper and lower boundaries
for the main issues of interest, i.e. breeding stock levels, catch and effort, boat
numbers and $ benefits that the different management systems could potentially
deliver (upper boundary – ITQ option 4 with a 20 per cent increase in pot numbers,
and lower boundary – the current management system option 1).

46

If it were decided to introduce an ITQ system, it would initially be implemented with the full set of
effort controls (including controls on pot numbers) that are used under the current system.
47
Available on the Department of Fisheries web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock
Lobster Council web site www.rocklobsterwa.com Copies can also be obtained by phoning the
Fisheries Department on 9482 7267.
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Social Issues
Below is a summary of the initial findings of a three-year research project funded by
the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation, titled A Social Assessment of
Coastal Communities Hosting the Western Rock Lobster Fleet, produced by V.
Huddleston of the Institute for Regional Development, the University of Western
Australia, December 200548. This report should be read in conjunction with this
section. This project still has about 18 months to run, so the results presented are
preliminary and are likely to change as additional information becomes available.
The project will also track the current management review process and industry’s
perceptions of the likely impact of the different management options.
Community development extends beyond the formal economy to consider
the needs of the population at large, and that in setting about its task it
aims to balance economic, social and environmental concerns, rather
than prioritising the economic approach above all else (Haughton, 1999,
p. 8)49.
Analysis of 17 coastal communities between Kalbarri and Augusta revealed trends in
population, employment and housing that are important in assessing the general socioeconomic characteristics of the communities. The growth of most of these
communities can be traced to the development of the rock lobster industry in the late
1950s and early 1960s. The rapid expansion of the lobster fishing industry led to ad
hoc residential development at many points along the coast, many of which were
reached by sea and virtually inaccessible by road in the early years.
Most of the communities experienced substantial population growth between 1991
and 2001. The median age increased because of ageing in situ, and the increasing
number of retirees from inland communities and larger centres. Most of the
communities also exhibit high dependency ratios50 compared with the Australian and
Western Australian ratios. This has significant economic implications, given the need
to invest in social infrastructure such as schools and health care for the dependent
population.
Some communities also exhibit a large seasonal population change, with the number
of dwellings not permanently occupied ranging between 15-20 per cent and 60-70 per
cent of the total number of dwellings. This seasonality is likely to affect business
activities in the communities.
Localities or regions with diverse economies are generally more able to withstand
downturns in a particular sector or industry. With the 17 communities, economic
diversity has been measured by using the proportion of persons employed in the top
three sectors to the total number of persons employed per community. A higher ratio
48

Available on the Department of Fisheries web site www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock
Lobster Council web site www.rocklobsterwa.com Copies can also be obtained by phoning the
Fisheries Department on 9482 7267
49
Haughton, G. (ed.) 1999, Community Economic Development, The Stationery Office, London.
50
Defined as the combined child population (0-14 years) and the aged population (65 years and over) –
persons in the dependent ages, to every 100 people of the intermediate age population (15-64 years) –
economically active ages
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would indicate that the community is highly dependent on the top three sectors of
employment and is thus less diversified in economic terms.
With the exception of Yanchep, Jurien Bay, Geraldton and Fremantle, the rest of the
communities exhibit lower- to moderately-diversified economies. In the smaller
fishing communities, unemployment rates are almost double the national average.
Smaller fishing communities also have high levels of part-time employment. Median
weekly incomes for most communities are comparable to the national average ($300$399).
The number of boats operating in the lobster fishery declined across the 17
communities resulting, in some cases, in a potential loss of fishing-related physical
facilities in some communities. The number of persons engaged in the fishery also
declined, with important implications to small businesses operating in the
accommodation, cafes and restaurant sector. Some communities have been found to
be less resilient and more sensitive to external changes while others have greater
capacity to handle change.
Measuring Community Resilience
In measuring community resilience, time-series indicators to describe the resilience or
sensitivity of communities and regions to change51 were used to provide an indication
of the “fragility” or “robustness” of the community to change or shocks. The
selection of the indicators in this
research has been restricted to those that
are available in a time series format and
Resilience is the ability to cope with change. To express
more fully:
for which 2001 Census data are
available. In addition to Census data,
Resilience is the capacity of human groups or
two fishery-related indicators were also
communities to cope with environmental,
included in the computation of the
economic, political or other kinds of change
resilience scores.
Data from the
stemming from internal or external factors. It is
Department of Fisheries were those of
related to uncertainty, vulnerability and risk and it
the 1991-92, 1996-97, 2001-02 and
can be considered at various geographical and
temporal scales. An alternative interpretation of
2004-05 WRL seasons.
The specific time series indicators used
in measuring community resilience
include percentage changes in:
1.
2.

3.
4.

resilience is the capacity and speed of an
ecosystem to recover from a disturbance. This
refers either to the elasticity of the ecosystem
which enables it to accommodate change while
maintaining its original state, or to the elasticity of
an ecosystem which permits the assimilation of
change by transformations of the ecosystem
(Sustainability and Public or Private Environmental
Management web-accessible database of glossary
items relating to subjects of sustainability, 2005).

Total resident population;
Elderly dependency ratio
defined as the number of
elderly people for every 100
people of working age;
Child dependency ratio defined as the number of children for every 100
people of working age;
Number of occupied dwellings;

51

Coakes Consulting 2002, Socio-Economic Assessment of the Forest Management Plan prepared for
the Conservation Commission and the Forest Products Commission, August 2002.
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5.

Labour force participation rate, calculated by expressing the number of
persons in the labour force as a percentage of the population aged 15 years
and over;
Unemployment rate defined as the number of unemployed people
expressed as a percentage of the labour force;
Economic diversity, measured as the proportion of persons employed in
the top three sectors to the total number of persons employed;
Total pot lifts for the whole season; and
Number of boats recorded in December.

6.
7.
8.
9.

To derive the composite indicator of community resilience to change, a scoring
system was adopted ranging from -3.0 to 3.0 points. The scores for each of the
indicators are then summed to provide a Total Resilience Score (TRS) for each
community. The TRS is based on the direction and magnitude of the percentage
change in each of the indicators between the 1996 and 2001 census periods and
between 2001-02 and 2004-05 WRL seasons. The resilience scores vary between -27
to 27, with high positive values indicating greater robustness to change and large
negative values indicating greater fragility and sensitivity to change.
Augusta

-4.0

Bunbury

-3.0

12.0

Fremantle
Yanchep

15.0

Two Rocks

15.0
3.0

Ledge Point

7.0

Lancelin
-5.0

Jurien Bay

-3.0

Green Head

-3.0

Leeman

6.0
3.0

Dongara
Geraldton

-5.0
4.0

Kalbarri
-10.0

Augusta
Busselton
Bunbury
Mandurah
Fremantle
Yanchep
Two Rocks
Ledge Point
Lancelin
Cervantes
Jurien Bay
Green Head
Leeman
Dongara
Geraldton

15.0

Mandurah

Cervantes

Community

15.0

Busselton

-5.0

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

Kalbarri

Number
of
Persons
Engaged
7
3
12
48
154
6
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55
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31
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29

Figure 9 showing Overall Community Resilience Scores and
Table 4 showing number of persons engaged in the WRL fishery in December
2004

While the overall resilience scores may change with the inclusion/refinement of other
indicators, as data becomes available during the course of this research52, these
resilience scores indicate that some communities are better able to handle change (i.e.,
52

For example, once the community surveys are complete, indicators on social capital and human
capital will be incorporated in the overall resilience scores.
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they are more resilient) and others less so. More resilient communities are Mandurah,
Busselton, Two Rocks, Yanchep and Fremantle. Less resilient communities are
Geraldton, Green Head, Jurien Bay, Cervantes, Bunbury and Augusta.
Analysis of interviews revealed fishers’ perceptions of the problems and issues
confronting them during these times of uncertainty over the price of lobsters and
increasing input costs such as fuel. Lower profitability has resulted in some fishers
leaving the industry and an ongoing struggle for others who remain. As one
respondent put it:
“The economics of fishing are now far more important than they used to be. It
used to be lifestyle, but this is changing now, with people thinking monetary
wise [in financial terms] before any other reason.”
Fishers’ perceptions on alternative management options indicate a number of potential
positive and negative impacts at the economic, social, environmental and management
levels.
The preliminary findings from interviews and consultations highlight the fact that:
•

Lobster fishers had been instrumental in the earlier growth and development
of coastal communities, with business operations and employment revolving
primarily around rock lobster fishing.

•

While rock lobster fishing is no longer the dominant economic activity in
some of these communities, it is still regarded as a significant economic and
social contributor to local economies and communities.

•

These communities/locations have offered good fishing grounds and a relaxed
secure lifestyle.

•

For communities that have young families, these towns offer a good
environment for raising children.

As the towns grew, their populations increased and their economies became more
diversified, they were less dependent on the lobster fishery. The decline in the
number of rock lobster fishers, coupled with younger fishers being less community
oriented, have resulted in rock lobster fishers becoming less involved in community
events and activities and generally becoming less community-minded. Nonetheless,
there are still some fishers who contribute both financially and physically to
community activities. With the increased mobility of the fleet, the number of wives
participating in community/school activities is also higher because they are left behind
to look after the children. Rock lobster fishers spend their income mostly in their
community of residence and contribute to the financial well-being of these
communities.
As in most small towns, there is some social segregation (e.g. old residents and new
residents). There are also disadvantages especially for those with children of high
school age. Parents face the dilemma of sending the children to boarding school or
having split families, with the husband staying behind in the coastal towns and the
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wife and children relocating somewhere else. For the older population who require
more intensive health care, these towns have limited medical care.
A key finding of this report is that a workable management arrangement for the
fishery requires the support of those involved – fishers and industry managers – and
the other stakeholders in the communities, including business groups, local
government and community residents. Having an intensive and open consultation
and ongoing information flow among the various stakeholders would go a long way
towards ensuring that any management changes that may be introduced in the fishery
will result not only in a sustainable fishery but also in viable and contented
communities.53

Boats Numbers and Employment
This section, which is based on Chapter 7 of ERA’s report,54 looks at the possible
employment impacts of the various management options, due to a reduction in boat
numbers.
As previously mentioned, the number of boats in the fishery has declined from 836 in
1964, to 495 as at December 2005. The decline does not appear to be slowing and
under the current price-cost squeeze the industry is experiencing, it could even
accelerate.
Modelling results show that the number of boats declines under all management
options, including the current management system, where the model estimates that 44
boats will leave the fishery. However, as shown in Table 3 above, the decline is
greater under the 20 per cent pot reduction option (69 leave the fishery); and 293
(more than half) leave the fishery under the ITQ option with reduced controls on
effort (pot numbers). How long it will take for the fleet to rationalise under the
different management options is difficult to assess. However, if fishers’ responses to
other changes in the management system can be used as an indicator (e.g. the 18 per
cent pot reduction in 1993), it is likely that any major change to the current
management system (e.g. a significant pot reduction or moving to ITQs) would
initially see a rapid reduction in boat numbers. It is likely that boat numbers would
then decline more gradually and as the fleet got smaller the decline would become
even slower.
Employment in the rock lobster fishery is considered to be a function of the catch and
effort measured as pots per vessel, pot lifts and vessel numbers55. Currently the most
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A Social Assessment Of Coastal Communities Hosting The Western Rock Lobster Fleet, produced by
V Huddleston of the Institute for Regional Development, University of Western Australia, December
2005. Available on the Department of Fisheries web site www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock
Lobster Council web site www.rocklobsterwa.com Copies can also be obtained by phoning the
Fisheries Department on 9482 7267
54
See A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster
Fishery, produced by Economic Research Associates on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at
www.fish.wa.gov.au or the Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobsterwa.com or
phone the Department of Fisheries on 9482 7267 for a hard copy.
55
For further details see A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast
Rock Lobster Fishery, produced by Economic Research Associates on the Department of Fisheries’

80

common configuration per vessel is three crew members, consisting of one skipper
plus two deckhands. This seems to be relatively stable because the current
management regime has produced a fairly stable annual pot lift figure over the years.
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Figure 10: Vessel, pot lifts and catch (kgs): 1993-94 to2003-04
While vessel numbers have declined, the other key driver – pot lifts – has not changed
as much and has held up at a stable level, which indicates that pots and pot lifts per
vessel have increased.
Figure 11 shows the results of using two different methods vessels numbers only and
of using combined vessel numbers and pot lifts to estimate the employment impacts of
the various management options. Figure 11 shows the position 10 years ago, at the
Census year, currently, and then for each of the management options at the end of the
10-year modelling period.

web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au or the Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site at
www.rocklobsterwa.com or phone the Department of Fisheries on 9482 7267 for a hard copy.
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Number of Pot Lifts and Catch (kgs)

Number of Vessels

Figure 10 below shows the number of vessels and pot lifts over the last decade.

Employment Based on Vessels

Empoyment Based on Vessels and Pot Lifts
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Figure 11: Employment change by scenario based on vessel numbers and
pot lifts
Employment is highest under the management options where effort (pot numbers) are
controlled (scenario 1 – the current management system, 1c – the current system with
a 20 per cent pot reduction and 3c and 3d – the ITQs with the current pot number
controls maintained). Employment is lowest under 4c and 4d, the ITQs with reduced
effort (pot number) controls, where vessels are allowed to fully adjust to quota.

Flow on Employment Consequences
ERA state in their report that previous impact studies of commercial fishing have
estimated an employment multiplier of 3.28 for rock lobster fishing in Western
Australia, i.e. for every person directly employed in rock lobster fishing, there are
3.28 people employed in other areas (for example, processing, boat building, and so
on). Using this estimate, we can estimate the total employment impacts of each
management option as shown in Table 5.
Using the vessel number and pot lifts method, employment is just over 5,900 currently
and reduces to 5,739 for Scenario 1; to 5,031 for Scenario 1c; to 4,801 for Scenario
3c; to 4,794 for Scenario 3d; and to just 3,800-3,900 for Scenarios 4c and 4d.
While there will be some flow-on or indirect employment impacts associated with any
reduction in direct employment of skippers and crews, their magnitude is not easy to
assess. In broad terms, much the same quantity of fuel and bait will be purchased,
boats will need to be repaired although there may be fewer of them, and pots and
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other fishing gear will need to be replaced. Hence, these conventional multiplier
impacts are likely to overstate the negative impact on employment.
Table 5: Estimates of employment by Scenario based on pot lifts and vessels

Aggregate
Direct
Employment
Employment
Multiplier
Total
Employment
Impact

10years
ago

current

1917

1647

1515

1440

1515

1515

777

768

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

6288

5402

4969

4723

4969

4969

2549

2519

0%
-5 %
0%
0%
Combined Vessels and Pot Lift Based Estimates

-49 %

-49 %

scen 1 scen 1c scen 3c
Vessel Based Estimates

scen
3d

Change Compared to Base Case

Aggregate
Direct
Employment
Employment
Multiplier
Total
Employment
Impact

scen
4c

scen
4d

1917

1808

1750

1534

1464

1462

1188

1178

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

3.28

6288

5930

5739

5031

4801

4794

3897

3864

0%

-12%

-16%

-16%

-32%

-33%

Change Compared with Base
Case

There are fewer representative boats in the fishery in all zones, whichever scenario is
adopted. In the case of Scenarios 1, 1c, 2 and 3, the change is broadly in line with past
trends. Under the ITQ Scenario 4, the boat numbers are approximately halved, with
the adjustment occurring largely during the implementation phase.
Fewer boat numbers under all scenarios means reduced direct employment
opportunities for skippers and deck hands in the lobster fleet. In the case of Scenario
4, the reduction in employment opportunities for crew over the implementation phase
is most pronounced. This, on the other hand, should see incomes rise among the
fewer boats that remain.
If any of ITQ management alternatives (Scenario 3 or Scenario 4) were adopted, the
changed employment requirements would pose a new set of challenges for industry if
it were to attract and hold suitably skilled, experienced and reliable pool of deck
hands. These challenges are additional to those already confronting the industry under
the existing arrangements as a consequence of very competitive remuneration being
offered by emerging industries in the Mid-West such as mining.
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Lifestyle choices
The bio-economic modelling is based on profit optimising behaviour of the operator
of the representative boat in each lobster fishing zone. In practice, business choices
made by individual fishers about when they fish, where they fish, and how they fish
may be a trade-off against lifestyle preferences that are about lifestyle optimisation,
particularly where family-run businesses are generally involved. This should not be
taken as suggesting that such behaviour is less than optimal from society’s viewpoint.
However, such trade-offs can result in the net $ benefits being different to the
modelling results and outcomes. This may see more boats remaining in the fleet, and,
consequently, the employment impacts may be less.

Who will own the quota and will wealth distribution changes?
The marketplace may view ITQs as a more secure and reliable share of the catch than
pots. Therefore if the fishery were to move to an ITQ system, investors and
processors may show more interest in owning or leasing quota than they currently do
in owning or leasing pots. However, for investors in particular, there is still a similar
level of security around “quota rights” in the same way as there is around unit (pot)
and boat licences. That is, the Minister for Fisheries will have the authority to vary,
suspend and cancel quota in a similar same way as currently applies to unit (pot) and
boat licences. Investors and processors would make their investment decisions based
on the $ return they could receive on their ITQ compared to other investment
opportunities (e.g. real estate, shares, etc). Processors may also want to hold quota to
ensure a continuity of supply at particular times of the year.
In other fisheries around the world, there have been mixed experiences with changes
in quota ownership. Some ITQ fisheries, particularly those with large volumes and
high processing/catching infrastructure costs, appear more prone to purchase by
processors/corporations than other low-volume, high-value fisheries, which appear
more likely to stay in the hands of family fishing businesses.
A trend towards a change in the composition of ownership of rock lobster entitlements
is already apparent under the current system (investors buy unit – pot – entitlements
and lease them out) and it is likely to continue. This trend may accelerate under an
ITQ system for the reasons discussed.
The experience in some ITQ fisheries where there has been a significant shift in the
ownership of quota entitlements to investors/processors, and hence in the wealth
distribution, is that it has resulted in a reduced sense of stewardship towards the
resource. That is, the industry takes less ownership and responsibility for
sustainability of the resource.
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Quota Experience in other Rock Lobster
Fisheries
The following section describes the rock lobster quota management experience in
South Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand and has been extracted from paper titled
How do Quota Management Systems Work in Rock Lobster Fisheries? The
Experience in New Zealand, Tasmania and South Australia, by Tim Bray, Steven Gill
and Ron Edwards, Department of Fisheries, 2005.56

Findings
Quota management systems are now in place for the New Zealand, Tasmanian and
South Australian rock lobster fisheries. New Zealand was the first to move to QMS
(1989), followed by the Southern Zone of South Australia (1993), Tasmania (1998)
and Northern Zone of South Australia (2001).
Throughout the world of fisheries management, there are a number of assumptions
made about quota management systems. Most common are that under a QMS the
fleet size falls, the ownership of commercial fishing access rights will concentrate,
and there will be vertical integration through the catching and processing sectors.
These assumed effects are made because the economic theory is that there are strong
incentives for fishing fleets to restructure in order to become more efficient and focus
on maximising the value of their catch as opposed to investing in inputs to maximise
their catch.
As part of a review of the system of management used for the West Coast Rock
Lobster Fishery, a Western Australian delegation visited New Zealand, Tasmania and
South Australia in 2004 to learn more about the management systems used for their
respective rock lobster fisheries.
The delegation wanted to test the quota management theories by observing and
learning from the experience of similar fisheries that are quota managed. In
particular, the delegation went to learn about the regulatory approach taken, and
understand what effect that approach has had on the fishery and the industry from a
resource sustainability, economic and sociological perspective.
Each of the fisheries visited targets the southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii). The
delegation found that common to all these management systems is the use of a total
allowable commercial catch (TACC) to constrain the industry’s annual catch. The
TACC is then divided into transferable quota units held on licences that are renewed
annually. All fisheries complement the TACC with the use of biological controls, i.e.
size limits and protection of animals in a breeding condition.
Further analysis reveals that the regulatory approach taken beyond these common
areas differs. Key differences include the presence or absence of: zones within the
56

Available on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock
Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobsterwa.com and available in hard copy by phoning the
Department of Fisheries on 9482 7267.
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fishery, closed seasons, limitations on pot use, pot design and restrictions on the
transferability of units of entitlement (both pots and quota).
The delegation observed that the absence or presence of these add on measures
influences the behaviour of the industry both with respect to investment and fishing
strategy decisions. Relevant literature supplied to the delegation supports many of
these observations.
This report groups its analysis of the respective management systems in two
categories.

Fisheries management
For each of the fisheries observed, the decision to move to a QMS was primarily
based on the need to address sustainability concerns. In all cases, the inability to
successfully manage under the pre-existing input-based systems made the decision to
adopt a QMS one that was ultimately supported by the government and the majority
of industry.
Subsequent to implementing a QMS, each of the fisheries have experienced
significant improvements in key sustainability indicators. The notable exception is
the Northern Zone South Australian Fishery where the QMS is just in its second
season of operation.
Most have attributed the success of QMS to the setting of a TACC that actually
constrained or reduced catch and in doing so allowed the stock to rebuild, and in some
cases rebuild quite rapidly. The need to set a TACC has meant that the stock
assessment process now comes under even further scrutiny – even though the TACC
in each of the fisheries has changed very little in percentage terms since first
introduced.
Noting that QMS has been largely successful for management of these rock lobster
fisheries, it is important to note that the failure of the previous management systems
cannot be solely attributed to the fact that they were input managed. For example,
senior South Australian research scientists believe that the over-reliance on catch per
unit effort data obtained from the industry in the stock assessment for the Northern
Zone Fishery process was a major contributing factor.
The level of information available to the delegation on the cost of managing the
fisheries under QMS varied and was not complete. However, the clear indication
from fisheries managers and industry alike was that the greatest cost burden is
experienced in the first few years as the fishery goes through a transition. The
experience has been that the most significant cost impact has come from compliance
and, to a lesser extent, research.
Without exception, compliance was identified as an issue and there are two key
elements: (i) accountability of the catch recording system for the licensed commercial
fishers; and (ii) illegal take by unlicensed operators for the black market. A
successful compliance program needs to have strategies to address both of these risks.
The temptation to focus on tracing the catch of licensed commercial operators could
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result in the expansion of black market activity – undermining the entire management
process.

Industry dynamics and fishing patterns
The response of industry to the introduction of a QMS in terms of their behaviour was
an area of particular interest to the delegation, and there were some interesting
findings.
The first point of interest is that for three of the four fisheries there was recognition,
either explicitly or implicitly, that prior to entering the QMS there was an overcapacity issue and that the new system should facilitate fleet restructure. Accordingly
in New Zealand, Tasmania and Northern Zone South Australia, there has been a
reduction in both boat numbers and the number of entities owning quota units.
The key elements that are present for each of the fisheries where there has been a
significant level of restructuring are: (i) a TACC that constrains catch and in doing so
created or exacerbated fleet over-capacity – the greater the imbalance, the greater the
force for restructuring; and (ii) a system that allows a market for units of entitlement
to function relatively freely.
The rate at which the fleet adjusts following the introduction of a QMS is a separate
issue, and is most likely dependent upon the extent to which the management system
limits aggregation of quota units and the degree to which the initial allocation of quota
redistributed catch.
When considering the Southern Zone South Australian Fishery, where there has not
been any significant change in fleet size, it is apparent that the economic forces that
would drive the fleet to restructure can be considerably dampened by regulation
designed to prevent aggregation. In this case, it is also relevant to note that at the time
the fishery moved into QMS the market for southern rock lobster was particularly
buoyant and industry was highly profitable.
This combination of circumstances has created an environment in which participants
in the fishery have a particularly good lifestyle. The price for this lifestyle is a
relatively constrained quota market, and the risk is that the fundamentals that underpin
the economics of the fishery change and regulation inhibits the industry’s ability to
adjust in order to maintain profitability.
As trading and leasing in quota (and pots within the Australian fisheries) occurred, the
value of entitlement both increased and increased quite rapidly. The rapid increase in
the value of entitlement is a function of demand. The demand to buy and lease quota
immediately following the introduction of a QMS is spurred by the need for
participants to adjust the volume of catch to the size of their operation. It is also
apparent that the improving health of the fisheries under QMS and the resultant
increase in catch rates improved profitability and added confidence to the market.
The trade in quota is mostly fuelled by people leaving the fishery, and to date the
majority of investment in quota entitlements has come from within the existing rights
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holders. These investors are typically “topping up” their own operations or putting
quota into the lease market. Retiring fishers who choose not to sell their stake in the
fishery also supply the lease market. Across all of the fisheries, it is apparent that the
profitability of fishing is less for a fisher who leases entitlement as opposed to an
owner/operator.
The growing presence of lease fishermen (quota catchers) in these fisheries has both
fisheries managers and industry leaders concerned that there is less stewardship of the
resource.
The development of the Chinese live market for southern rock lobster in the 1990s
resulted in very high prices being realised during the southern hemisphere winter.
This coincided with a move to QMS for all but the Northern Zone South Australian
Fishery. In the QMS fisheries, there was a change in fishing patterns. The industry
has moved away from targeting high catch rate periods and landing a variety of
lobster with respect to size and colour, to an industry that increasingly supplies a size
and colour of lobster to the market when the market is prepared to pay the highest
price.
This change in fishing strategy has occurred because the rush to fish no longer exists
and it is therefore possible for processors to provide direct market signals to fishermen
through regular changes in beach price. The change has been greatest in Tasmania
and New Zealand, where the fishing season is structured so that the quota year ends at
a traditionally high catch rate period giving fishers confidence that they will be able to
take their full allocation.

General Observations
The transition into QMS for the New Zealand, Tasmanian and South Australian
fisheries has, on the whole, been positive. Where the systems have been in place for a
number of years, it is clear that the setting of a TACC can be a very effective tool for
managing sustainability, provided that the TACC setting process is underpinned by
quality research and reinforced by a comprehensive compliance program.
Where fleet over-capacity is an issue, the move to a QMS can accelerate the process
of restructuring when combined with a management system that allows the trade and
lease market to function relatively freely.
The price of access to the fishery inevitably rises. On the one hand, this has a positive
effect with respect to return on investment, however it will inevitably make the cost of
entry high.
It is possible for within season price premiums to be realised through changed fishing
behaviour when market signals are provided directly to fishers via processors.
There are opportunities under QMS for participants to improve their quality of life by
reducing the amount of time spent fishing while maintaining profitability.
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Conclusions
The aim of this review report was not to recommend one form of management over
another, but rather to provide stakeholders with information on the management
options that are available and the major issues involved with them and benefits they
have to offer. The debate on the most appropriate management system for the
industry has been given additional momentum over the last few years because the
industry is experiencing a significant “cost-price squeeze” that is unlikely to diminish
in the near future. If changes to the management system can improve the industry’s
efficiency and produce significant extra benefits, then they need to be thoroughly
evaluated.
It is hoped that stakeholders will find the information provided useful for the
forthcoming discussions on which management system (effort controls or ITQs)
provides the best long-term social, economic and biological benefits for the Western
Rock Lobster Fishery.
If, after full consultation involving all stakeholders, it were decided to change the
fishery’s management system (i.e. to make changes to the current system or introduce
quotas), the changes would be implemented cautiously and gradually. This would
ensure all stakeholders became accustomed to the changes and to carefully monitored
them to determine if they were having any negative or unforseen impacts.
The bio-economic model that the consultants ERA have developed to assess the
performance of the fishery under different effort control and ITQ management
systems has produced interesting results that need to be carefully evaluated by fishers
and the industry generally. This report has highlighted the assumptions in the model
that have the greatest impact on the performance (particularly economic) of the
different management options. The large efficiency gains (i.e. reductions in fishing
costs through more efficient pots and reduced boat numbers) and, to a lesser extent,
price increases are the major drivers in the model for fleet rationalisation and hence
the net $ benefits this results in.
ERA’s modelling results indicate that overall the ITQ management systems offer
greater scope for fishers to be more efficient (i.e. to reduce their costs) and for
processors to maximise the value of the catch (and hence the beach price paid to
fishers). However, as explained in the report the significant $ benefits that the model
estimates for the ITQ options are dependent on fishers maximising the potentially
large efficiency gains and processors maximising the potential market opportunities
that ITQs offer.
The bio-economic modelling results need to be balanced against the risks regarding
the breeding stock, non-compliance and quota avoidance, together with the increased
economic and social dislocation costs that could flow from the implementation of the
different management options. These costs will flow through to management charges
and, as a consequence of fleet rationalisation (e.g. reduced boat numbers, fleet
centralisation at a reduced number of ports, etc) and operation cost adjustments, they
will also flow through to regional communities. The modelling does not take into
account the impacts of the transition time that it takes to move from the current,
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steady state management arrangements to a steady situation under a new system of
management, which could vary from a few years to a decade or more.
Noting that there are additional costs and risks associated with changing to a different
management system, the benefits would need to be significant. Industry would
possibly need to gain a 10% increase in annual net ($) benefits ($20 to $30 million per
year) compared to the current system to warrant implementing a new approach.
Desirably, the Western Rock Lobster Council will work with industry to identify the
two or three key options (including the status quo) early in the consultative process, so
that the focus of the debate can be brought to bear on those options that could have the
greatest benefit for the industry and the community.
The challenge is for industry members to understand the reports that have been
provided, with the assistance of the industry appointed facilitator and relevant
Department of Fisheries staff, in order to develop an informed view. This will
facilitate effective communication with colleagues, fishermen, relevant peak bodies
and the Rock Lobster Industry Advisory Committee, to enable industry to recommend
future directions for the management of this fishery.
Details of the consultations that will commence in February 2006 are provided in
Attachment 2.
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Attachments
Attachment 1

Definition Of Terms And Abbreviations
Table 1
TERM OR
ABREVIATION
Breeding stock
Catch rate or
catch per unit of
fishing effort

Exploitation,
also referred to
as the
exploitation rate
Effective fishing
effort
Fishing effort

Fishing
efficiency

Individual
transferable
effort
ITE
Individual
transferable
quota
ITQ
Recruitment to
the fishery
Recruitment to
the breeding
stock
Stock and
recruitment

DEFINITION OR MEANING
(in relation to the Western Rock Lobster Fishery)
Rock lobsters that are sexually mature.
The average weight of rock lobsters caught each time a pot is pull,
i.e. it is the total weight of rock lobster caught each season
divided by the total number of pot pulls for the season. For
example, if a fisher catches 15,000kg and makes 20,000 pot lifts
for the season, then his average catch rate for the season is 0.75kg
of lobsters per pot lift.
The number (or weight) of legal size rock lobsters that are taken
from the population/stock each season out of the estimated total
biomass of legal size lobsters in the population.
Effective fishing effort takes into account the increases in fishing
efficiency that have taken place over time.
The number of pot pulls or lifts a fisher makes in a year. For
example, if a fisher had 100 pots and fished them for 185 days in
the season, he would have made 18,500 pot pulls for the season.
If every fisher’s fishing effort is added up at the end of the season,
it gives the total fishing effort expended in the fishery.
This measure of fishing effort does not take into account the
efficiency increases that have occurred in fishing operations since
1964, when a pot was not nearly as efficient/effective as it is now.
This is the measure of how efficient the fishing effort is, i.e. how
effective a pot lift is. Fishers did not fish as efficiently in 1964 as
they do in 2005. This is because they now have much better
boats, pots, and technology (GPS, colour sounders).
An ITE is a unit of fishing effort (e.g. a rock lobster pot) that can
be transferred between fishers in the same zone.

Each fisher’s individual share of the total allowable catch (TAC)
in their zone.

The number of young rock lobsters that grow to legal size each
year.
The number of rock lobsters that survive fishing and grow to
become mature/breeders each year.
The relationship between the numbers of breeders (eggs) and the
number of puerulus settling (level of recruitment of young
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relationship

Total allowable
catch
TAC
Total allowable
commercial
catch
TACC

lobsters). A good number of breeders are required to ensure that
the number of eggs produced do not affect the level of puerulus
settlement (and hence level of catch 3-4 years later), no matter
what the environmental conditions are.
In other words, you always want the environmental conditions to
be the factor that determines the level of puerulus settlement, not
the number of breeding lobsters. If you reduce the number of
breeders too far, then the number of eggs produced will not be
sufficient to give you average or good levels of puerulus
settlement, even if the environmental conditions are favourable.
Even worse, in years of poor environmental conditions and too
few breeders (low egg production), it could produce disastrously
low levels of puerulus settlement and hence very low lobster
catches three to four years later. This has occurred in many
fisheries around the world, in Australia and in Western Australia
(e.g. the Exmouth Gulf tiger prawn fishery, which declined to less
than a quarter of its potential long-term production in the early
1980s due to not enough breeding stock).
At the current levels of rock lobster breeding stock, it is the
environmental conditions (e.g. strength of the Leeuwin Current)
that determine the level of puerulus settlement and hence catch.
The total amount (kg) of rock lobsters that can be caught by all
fishers (commercial, recreational, indigenous, etc) in a season.
An allowance is also made for illegal (unreported) catch.
The total amount (kg) of rock lobsters that can be caught by all
commercial fishers.
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Attachment 2

Scope of the Review of Management Options for
the Rock Lobster Fishery
Objectives Of The Review
In the context of ecologically sustainable development, the objective for the review of
the rock lobster management system is to:
Assess and compare alternative management systems using the current
management system (fishing effort/input controls) as the benchmark. Using this
comparison, make a decision as to which system offers the best long-term socioeconomic return to the State of Western Australia from the ecologically
sustainable use of the western rock lobster resource based on:
a) providing the greatest incentives and opportunity for growth in
economic return for all sectors of the rock lobster industry and the
Western Australian economy in general; and
b) in the context of providing the best socio-economic benefit to the
Western Australian community, encourage the maintenance and
development of regional communities.
It is important to reiterate that the current effort management system has served the
fishery well over the years and would continue to do so in future provided managers
and industry reduce fishing effort if overexploitation threatens the breeding stock.
However, there is a need to assess if additional benefits (ecological, economic, social
and management) can be obtained by moving to an alternative management system,
while still ensuring long-term sustainability.

Timetable Of Review
Jan 04 –
Oct 05

Oct 05 –
Sept 06

Oct 06 –
Feb 07

March 07
– Nov 08

Phase 1
Establishing objectives of the study
and undertaking the assessment of
the four management systems to be
compared
Phase 2
Communicate assessment and
comparison of management systems
with stakeholders
Phase 3
Poll of stakeholder views and
RLIAC has final meetings with
industry and prepares advice for
Government
Phase 4
State Government makes its
decision and any new management
system is put in place for the 200809 season
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Phase 1 – Objective Analysis of Management Scenarios
Commencing in October 2003, a joint departmental and industry Steering Committee
chaired by the Executive Director of Fisheries, Dr Peter Rogers, oversaw the
development of papers that assessed the relative advantages and disadvantages of the
effort control and quota management systems outlined above, with respect to the
review’s stated objective. The areas of study covered are:
1. Broad issues – Impacts on the fishing industry and fisheries management
Assessment of the likely shift in catch shares, changes in fishing behaviour
and fleet dynamics, and size and the risk of breeding stock depletion and
management failure.
2. Economic modelling – Cost efficiency comparisons of effort control and
quota management systems
A cost-benefit analysis of the four management systems, including the cost of
fisheries management, compliance and research; cost of production; and the
identification of any economic opportunities that can be realised under the
alternative management systems. Also included in the economic evaluations
are some initial assessments of market development/advantage opportunities
under effort control and quota management systems.
3. Social impacts – Assessment of the likely impacts on social infrastructure of
effort control and quota management systems
Through the establishment of appropriate social indicators, develop a
conceptual model to predict the behaviour of the rock lobster industry under
the various management options and therefore their impact on existing host
communities.
4. Experience in other fisheries – Assessment of management systems used in
other countries and Australian States
Building on work already completed, review and update the current experience
in places such as New Zealand, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria.

Phase 2 – Communicate Analysis of Management Scenarios
with Stakeholders
The purpose of Phase 2 is to communicate to all stakeholders (commercial and
recreational fishers, processors, conservation sector, etc) the results of the assessment
and comparison of the four management options in the context of the review’s
objective. The studies that have been conducted will be published and the
information will empower stakeholders to arrive at their own conclusions as to which
management system is best. Phase 2 will commence in October 2005 and be
completed by September 2006.
The communication process will use an independent facilitator who will conduct a
series of workshops with professional fishermen’s associations and other interested
parties. In the interests of fairness and the transparency of this process, it is desirable
that an independent facilitator, who understands fisheries management and resource
allocation issues and is independent of both the rock lobster industry and the
Department of Fisheries, facilitates the workshops. The meetings will be co-ordinated
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by the Western Rock Lobster Council, the Western Australian Fishing Industry
Council and Western Rock Lobster Development Association.
The importance of the role to be played by professional fishers’ associations, the
Western Rock Lobster Council and the Western Rock Lobster Development
Association in this phase cannot be overstated. There is an opportunity for industry
leaders to facilitate and guide industry’s discovery of the issues and development of a
broadly supported position in such a way as to enhance the prospect of a very positive
outcome.

Phase 3 – RLIAC Prepare Advice for Government
At the commencement of the third phase, stakeholders by now should understand the
strengths and weaknesses of the four management options that have been assessed,
and have made a decision as to which one they believe is the best.
During this period, RLIAC will receive submissions from stakeholders and engage
with them to clarify their positions. Stakeholder submissions and results from the
studies that have been undertaken will be used by RLIAC to develop advice to the
Government on which management option would best meet the future needs of the
rock lobster industry and the community generally. RLIAC will continue to
communicate with stakeholders throughout this period to ensure its understanding of
the respective stakeholder positions is well understood.
At this point, the Western Rock Lobster Council will conduct a poll of the rock
lobster fishing sector to ascertain which management option is preferred. It is
important to note that the results of this poll will not necessarily determine RLIAC’s
advice to the Minister or the Government’s final position. The poll will make it clear
to the Government what the majority view of fishers is, but the ultimate decision will
be made based on the substantial merits of the case for or against management
change. A case for changing the current management system would need to produce
convincing arguments that there are significant benefits in an ecologically sustainable
development context to be realised under a new system of management.
By October 2006, RLIAC will be in a position to communicate the substance its
intended advice to the Government on the coastal tour before formally presenting this
advice to the Minister for Fisheries in early 2007. This final step provides further
transparency for the process, and the opportunity for RLIAC to ensure it has properly
accounted for all stakeholder views and on balance has developed the best advice.

Phase 4 – Government’s Decision and Implementation
Once the Minister for Fisheries has received RLIAC’s advice, he will take his position
to Cabinet. Cabinet’s view on the long-term management of the rock lobster fishery
in the context of ecologically sustainable development and national competition
policy is likely to be known in 2007 and will immediately be communicated to all
stakeholders.
If the decision is to move to a new management system, it is anticipated it will be
implemented in time for the 2008-09 season.
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Attachment 3

Economic Issues Impacting on the Western Rock
Lobster Industry
Introduction
Rock lobster fishing has traditionally been seen as a lucrative business when
compared to some other forms of agriculture and fishing. Armchair commentators
point to the considerable capital value tied up in unit (pot) entitlements as evidence of
the fishery’s wealth. As recently as three years ago, this was estimated to be worth
almost $1.8 billion in Western Australia alone. But a closer examination of the rock
lobster industry suggests that rock lobster fishing is suffering from similar pressures
as other agricultural and fishing industries. The cost of fishing has been increasing
while the value of rock lobsters have been declining – this cost-price squeeze is more
commonly associated with industries such as the dairy and wheat industries. The
recent intensification of these trends may be one of the reasons the price of rock
lobster unit authorisations (pot entitlements) has declined by about 27 per cent in the
last two years.
However, the changing economics in the industry are not new. Boat numbers in the
Western Rock Lobster Fishery have been declining for as long as 40 years as fishers
have moved to larger boats with higher pot numbers per boat where they can take
advantage of economies of scale. This is similar to the story told in the dairy industry,
as farmers have responded to increasing costs and reducing prices by developing
larger and larger herds. The concern is that in recent years, economic pressures have
been increasing to a point that can no longer just be addressed by fishers moving to
larger, more efficient vessels.
The problem facing the industry is determining which management arrangement will
provide the right incentives for fishers to improve their fishing efficiency and
marketing efforts in new and innovative ways, so they can collectively tackle the
ongoing cost-price pressures.
The concern is that the current individual transferable effort (ITE) control system of
management has restrained the ability of fishers to manage their input costs as
effectively as they might otherwise been able to under a quota system of management.
The issue of how much value could be derived from a quota system compared to a pot
restriction system is one of the questions being addressed in the study presented in the
related review report.

The Cost-price Squeeze
The profitability of rock lobster fishing is affected by a few key economic and
financial parameters and these are:
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1. the prices received for rock lobsters, considering the fluctuations in price from
season to season and the fluctuations in price within a season;
2. the catch of rock lobsters, considering the timing of the catch and variation in
the catch across seasons;
3. input costs including,
o fuel costs,
o bait costs,
o labour costs,
o capital costs (namely the cost of boats, debt servicing and the cost of
replacing or upgrading fishing equipment), and
o administration and other sundry on-costs.
Like other primary industries, the rock lobster industry has been increasingly
confronted with rising costs and stagnating or declining prices. The following is a
summary of these factors – showing the historical trends and providing some insight
to the future.

Rock Lobster Prices
More than 95 per cent of rock lobsters caught in Western Australia are exported. The
major markets for lobster are in the United States and South-East Asia. This means
the Western Australian export market is very dependent on the fluctuations in the
Australian dollar against the US dollar57.
While Western Australia’s lobster fishery is the largest spiny lobster producer, it
represents less than 10 per cent of world total lobster supply, suggesting that monthly
(or intra-seasonal) fluctuations in local supply are not likely to have a major impact on
prices received within a given season, although annual fluctuations (season to season)
could have some impact. It is noted that if monthly prices are averaged over 10 years,
there is about a $2 per kilogram variation from the low price month of December to
the high priced month of June. However, there have been much greater fluctuations
in the average price from year to year with the average annual price fluctuating
between $36 per kilogram and $20 per kilogram (CPI adjusted) over the last ten years.
As noted earlier, prices for rock lobsters have, over the longer term, been declining in
real terms. The downward trend in rock lobster prices is even more pronounced if they
are adjusted to eliminate fluctuations in exchange rate. Figure 1 below shows the CPI
adjusted price (termed the real price) of rock lobsters, plotted against the price
adjusted for exchange rate and the CPI (termed the real trade weighted price). The
‘best fit’ trend line (the solid straight line in Figure 1) is down from $32 per kilogram
in the early 1990s, to about $21 per kilogram now. The trend line can be considered
as the price fishers would have received if exchange rates had remained constant at
their current levels and inflation were taken into account.

57

Note that most South-East Asian currencies are pegged to the US dollar, which means they go up and
down in value as the US dollar fluctuates. Therefore, export prices are almost solely related to the
prices received at the export market in the US dollar equivalent value.
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Figure 1: CPI Adjusted Beach Price for Rock Lobsters – With and Without
Currency Adjustment
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The important point is that the favourable exchange rate movements in 1999 and 2000
have probably provided a short-term buffer against a decline in the world price for
rock lobsters (see dotted line in Figure 1). The major concern now is the Australian
dollar could remain strong and if this occurs prices are likely to remain low in
Australian dollar terms. At the time of writing (December 2005), the Australian
dollar was valued at US75 cents and the outlook for a strengthening or weakening
dollar was mixed, with some commentators predicting US80 cents and others
predicting US68 cents over the next 12 months.

Catch History and Outlook
Catch rates in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery have steadily increased (with
seasonal fluctuations), although the rate of growth in catch has slowed considerably
since the late 1970s. Over the long-term, there are unlikely to be any changes to
current catch levels of around 11,500 tonnes per annum.
Year to year fluctuations in catch reflect the changing seasonal conditions. Effort
levels within the fishery have also impacted on catch with effort reductions in 1992
and 1994 resulting in reductions in catch in the following season. However, in each
case, the fishery has recovered and catch rates have increased slightly beyond those
prior to the effort reduction. The reason for increased catches could be twofold, being
i) better protection of the breeding animals (e.g. the policy of returning breeding
animals to the water, if caught); and ii) improvements in the effectiveness of fishing
methods has increased the catch rate per pot. In the recent modelling exercise
conducted to compare management options, it was assumed that there is a 1 per cent
improvement in the effectiveness of fishing each year.
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In the short term, a 13 per cent reduction in catch is expected in the 2005-06 season
and a further 9 per cent reduction in the 2006-07 season. Some recovery in catch is
expected in 2007-08.
The predicted reductions in catch over the next two years will have a major impact on
the fishers' bottom line as it is likely to coincide with increased cost-price pressures.
A reduction in the value of catch will also impact on deckhands’ and skippers’ wages
because most are paid under revenue sharing arrangements.
Concerns about the status of the fishery’s stock have led to the adoption of further
effort reduction measures across the fishery. These effort reduction measures are
likely to reduce catch further than expected in the next season, although the negative
impact of effort reduction measures should be dissipated within two years.
Short-term reductions (and increases) in catch have an immediate impact on fishers’
profit margins because any corresponding efficiency gains are occurring at a much
slower rate.
A 10 per cent reduction in catch would have an average impact of about $50,000
in reduced revenue per fisher. Given that most fishers cannot reduce their fishing
costs in poorer years, this is likely to affect the average profit margin by about the
same amount.

Input Costs
Operational costs (such as fuel, bait and labour) make up nearly 60 per cent of the
total costs of ‘an average’ rock lobster fisher with fuel accounting for about 14 per
cent (net of crew’s contribution and tax), bait 11 per cent and labour 34 per cent of
costs. The balance (41 per cent) of costs can be attributed to the servicing of capital
for boats (assuming depreciation at 5 per cent per annum and the cost of capital at 7
per cent per annum), administration, insurance, and other non-fishing costs. These
figures have been derived from the analysis undertaken in February this year
(Thomson and Caputi, 200558) with supporting assumptions from the study
undertaken by Economic Research Associates.

Fuel
For most fishers, depending on the zone fished and the price of diesel fuel, their
annual fuel bill is between $40,000 and $60,000 per year, after the government tax
rebate is returned to the boat owner/operator. The trend in fuel prices is a worrying
development for the industry as it attempts to remain profitable. Prices have
increased 22 per cent in a 12-month period from December 2004 and 52 per cent over
a four-year period from February 2001.

58

Thomson, N., Caputi, N., 2005. An Economic Analysis of Management Options in the Western Rock
Lobster Fishery of Western Australia., In: Proc of 3rd Bi-Annual Conference of the North American
Association of Fisheries Economists, Vancouver, British Columbia.
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Figure 2: Average Diesel Fuel Prices in the State’s Mid-West Region – Fuel Watch
Average Diesel Fuel Prices
(Midwest of Western Australia - Source Fuel Watch)
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Increasing fuel prices are being driven by the rising demand for fuel in emerging
economies such as China and India. These same economic drivers are fuelling higher
wages in the Western Australian mining sector, which potentially add to the labour
shortage in the rock lobster industry. Demand is predicted to continue to expand and
over the longer term there are real concerns about the long-term supply of oil. Given
these factors, it is likely that there will be ongoing price pressure on diesel fuel prices.

100

Figure 3: The Impact of Fuel Prices on Fishers’ Profits
Rock Lobster Fisher Profit Sensitivity to Fuel Costs
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Figure 3 demonstrates the likely relationship between fuel prices and profit of rock
lobster fishers.
For every 10-cent increase in fuel prices, there is about a $4,000 reduction in
profit. Naturally, some fishers would see greater reductions than this if their
annual fuel bill were more than $50,000 per year.

Labour
In September 2005, economic analysts BIS Shrapnel predicted average wages growth
of 6.5 per cent in 2006, which if it occurs, will place enormous pressure on labour
availability for the 2005-06 season. This impact is likely to be more pronounced in
the State’s Mid-West where mining is expanding. Already, deckhand earnings are
falling behind average weekly earnings. If catch is reduced in the 2005-06 season (as
it is expected to), then this will reduce the earnings of deckhands further, widening the
gap between average earnings and deckhand earnings. The industry is concerned with
its ability to retain labour and predicted catch reductions in the next two years are
likely to exacerbate the problem.
Under the current revenue sharing arrangements, crew are paid as a percentage of the
catch which provides a buffer for the owner if the catch is poor (because deckhands’
payments will be low) but provides a bonus for deckhands if the catch is good
(because deckhands’ payments will be high). However, this buffer comes at the cost
of declining competitiveness in the labour market when catches (and prices) are low.
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Figure 4: Average Weekly Earnings and Deckhand Earnings.
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Figure 4 shows the fluctuation in average deckhand earnings compared to the average
Australian weekly earnings rate. Since 2001, average weekly earnings have been
higher than the estimated deckhand weekly earnings and the gap is likely to widen in
2006 (denoted by the dotted lines). This decline in deckhand earnings is a function of
the predicted decline in total catch (although prices are assumed to increase by $2 per
kilogram).
One solution to the declining attractiveness of working in the rock lobster industry
may be to pay crew a greater proportion of the value of the catch (either as a fixed
payment or under a revenue sharing arrangement). But any increase in wages (over
and above current revenue sharing arrangements) would have a considerable impact
on the fishers’ profit margin, unless the increase is associated with improved
efficiencies.
An increase in wages of 6.5 per cent, without a similar increase in revenue would
mean that average profits could decline by about $7,000 (assuming the boat was
crewed by two deckhands).
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Fixed Costs
It is estimated that fixed costs make up about 41 per cent of fishing costs. Fixed costs
include the cost of servicing debt, paying regular expenditure on land-based
operations and paying for vessels (including depreciation). The estimate is based on
the assumption that the interest rate on debt is 7 per cent per annum and boats are
depreciated at a rate of 5 per cent per annum).
Depending on the level of indebtedness, fluctuations in the cost of capital can exert a
significant effect on fishers’ profit margins. The prospect of an interest rate rise, of
say 0.5 percentage points during the 2005-06 season, has been heightened by strong
wages growth.
If it is assumed that 40 per cent of capital costs are financed, then a 0.5 percentage
point increase in interest rates could represent an additional cost of about $1,000
per boat per year. Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates could
lead to a reduction in average annual profit of less than $2,000. The impact of
interest rate rises would naturally be much more dramatic if the level of
indebtedness is higher. Note these calculations do not include the cost of financing
pot entitlements if money is borrowed against these.

Value of Pot Entitlements
The market value of rock lobster unit (pot) entitlements (that are individually
transferable as a restricted entitlement of fishing effort) has increased considerably
over the last 15 years (particularly after the pot reduction of 1993), although in the last
two seasons the sale price of pot entitlements has declined. This is not surprising,
given the number of risk factors facing the industry at the present time and the fact
that the market for rock lobster unit (pot) entitlements reflects the expected future
profitability of rock lobster fishing operations.
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Figure 5: Trends in Rock Lobster Pot Prices Since 1990
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If a new management system increases profits in the industry, then it is likely that the
value of entitlements (whether they be pots or quota) will increase. The willingness
of fishers to pay higher prices for entitlements reflects the expectation of future
earnings. So profits drive entitlement values, and not the other way around.
The modelling exercise does not consider the value of entitlements but rather
measures the likely change in profit without any regard to entitlement values. This
approach is sufficient for the purposes of comparing management options because the
profitability of the industry is the key issue of concern. Capital gains in entitlements
will logically follow if profits can be improved through new management methods.

Fleet Size and Composition
The rock lobster fishing fleet has been steadily declining since the 1960s and by
December 2004 consisted of 549 operational boats, down from a peak of 836 in 1963.
The trend of declining boat numbers is likely to continue as the average number of
pots per boat increases. It is noted that the trend (as shown in Figure 6) accelerated
for a short time immediately after the introduction of pot reduction in 1993. Figure 6
would also suggest that changes in the catch rates have some impact on the rate at
which boats are exiting the fleet. It appears to be reasonable to assume that boat
numbers will continue to decline in the future, given the ongoing challenges being
posed by the continuing cost price pressures.
This decline is likely to be accelerated if further pot reductions are introduced or if a
quota system is introduced.
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Figure 6: Fleet Numbers and Catch
Catch Per Boat and Boat Numbers

26.00

Boats

700
680
660
640
620
600
580
560
540
520
500

Tonnes Per Boat

24.00
22.00
20.00
18.00
16.00
14.00

19
9
19 0-9
9 1
19 1-9
9 2
19 2-9
9 3
19 3-9
9 4
19 4-9
9 5
19 5-9
9 6
19 6-9
9 7
19 7-9
9 8
19 8-9
9 9
20 9-0
0 0
20 0-0
0 1
20 1-0
0 2
20 2-0
03 3
-0
4

12.00

Number of Boats

Catch Per Boat

Year

Profitability of Industry
The economic outlook for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery appears somewhat
pessimistic at this stage and this heightens the need for management reform,
particularly if that reform results in improved efficiency within the fishery.
Presently, the outlook for major cost and revenue parameters are:
•
•
•
•
•
•

exchange rates, which are likely to remain at their current higher levels;
diesel fuel costs, with prices likely to escalate, possibly at a rate above
inflation;
interest rates, where there is some possibility of a modest interest rate rise;
labour competition, which is increasing;
prices of rock lobsters, which could continue to be negative over the longer
term – as world lobster production increases; and
catch, which is negative in the next two years, particularly in Zones B and C.

In order to make sense of the aggregate impact of changes an index of profitability has
been estimated over the last 15 years using the following formula.
π=

59

1 - [(Fuel ($) + Bait ($) + Labour ($) + Boat Capital Costs* 30%59*Interest Rate Charges ($)]
Revenue (Prices ($/kg) * Catch (kg))

An assumed value of 30 per cent is given to reflect the debt to equity ratio of the average fisher.
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Where:
o π is the aggregate index of industry profitability;
o all costs (fuel, bait, labour, 40 per cent of estimated boat capital * interest
charges) and revenues are estimates of nominal aggregate costs and revenues;
and
o boat capital costs are scaled to boat numbers over time, assuming average
inputs per boat remain unchanged.
The index shows costs increasing as a percentage of revenue (by about 2.5 per cent
per annum) over the last six years and that this will increase further in the 2005-06
season. This raises concerns that the viability of the industry may be being threatened
to a much greater extent than has previously been the case.
Figure 7: Aggregate Industry Profitability Index 1999-2000 to 2005-06
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Figure 7 indicates that in 1999-2000 about 60 per cent of revenue was captured by
industry as profit (excluding some onshore costs and servicing of pot entitlements).
But in 2005-06, it is expected that only 47 per cent of revenue will be captured in the
same way (that is, costs make up over 50 per cent of direct operational revenues).
In 2005-06, there is likely to be a combination of low catches, low prices, possibly
higher interest rate charges (an assumed 1 per cent increase) and higher fuel prices.
Assumptions for the 2005-06 season are:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Price $23/kg, up $2/kg from the previous season;
Catch 11,500 tonnes, down 2,000 tonnes from the previous season;
Fuel prices, $1/litre ex-tax, up 22 cents/litre from the previous season;
Bait costs, up 5 per cent from the previous season;
Interest rates, up 1 percentage point from the previous season; and
Boat numbers 540, down nine from the previous season.
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Conclusions
In economic terms, it would appear that the Western Rock Lobster Fishery is facing
challenging times as a result of the ongoing and intensifying cost-price squeeze,
consistent with other primary commodity markets. This is likely to have a
considerable long-term impact on the profitability of the fishery, unless industry can
continuously improve its efficiency or value of its product. Failure to do so is likely
to not only harm profit margins but also the capital value of pot entitlements.
The main cost drivers show little sign of easing over the short- or longer term and the
outlook for rock lobster prices is not optimistic. Even if it is assumed that prices will
rise to $23/kg in the 2005-06, the season is likely to have lower profits than in the last
few seasons. Neither does it appear that the industry can rely on its good fortune in
the late 90s and early 2000s, when the Australian dollar moved in a favourable
direction for exporters.
The industry is also facing challenges with its labour arrangements. The historical
method of sharing revenue with fishers is placing fishing labour in an increasingly
unattractive position while mining and tourism flourish in the key fishing areas,
thereby drawing down the labour pool for the rock lobster industry.
If industry wishes to maintain or improve its current rate of return, it needs to find a
management system that allows it to restructure input costs. Similarly, it needs to
consider the prospects of improving its marketing of product.
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Attachment 5
A description on the main management rules (Table A) and assumptions (Table B) used in the economic modelling.
Table A.
A description of the management arrangements used to model the management options that were assessed and compared in the review of the
Western Rock Lobster Fishery (from Appendix 11 in A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster
Fishery. Economic Research Associates report prepared for the Department of Fisheries on behalf of Rock Lobster Industry Advisory
Committee. December 2005.)
Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery
Management controls

Current ITE

Modified ITE

ITQ – effort
controlled

ITQ

1. Spatial – boundaries

Cape Leeuwin to NW Cape
Four Fishing Zones (A, B, C)
and Big Bank1.

No Change
Three Zones60 (A, B & C)

No Change
Three Zones² (A, B & C)

No Change
Three Zones² (A, B & C)

2. Temporal – opening and
closing times

Seasonal Controls:
15 November-30June (Zones
B & C)
15 March-30 June (Zone A)
Zone A authorisations are
entitled to fish in Zone B up
until 14 March.
Big Bank¹ 10 Feb-last day of

Extended Season
15 November -31 August
(Zones B & C)
15 March-31August (Zone A)
Zone A authorisations are
entitled to fish in Zone B up
until 14 March.
No Big Bank.

Extended Season
15 November-31 August
(Zones B & C)
15 March-31August (Zone A)
Zone A authorisations are
entitled to fish in Zone B up
until 14 March.
No Big Bank.

Extended Season
15 November-31 August
(Zones B & C)
15 Mar-31Aug (Zone A)
Zone A authorisations are
entitled to fish in Zone B
up until 14 March.
No Big Bank.

1

Big Bank is incorporated into Zone B for modelling purposes, as it is a minor subset of Zone B. In the Department’s judgment, this is not likely to impact materially on the
outputs from the modelling. Under the existing management rules, Big Bank operates in the following way: A Zone fishers can fish in Zone B up until 14 March, when they
must go to the Abrolhos Islands. A and B Zone fishers who nominate to fish the Big Bank from 10 February must remain in Big Bank until midday on the last day of
February of the season. Big Bank then becomes part of the B Zone fishery and any Zone A or B fisher can go there or leave it as they please.
2
Big Bank is incorporated into Zone B.
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Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery
Management controls

Current ITE

Modified ITE

ITQ – effort
controlled

ITQ

February.
3. Access

4. Effort

Transferable zone specific
WRL Managed Fishery
Licence (MFL) attached to a
Fishing Boat Licence (FBL).
One WRL MFL per FBL61.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

More than one WRL MFL can
be attached to an FBL3 but
only one MFL entitlement can
be exercised on any day.

More than one WRL MFL can
be attached to an FBL3 but
only one MFL entitlement can
be exercised on any day.

More than one WRL
MFL can be attached to
an FBL3 but only one
MFL entitlement can be
exercised on any day.

Right of renewal.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

Minimum Unit Entitlement
(63) is required to operate.

Minimum Unit Entitlement
(45) to fish.

Minimum catch quota
entitlement equivalent to a 45pot entitlement to fish.

Individually transferable Unit
Entitlements (69,282 units).

Not Applicable.

Replaced by catch quota/pot
for season, but maximum
daily gear usage constraint
remains

Minimum catch quota
entitlement equivalent to
a 45-pot entitlement to
fish.
Not Applicable.

Individual maximum Gear
Usage (56,813 pots that can be
operated).

No Change.

No Change.

No maximum pot usage.
Fishers can use as many
pots as they like.

3

Other fishery endorsements can appear on an FBL
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Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery
Management controls

Current ITE

Modified ITE

ITQ – effort
controlled

ITQ

With a maximum number of
pot/fishing day entitlements in
each zone endorsed on the
MFL i.e. Zones B & C-185
pot/ fishing days; Zone A-90
pot/fishing days.

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

No allowance for ‘dud’ days.

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

Two-day and more pulls are
to be treated as one-day pulls.

Not Applicable.

No carry forward of
pot/fishing day credits, i.e. an
individual fisher’s maximum
pot numbers deemed to be
used on each fishing day.

Not Applicable.

Pot size and volume restricted
and escape gaps remain the
same.

No Change.

Pot setting and retrievals
restricted to one/day.

No Change.

Not Applicable.

Pot design freedom up to
a 40 per cent efficiency
increase
50 per cent increase in pot
volume and three necks/pot in
Year 3.

Multiple day pulls to be
allowed.

No Change.
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Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery
Management controls

5. Biological

6. Annual Catch

Current ITE

Modified ITE

ITQ – effort
controlled

ITQ

Minimum size limits.
77mm carapace (15 Nov-31
Jan).

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

76 mm carapace (1Feb-30
Jun).

76 mm carapace (1 Feb-31
Aug).

76 mm carapace (1 Feb-31
Aug).

76 mm carapace (1 Feb31 Aug).

Maximum size limits for
female.
115 mm carapace south of 30°
South.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

105 mm carapace north of 30°
South.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

Taking setose and tarspot
prohibited.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

Annual Total Allowable
Commercial Catch (TACC),
i.e. two scenarios:

Annual Total Allowable
Commercial Catch
(TACC), i.e. two
scenarios:

1.Conservatively fixed ‘Yearin-year-out’ TACC for each
Zone, i.e. Zone A-1,600

1.Conservatively fixed
‘year-in-year-out’ TACC
for each Zone, i.e. Zone
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Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery
Management controls

Current ITE

Modified ITE

ITQ – effort
controlled
tonnes, Zone B-3,600 tonnes,
Zone C-4,800 tonnes
Note: Zone C may need to be
kicked-in at a lower figure if
the introduction of annual
catch quotas coincided with
predicted low catch seasons.

6. Annual Catch (continued)

ITQ
A-1,600 tonnes, Zone B3,600 tonnes, Zone C4,800 tonnes
Note: Zone C may need
to be kicked-in at a lower
figure if the introduction
of annual catch quotas
coincided with predicted
low catch seasons.

or

or

2.A conservatively set variable
annual TACC based on
predicted (puerulus)
sustainable catch levels for
each of Zones A, B and C.

2.A conservatively set
variable annual TACC
based on predicted
(puerulus) sustainable
catch levels for each of
Zones A, B and C.

Zone A authorisation will
have a catch quota in Zone B
that can be fished until 15

Zone A authorisations
will have a catch quota in
Zone B that can be fished

4

Zone A quota to be calculated using their share/proportion of the catch (based on the number of pots held on the MFL) taken in Zone B during the period 15 November to
14 March. The proportion of catch thus calculated to be used for all future quota calculations.
5
Zone A quota to be calculated using their share/proportion of the catch (based on the number of pots held on the MFL) taken in Zone B during the period 15 November to
14 March. The proportion of catch thus calculated to be used for all future quota calculations. Zone A fishers are to be able to take their quota of catch in Zone B at any time
of the season.
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Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery
Management controls

Current ITE

Modified ITE

ITQ – effort
controlled

ITQ

March4.

in Zone B at any time of
the season.5

Individual Transferable
Annual Catch quotas (kg) by
zone endorsed on individual
MFLs.

Individual Transferable
catch Quotas (ITQ)(kgs)
by zone endorsed on
individual MFLs.

7. Satellite Vessel Monitoring
System (VMS)

VMS assumed to be
operational6

VMS will be operational.

VMS will be operational.

VMS will be operational.

8. Transferability

Individual transferable pot
entitlements are not
transferable between Zones B
& C but are transferable
within these two zones.

Individual residual pot/fishing
day entitlements would not be
transferable between zones
but transferable within zones
between fishers during the
season, but within a maximum
gear usage constraint.

Individual residual catch
quota/pot would not be
transferable between zones but
transferable within zones
between fishers.

Individual catch quota to
be fully transferable
within zones and within
seasons.

Individual pot entitlements are
transferable between Zones A
& B. Current policy requires
that there must be a 100 per
6

No decision has been made to introduce VMS under the current management regime but for the purposes of this evaluation it has been assumed that VMS is operational.
Unrestricted transferability of pot entitlements between Zones A & B was reviewed by Department of Fisheries and RLIAC during the course of this evaluation because of
concerns about the transfer of effort between Zone A and B going beyond historic levels. The policy adopted is to only allow transfers of pots from A Zone to B Zone and
vice versa if there is an equal transfer in the other direction.
62
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Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery
Management controls

Current ITE

Modified ITE

ITQ – effort
controlled

ITQ

cent swap in each direction.62.

9. Cost Recovery

10. Processing

Department of Fisheries cost
of management, research,
compliance and enforcement
recovered in accordance with
agreed cost attribution and
recovery rules
-Licensed processing
establishments
-Licensing of lobster
processing for Australian
domestic market is not
restricted
- Licensing of lobster
processing for export is
restricted to the existing

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

No Change.

No restrictions on export
processing licence numbers.

No restrictions on export
processing licence numbers.

No restrictions on export
processing licence

63

Continuation of this restriction on competition is conditional on satisfying the NCP ‘public interest’ test. There is currently an initiative to remove the restriction on the
number of WRL export processing licences.
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Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery
Management controls

Current ITE

Modified ITE

ITQ – effort
controlled

ITQ

number of issued licences,
currently 1663.

numbers.

Table B
Key Differences in the Features of the Alternative Management Options Modelled (from Table 3.2 in A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the West Coast
Rock Lobster Fishery. Economic Research Associates report prepared for the Department of Fisheries on behalf of Rock Lobster Industry Advisory Committee. December
2005.)
Features

Zones

All
Zones

Input Controlled Regimes
Existing Regime
Modified
ITE
Rules
Exiting
20 per
Rules
cent Pot
Reduction
1
1c
2
Jun-30
Jun-30
Aug-31

Scenario Code
End of Season
Price
Differentials

$ -

$ -

Extra Costs ¹
Pot #’s

$ Limited

Pots/Boat

100 per
cent

Limited
Pots/Days
Rush to Fish

No
Yes

Quotas with Pots Controlled
Fixed
TACC

Quota Controlled
Fixed
TACC

Variable TACC

Variable TACC

3a
Aug-31

3b
Aug-31

3c
Aug-31

3d
Aug-31

4a
Aug-31

4b
Aug-31

4c
Aug-31

4d
Aug-31

$2.00/kg

$5.00/kg

$3.50/kg

$2.00/kg

$1.00/kg

$5.50/kg

$2.50/kg

$1.25/kg

$5,000
Limited

$7,200
Limited

$7,200
Limited

$7,200
Limited

$7,200
Limited

$7,200
Limited

$2,200
Flexible

$2,200
Flexible

$2,200
Flexible

100 per
cent

100 per
cent

100 per
cent

100 per
cent

100 per
cent

100 per
cent

120 per
cent

$4.00/k
g
$2,200
Flexibl
e
120 per
cent

120 per
cent

120 per
cent

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No
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Effort Creep

1 per
cent
100 per
cent

2 per cent

1 per cent

0 per cent

110 per
cent

100 per
cent

Preset

Preset

1 per
cent

TACC
Variation
Whites Quota
Reds Quota
Whites Quota
Reds Quota
Whites Quota
Reds Quota

Catchability
Opening Boat
#’s
Boat #’s
Decline pa

Zone
A
Zone B
Zone
C

0 per
cent
115 per
cent

0 per
cent
115 per
cent

0 per cent

115 per
cent

0 per
cent
115 per
cent

Preset

Preset

Preset

Preset

Preset

1.5 per
cent

1 per cent

1 per cent

1 per
cent

1 per
cent

NR

NR

NR

0 per cent

No
No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No

No

50 per
cent ²
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

90 per
cent ³
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
No
No

0 per
cent
140 per
cent

0 per
cent
140 per
cent

0 per
cent
140 per
cent

Flexible

Flexibl
e

Flexible

Flexible

1 per
cent

1 per cent

1 per
cent

1 per
cent

1 per
cent

90 per
cent ³
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

0 per cent

50 per
cent ²
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

90 per
cent ³
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

90 per
cent ³
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

140 per
cent

No
Yes
No
No
No
No

Notes: ¹ Extended season increases firm cost by $7,200; ITQ’s reduces firm cost by $5,000; and pot reduction increases firm cost by $5,000.
² Variable TACC= (50 per cent of ‘predicted’ current year catch for Scenario 1+ 50 per cent of the 10-year average catch for Scenario 1)
³ Variable TACC= (90 per cent of ‘predicted’ current year catch for Scenario 1+ 90 per cent of the 10-year average catch for Scenario 1)
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Attachment 6

Quota and Pot Transfers Under an Effort Controlled ITQ
System
If it were decided to move to ITQs with controls on effort (pot numbers), a clear set of
business rules for quota/pot transfers would be developed with stakeholders.
Transfers of quota and pots (buying, selling, leasing) could initially be done prior to
the season but, as the system evolved, transfers within season could also be
considered. However, there are some complex issues that would have to be carefully
thought through before any system was implemented. The most important would be
to decide in what way quota and pot usage should be linked, as one of the implicit
aims of this system is to maintain control on the level of fishing effort (at least
initially). Some examples of how quota transfers could work under this system are
provided below.
No quota transfers within season
As already mentioned, not allowing quota transfers during season would be a simple
and perhaps first step in implementing an ITQ system with controls on pot numbers.
However, industry would be likely to find such a system restrictive and there would
be fishers with individual circumstances that arose during the season (e.g. health,
accident, death, family, hardship, etc) who would need to be considered.
Transferring quota within season – Example 1
This example does not allow a fisher to use any more pots than he has at the start of
the season. If a fisher wanted extra quota he could purchase it or lease it during the
season and he would use the number of pots on his licence at the start of the season to
catch it. For example if a fisher had 110 pots and he had 6,000 kg of quota left at the
end of March and he purchased or leased an additional 4,000 kg, he would only be
able to use his 110 pots to catch the 10,000kg by the end of the season.
Transferring quota within season – Example 2
In this example, a fisher would be able to use additional pots if he purchased or leased
additional quota. This is a flexible system from the point of view of transferring
quota, but it would be a very complex system to administer. It would be necessary to
evolve the system to this degree of flexibility over a period of time (several years).
Quota transfers
• If a fisher had an initial ITQ for the season of 129.6 kg per unit and he had 110
units, his total ITQ for the season would be 14,256 kg. If he was allowed to
use all his units to fish, he could have 110 pots in the water.
• If he had already caught 8,256 kg (say by the end of March) and he wanted to
transfer some of his quota and he didn’t want to continue fishing, he could
transfer his 110 pots with 6,000 kg of quota attached (14,256kg – 8,256kg =
6,000kg) to another fisher, or if he just wanted to fish less, he could transfer
55 pots with 3,000 kg of quota, leaving 55 pots and 3,000 kg of quota for
himself to fish.
• If he decided he wanted to have additional quota, then using the same example
above, if he had 6,000kg of quota left and he purchased 40 pots with 2,000 kg
of quota attached from another fisher, then his quota for the remainder of the
season (April to end of August) would be 8,000 kg.
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Pot usage
In the example above in which a fisher has purchased an additional 40 pots with
2,000kg of quota to add to the remainder of his quota (110 pots with 6,000 kg of
quota), he would have to fish his quota in the following way:
• he would use 150 pots to catch 4,000 kg of quota;
• and then he would have to revert to using 110 pots to catch his remaining
4,000 kg.
A sophisticated real time register would be needed to keep track of transfers and the
records would have to be immediately available to Department of Fisheries
Compliance Officers.
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No. 2
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No. 4
No. 5
No. 6
No. 7
No. 8
No. 9
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No. 20
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The Offshore Constitutional Settlement, Western Australia 1988.
Commercial fishing licensing in Western Australia. (1989)
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Plan for the Management of the Houtman Abrolhos Fish Habitat Protection
Area (draft). Prepared by the Abrolhos Islands Management Advisory
Committee in conjunction with Fisheries Western Australia (October 1997)
The impact of Occupational Safety and Health on the management of
Western Australian Fisheries. Cameron Wilson (in press)
The Aquaculture of non-endemic species in Western Australia - Silver
Perch (Bidyanus bidyanus). Tina Thorne (June 1997)
Issues affecting Western Australia's inshore crab fishery - Blue swimmer
crab (Portunus pelagicus), Sand crab (Ovalipes australiensis). Cathy
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No. 164 Report of the Mackerel Independent Advisory Panel to the Executive
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No. 171 Draft Aquaculture Plan for Shark Bay (April 2004)
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(December 2003)
No. 175 Fish Stock and Fishery Enhancement in Western Australia - a discussion
paper. By Jane Borg (February 2004)
No. 176 Fish Stock and Fishery Enhancement in Western Australia - a summary
report. By Jane Borg (February 2004)
No. 177 Fisheries Environmental Management Plan for the Gascoyne Region (in
press)
No. 178 Draft Plan of Management for the Kalbarri Blue Holes Fish Habitat
Protection Area (March 2004)
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the recreational component of the catch, prepared by the Southern
Recreational Fishing Working Group (July 2004)
No. 183 Final Report of the Fisheries Statutory Management Authority Advisory
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snapper fishing in Cockburn Sound and surrounding waters. (October
2004).
No. 188 Plan of Management for the Kalbarri Blue Holes Fish Habitat Protection (in
press).
No. 189 Proposed Management Arrangements for the Gascoyne Commercial
‘Wetline’ Fishery. A Discussion Paper Prepared By The West Coast And
Gascoyne Wetline Review Management Planning Panel (January 2005).
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No. 208 Review of the Fish Resources Management Act 1994. A discussion paper
(in press)
No. 209 Assessment of Western Rock Lobster Strategic Management Options
An Overview of Bio-Economic, Sociological and Comparative Analyses
(Volume 1 of 4)
No. 210 Assessment of Western Rock Lobster Strategic Management Options
A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the West Coast
Rock Lobster Fishery
(Volume 2 of 4)
No. 211 Assessment of Western Rock Lobster Strategic Management Options
A Social Assessment of Coastal Communities Hosting the Western Rock
Lobster Fishing Fleet
(Volume 3 of 4)
No. 212 Assessment of Western Rock Lobster Strategic Management Options
How do Quota Management Systems Work in Rock Lobster Fisheries?
(Volume 4 of 4)
129

